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This dissertation explores four events in which Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope 
Benedict XVI) attempts to address the modern and post-modern worlds. I demonstrate 
that his treatments of the relationship between reason and revelation, the Enlightenment’s 
legacy, universal values, identity, and pluralism are engaged with a similar set of 
concepts addressed in the communitarian critique’s initial reaction to the notion of the 
original position advanced in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and the libertarian spirit 
of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I posit that at the heart of this critique, as 
well as in Ratzinger’s works analyzed here, is the concept of liberal entitlement as 
generated from Locke and other social contractors, and that bound up with this are a 
challenge against philosophic obsolescence and the absences of humility and obligation. 
It is through these three themes—humility, obligation, and obsolescence—that 
Ratzinger’s political teaching and his own communitarian thought emerge in his writings. 
Particular attention is paid to the communitarian critique’s discussion of the narrative 
  
method and the importance of identity, as they offer potential solutions for Ratzinger’s 
desire for creating a non-coercive sense of civic obligation through a salient European 
identity and correcting the breakdown of common moral reference points in the West. 
This study ultimately explores where these select works by Ratzinger fit within this 
dialogue, and where they do not, as well as how they are situated within “garden variety” 
communitarianism of political theory and the Catholic Church’s anti-liberal history. In 












HUMILITY, OBLIGATION, AND OBSOLESCENCE: 















Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 










Professor Charles E. Butterworth, Chair 
Professor Mark Graber 
Professor Karol Soltan 
Professor Wayne McIntosh 
























© Copyright by 













I would like to thank the Department of Government & Politics of the University 
of Maryland at College Park for the opportunity to have studied under so many great 
faculty members. A round of thanks is first due to all of the committee members who 
joined me on this dissertation process: Drs. Charles E. Butterworth, Mark Graber, Karol 
Soltan, Wayne McIntosh, and Charles Manekin. A large debt of gratitude is owed to Prof. 
Charles E. Butterworth, my adviser and dissertation committee chair. His support and 
mentorship throughout my graduate career were of the highest standard. Dr. 
Butterworth’s blend of professionalism and humor (when needed) were essential to 
finishing this project. I am greatly indebted to him for his timely feedback and insightful 
comments on early chapter drafts that no doubt directed the development of this work. 
Special thanks are also due to Prof. Mark Graber, who so bluntly offered several “so 
what?” questions to sharpen the focus of this project’s thesis. I would also like to thank 
Prof. Karol Soltan for his role as an understanding and even-handed sounding board as 
this project took shape. Fellow graduate program peer, Greg McBrayer, also deserves 
thanks for his reading and providing input on how I should bring some of the ancients 
into discussion with the communitarian critique. 
Thanks are, of course, also due to friends and family members who have helped 
me out throughout my graduate experience. First and foremost, this work would not have 
been possible without the love and patience of my beloved wife and best friend, Jasmine. 
The completion of this project is an accomplishment that is equally hers as it is mine. The 
same can be said of our two children, who watched their father read, write, and edit while 




my parents, Magreta and David Kuzner, as well as my wife’s, Mia and Edwin Abeya, for 
their support. An acknowledgment is due to my wife’s uncle, the late Bishop Francisco 
Claver, SJ, who provided a firsthand introduction to the concept of inculturation, which 
was a major part of the inspiration for this project. Credit is due to my brother, Prof. 
James Kuzner, a member of Case Western Reserve University’s English faculty, for his 
reading and offering suggestions on my communitarian critique and Habermas chapters. 
Also, a number of friends and former colleagues from my time at CQ Press and beyond 
deserve special acknowledgment for either their general support or editorial tutelage, as I 
pursued an evening career as a graduate student in political science: Tom Colin, Steve 
Pazdan, Lorna Notsch, and, lastly, Doug Goldenberg-Hart, who served as an invaluable 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Dedication ........................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
Joseph Ratzinger Interpreted through the Communitarian Critique ............................... 1 
Selecting and Defining the Communitarian Critique ...................................................... 7 
The Events: Criteria for Inclusion................................................................................... 9 
Approach, Organization, and Synopses ........................................................................ 15 
Impact and Contribution ............................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 2: The Communitarian Baseline: Critiquing the Liberal Self ............................. 22 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 22 
Communitarian Critique Overview ........................................................................... 22 
Reacting to Rawls and Nozick .................................................................................. 25 
Chapter Organization ................................................................................................ 30 
The Basic Arguments .................................................................................................... 30 
MacIntyre: Unity, Narrative, and Moral Disorder .................................................... 30 
Sandel: Reflection, Identity, and Language .............................................................. 32 
Taylor: Primacy of Rights, Potential and Obligations, and Human Insufficiency ... 33 
Walzer: Particularism, Self-Respect, and Distribution of Social Goods .................. 36 
Communitarian Concepts for Dialogue ........................................................................ 37 
Human Nature, Freedom, and Potential .................................................................... 37 
Challenge to Autonomy ............................................................................................ 42 
Primacy of History, Particularism, and Anti-Hypotheticals ..................................... 47 
The Power of Narrative and Language ..................................................................... 49 
Critical Vision of the Enlightenment ........................................................................ 52 
Responsibilities and Obligations............................................................................... 55 
Application of the Six Principles .............................................................................. 57 
Chapter 3: Faith, Reason, and Law in the Habermas Encounter ...................................... 59 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 59 
Humility in Universalism vs. Particularism, First Principles, and Internal 
Deliberation............................................................................................................... 59 
Context of the Encounter .......................................................................................... 63 
Challenges and Chapter Organization ...................................................................... 65 
Fides et Ratio: A Predecessor’s View on Truth, Pluralism, and Inculturation ............. 68 
Ratzinger’s Previous Works on Faith and Reason ........................................................ 72 
Defining Reason in Previous Works ......................................................................... 74 
Defining Faith in Previous Works ............................................................................ 77 
Jürgen Habermas’s Munich Essay: “Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic 
Constitutional State” ..................................................................................................... 80 
Habermas on Catholicism ......................................................................................... 81 
Habermas on Shaping Solidarity .............................................................................. 82 




Joseph Ratzinger’s Munich Essay: “That Which Holds the World Together: The Pre-
Political Moral Foundations of a Free State” ................................................................ 85 
Importance of the Origins of Law ............................................................................. 87 
Terrorism and Religious Fundamentalism: When Reason Becomes Will................ 91 
Ratzinger’s New Rationalism? ................................................................................. 92 
Chapter 4: Social Solidarity, Identity, and the Challenge of Pluralism in the Pera 
Exchange ........................................................................................................................... 96 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 96 
Obligation through Identity and Sacred Common Denominators ............................ 96 
Ratzinger vs. Pera ................................................................................................... 100 
Controlling Cyclical Development ......................................................................... 103 
Chapter Organization and Document Selection ...................................................... 104 
Pera’s Initial Lecture: “Relativism, Christianity, and the West” (May 12, 2004) ...... 106 
Western Paralysis .................................................................................................... 106 
Pera and Meta-Criteria ............................................................................................ 109 
Relativism, Political Malaise, and Democracy ....................................................... 111 
Ratzinger’s Initial Address: “The Spiritual Roots of Europe” (May 13, 2004) .......... 114 
The Sacred .............................................................................................................. 114 
European Shifts and the Modern Era ...................................................................... 115 
Healing Cultural Malaise ........................................................................................ 119 
Reason and Social Solidarity .................................................................................. 120 
Reconciling European Identity with Multiculturalism ........................................... 122 
Pera’s Response to Ratzinger...................................................................................... 125 
Ratzinger’s Response to Pera...................................................................................... 129 
Christian Consensus: America vs. Europe .............................................................. 130 
When Secularists Live with Believers .................................................................... 136 
The Unpersuasive Salesman: Christianity .............................................................. 137 
Rationalism Resurfaced .......................................................................................... 138 
Missing Pieces ........................................................................................................ 140 
Chapter 5: Modernity, Enlightenment, and Familiar Social Glue .................................. 143 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 143 
Recapping the Events: Preparations for Countering Obsolescence ........................ 143 
Chapter Organization and Progression ................................................................... 146 
Crisis of Cultures Address (April 1, 2005) ................................................................. 146 
Reconciliation ......................................................................................................... 146 
A Brief Detour: Defining Culture and Inculturation............................................... 148 
A New Moralism, European Foundations, and Scientific Uniformity ................... 151 
Resuscitating God, Again ....................................................................................... 152 
The Enlightenment: Criticism and a Reinterpretation ............................................ 155 
Ratzinger’s Solution: A New Social Glue—Christianity as Logos ........................ 159 
Regensburg Lecture (September 12, 2006): “Faith, Reason and the University: 
Memories and Reflections” ......................................................................................... 162 
Hellenized Christianity ........................................................................................... 162 
Violence as Irrational Behavior .............................................................................. 166 
God = Logos = Reason [or God as Reason/Logos] ................................................ 169 




Reconnecting with Modernity................................................................................. 174 
Recreational Pragmatism? .......................................................................................... 176 
The Communitarian Connection ................................................................................. 180 
The Poet and the Philosopher: The Narrative Solution .......................................... 180 
Hellenization and Narrative .................................................................................... 183 
Chapter 6: Conclusion..................................................................................................... 186 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 186 
Macro-Theme Assessment: Finding Humility, Obligation, and Obsolescence .......... 187 
Communitarian Diagnosis: Alignments and Deviations............................................. 190 
Liberal-Conservative Communitarianism ............................................................... 190 
MacIntyre: Narrative Discourse, Common Language, and Virtue Development .. 192 
Taylor: Fraternity and Cultivation .......................................................................... 194 
Sandel: Identity Adviser ......................................................................................... 195 
Walzer: The Changing Nature and Definitions of Power and Labor...................... 199 
Comparing Ratzinger with General Communitarianism ............................................ 204 
Garden Variety Anti-Liberalism ............................................................................. 204 
The Common Good through Encyclicals ................................................................ 207 
St. Thomas and the Common Good ........................................................................ 210 
Final Thoughts ........................................................................................................ 213 
Glossary .......................................................................................................................... 219 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
Joseph Ratzinger Interpreted through the Communitarian Critique 
 
Political philosophy aims to move political thought from the base, and often petty, 
realm of opinion to the elusive kingdoms of wisdom and truth. Throughout its history, 
political philosophy has sought to discover a better rationalism to fulfill this 
transcendence, often leaving its predecessors in a cheap obsolescence when one era takes 
on the task of evolving into a new paradigm. The Enlightenment’s break with the 
classical and medieval eras—and later, by way of inspiration, John Rawls’s concept of 
the original position and his ode to deontological liberalism—sought to elevate human 
judgment to an objective and less cruel plateau, yet what resulted was a disposition that 
made the act of judgment easier and, unfortunately, at times arbitrary since the common 
criteria for judgment disappeared. Authors belonging to the communitarian critique1
                                                 
1 The phrase “communitarian critique” can be found in Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. 
Downing’s article, “Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique,” in the American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 3, (Aug. 1987): 637–655. My usage of the 
phrase deviates in two ways: 1) their article covers Alasadair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, 
Michael Walzer, and Benjamin Barber, leaving out Charles Taylor from their research; 
and 2) John Rawls as the communitarian target is included, but Robert Nozick, who 
Walzer is replying to in Spheres of Justice and Taylor addresses in “Atomism,” is absent. 
“Communitarian critique” is preferred since it describes an era of writing, rather than 
application of the term as a label to the writers themselves. Lastly, it should also be noted 
that Walzer himself used the phrase in his article, “The Communitarian Critique of 
Liberalism,” in Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb. 1990): 6–23. He mentions Sandel 
and MacIntyre in his article, but not Taylor. 
 of 
Rawls argue that the original position he posits underestimates the value of identity and 
social attachments and neglects to understand the importance of such criteria as common 




decisions in accordance with a set of principles of justice. Some religious-minded 
thinkers outside of the field of political philosophy believe that scripture can provide 
these criteria; however, interpretations can vary and have the potential to lead to a 
religious fundamentalism that even the faithful find questionable. Joseph Ratzinger (now 
Pope Benedict XVI) offers a unique Roman Catholic perspective on this issue since his 
academic career and administrative positions within the Church straddled both the 
religious and political worlds, revealing an author working to reconcile many of the same 
topics at the core of the communitarian critique, such as the limits of self-autonomy, the 
Enlightenment’s role in moral breakdown, civic obligations, the primacy of history, 
humility, and the power of narrative and language as these topics relate to identity and 
how to persuade citizens to act on non-binding obligations without coercive measures. 
These themes take form in Ratzinger’s writing as: the Enlightenment and ensuing modern 
rationalism that led to relativism; how the Church ought to handle pluralism in relation to 
narrative identity and social solidarity; a civilization’s sense of the sacred to discover 
generational connections and to navigate the timeless issue of universalism versus 
particularism; inculturation and Hellenized Christianity; and the reconciliation of faith 
and reason, which brings to light internal deliberation and the origins of first principles. 
The communitarian critique in political philosophy is a window into a time in the 
late twentieth century that represents an initial response to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice 
(1971) as well as the libertarian spirit of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(1974). This was not only a critical moment for the field of political theory, but also for 
the challenges of a rapidly globalizing and highly pluralistic world. Four representative 




(1982), Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983), Charles Taylor’s “Atomism” essay 
(1979), and Alasadair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981). In this research project, I argue 
that some of the seasoned writings of Ratzinger can be viewed within this same reaction 
to Rawls’s Theory and Nozick’s Anarchy. The social thought of the Roman Catholic 
Church finds a welcome home in communitarianism due to the Church’s emphasis on the 
need to balance human rights with responsibilities and obligations, as well as the 
institution’s long tradition of anti-liberal sentiments and promotion of the common good. 
Communitarian theory is to a degree anti-liberal theory, so the pairing of Ratzinger is not 
a stretch if it can be found that his reasons—and one would expect they comport with the 
Church’s general anti-liberal output as much as it is possible considering that the 
institution has changed over time—are the same as those in the communitarian critique. 
At the very least, he is in dialogue with the same set of concepts as these political 
theorists. 
Three issues reside within this critique of liberal entitlement2
                                                 
2 By “liberal entitlement,” I am referring to Locke’s notion in his Second Treatise on 
Government whereby individuals acquire property from nature by mixing their labor with 
unclaimed objects. These objects are rightfully theirs until they amass an amount of 
objects at which point spoiling would occur, in which case the objects must be exchanged 
for currency or something else that does not spoil. This right transfers from the state of 
nature to the political state, which considers property rights as an essential protection and 
critical underpinning of political formation. From there, protection of property extends to 
one’s personhood and will (Book II, chapter V: Of Property). 
 and are quite 
pronounced in the political teachings of Ratzinger: the absence of humility and obligation 
and a challenge to philosophical obsolescence brought on by the Enlightenment. While 
Ratzinger does not position himself as an adversary to the universal principles and 
standards of modern political theory, liberal entitlement is a force the Church counters 




What followed the Enlightenment was a culture of refutation that led to a tendency to 
render ideas of previous generations obsolete as a particular paradigm was promoted to 
the dominant and intellectually accepted way of thinking. Thomas Kuhn famously 
described this as the “transformations of paradigms” and the “usual development pattern 
of mature science” (1996, 12). This approach creates a great, humbling irony, for while 
scientific revolutions boast of discovering scientific laws, the discoverers of these laws 
must accept a degree of uncertainty since the laws can be easily discarded at the next 
paradigm transformation. 
However, unlike in the hard sciences, when the discipline of philosophy severs 
ties with the cultural and intellectual heritage of previous generations, the aspect of 
humility is lost. The social definitions and philosophical underpinnings of any society do 
not simply disappear, nor can they be ignored by rational actors as these actors attempt to 
purify their judgments and decisions. The communitarian critique challenged this loss of 
a sense of humility and the idea of obsolescing one’s past via the authority of 
autonomous reason in the perceived neutral original position put forth by Rawls and in 
the modern individual who reinvents him/herself free of consideration of communal 
identities and obligations. 
Ratzinger’s own challenges to the loss of humility and Rawls’s views are seen in 
his insistence that Europeans cannot ignore the sacred values, mores, and customs that 
are the foundation of any civilization. Specifically, he calls attention to the Christian 
origins of the Enlightenment and the necessity of supplementing biblical interpretation 
with an understanding of the Bible’s Greek and other classical influences. The theme of 




his faith’s relationship with reason, and, in doing so, reveals the ongoing renewal and 
perfectible aspects of faith. For Ratzinger, faith takes on a similar characteristic of virtue 
and character development discussed in part of the communitarian critique3
Obligation in Ratzinger’s works is achieved through a communal narrative that 
reinforces historical social attachments by way of a group identity, and his construction 
of a European narrative produces a form of communitarianism quite similar to that found 
in MacIntyre’s After Virtue. Taylor’s communitarian thought in “Atomism” is germane to 
Ratzinger with regards to virtue development, which recognizes the insufficiency of 
human nature and a need to improve this natural state, as well as the importance of a 
binding multigenerational reach which resembles Ratzinger’s own grasp for Hellenized 
Christianity and his idea that every culture ought to preserve its sense of the sacred. 
Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice and Walzer’s Spheres of Justice are less in 
alignment with Ratzinger than MacIntyre and Taylor, but are engaged with the topics of 
identity and social definition that Ratzinger’s works wrestle with and his papacy as 
Benedict XVI is certainly facing. Sandel has a lot to say about competing identities that 
Ratzinger could benefit from when addressing the European cultural crisis, and Walzer’s 
system of distributive justice would be quite applicable to the Church’s writings on 
, which sees 
human nature as perennially in need of fulfilling its potential. And while perfection can 
never be achieved, when humanity falls off this course of at least attempting to fulfill its 
potential, moral disorder spreads. 
                                                 
3 Specifically, this is in reference to MacIntyre and Taylor, though Walzer can also be 
included for his educational discussion on self-respect as a way to curb an insecure 




subsidiarity, labor rights, and distributivism, which all speak to human rights and liberal 
entitlement.  
Overall, Ratzinger’s communitarianism is more nuanced than both the Church’s 
anti-liberal history and general communitarian political theory, which produces a 
platform of desired policy outcomes that contain some common spirit of balancing the 
needs of the individual with those of the group and advocating a sense of responsibility 
among a constituency with identifiable common ends. His communitarianism integrates 
more history and philosophy than both of these general forms, and while the 
communitarian critique certainly contains an unfavorable view of the Enlightenment—
even as Ratzinger takes his own issue with the era—he attempts to reconcile the 
Enlightenment with the Church, which is a cue from Vatican II’s project to engage the 
modern world. Yet Ratzinger’s philosophy differs from previous Catholic social thought 
produced in encyclical letters in that these letters are largely about how the common good 
is applied. He explains why it is applied and how to encourage its application from a 
socio-philosophic perspective that resembles St. Thomas’s idea that moral obligation 
binds humans to law, and that this cannot be done through force but only by attachment 
to a conscience that recognizes the common good. The three prominent features of 
Ratzinger’s communitarianism—humility, obligation, and obsolescence—are part of an 
effort to solidify this binding. 
The Church, like many predecessors of modernity, must find a way to rid itself of 
society’s perception that it is an anachronistic institution destined for obsolescence. 
Ratzinger takes up this idea through a contention that Christianity is part of the 




anchored in a society. In addition, humility helps maintain a healthy equilibrium in public 
debates, as it serves as a buffer to any ideology or theology that becomes excessively 
autonomous of any refutation or challenge. Finally, obligation and civility are established 
through a binding narrative of the deepest beliefs, language, and customs of one’s 
cultural and philosophic heritages. 
 
Selecting and Defining the Communitarian Critique 
 
Communitarianism is isolated to this period of time and these four particular 
works since they represent a strong sampling of initial reactions to Rawls or Nozick. That 
is to say, I do not attempt to place Ratzinger’s works within, say, all of Taylor’s catalog, 
for some points Taylor makes take on new meanings later in his career, or his works 
make other contributions to communitarian themes beyond those noted in this study. For 
example, Taylor discusses narrative and identity in Sources of the Self (1989), when he 
uses the phrase “transcendental condition of interlocution,” which speaks to “having a 
grasp on our own language, that we in some fashion confront it or relate it to the language 
of others.”4
                                                 
4 See pp. 38–39 in the chapter, “The Self in Moral Space” of Part I: Identity and the Good 
in Taylor’s Sources of the Self. 
 In this study, narrative is primarily associated with MacIntyre. Even Rawls, 
the author whom the communitarian critique is primarily responding to, alters and 
evolves his arguments from A Theory of Justice in subsequent works such as “Justice as 
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” (1985) and Political Liberalism (1993). Such is the 





collective dialogues among peers occur within the discipline. What Ratzinger adds to this 
discussion is a tangible example of an institutional administrator wrangling with the 
issues that the communitarian critique is attempting to pull down from Rawlsian 
abstractness into a materialized, possibly implementable political landscape. Lastly, from 
a practical standpoint, it would become quite cumbersome to disentangle which Rawls 
the authors are responding to. The initial reaction offers a “pure” first response of 
developed communitarian works. Describing this—the communitarian critique—as a 
reaction and event also eliminates the difficulties that arise in labeling these four authors 
as communitarians.5
 It may seem a bold contention to label Ratzinger a communitarian, yet they are 
generally understood to be members of a paradigm who seek to balance the rights and 
responsibilities of the individual with the needs of the group—the common good—a 
theme found throughout the Church’s history. What I hope to demonstrate is that 
Ratzinger’s deepest and most developed political thoughts can be understood within this 
important period of writing in contemporary political philosophy. In doing so, I 
 
                                                 
5 For example, MacIntyre has been quoted as saying, “In spite of rumors to the contrary, I 
am not and never have been a communitarian” (Bell 2010), while Sandel has reflected on 
the liberal-communitarian debates of the 1980s with an outsider’s tone. Specifically, he 
called the term communitarian “misleading” since it implied that rights were dependent 
on the “values or preferences that prevail in any given community at any given time” 
(2005, 212–213). Similarly, Taylor once expressed he was “unhappy with the term 
‘communitarianism’” since it seemed to be a construction of liberalism’s critics looking 
for an “all-embracing principle, which would in some equal and opposite way exalt the 
life of the community over everything” (1994, 250). However, it should be noted that 
Taylor contributed a number of articles to the communitarian journal, The Responsive 
Community (see Vol. 3, Issue 4, Fall 1993; Vol. 6, Issue 3, Summer 1996; Vol. 13, Issue 
4, Fall 2003; and Vol. 14, Issue 1, Winter 2003/2004). Walzer, who uses the phrase 
“communitarian critique,” describes it as part of a correction to liberalism’s “self-
subverting doctrine” but stops short when this phrase begins to suggest that liberalism is 




ultimately explore where these select works by Ratzinger fit within this dialogue and 
where they do not, how they are situated within “garden variety” communitarianism of 
political theory and the Catholic Church’s anti-liberal history, as well as how they 
contribute to Ratzinger’s own communitarian political thought. 
 
The Events: Criteria for Inclusion 
 
Before explaining how the events covered in this dissertation were selected, it 
should first be noted why Ratzinger himself was chosen as the research subject. Ratzinger 
has penetrated and shaped Catholic political and philosophical thought, education, and 
far-reaching policies of the Church. One individual alone does not represent an institution 
with centuries of philosophic and institutional development, but his influence within this 
window of four key events is part of what this study attempts to address, at least from a 
cultural-political standpoint. He was not merely a powerful executor of a large institution 
in either his capacity as a cardinal or now as pope, but also a writer mindful to discuss 
Western philosophy and how it impacted European history, reason, and the evolution of 
the Church. Ratzinger is a unique combination of an authority figure within the Church 
and an intellectual as a private theologian and university academic. He earned his 
doctorate in theology from the University of Munich in 1953.6
                                                 
6 Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican’s Enforcer of the Faith, 34. 
 He then spent eighteen 
years in various teaching positions across four universities in Germany through 
successive appointments: University of Bonn (1959–1963), University of Münster (1963–




1977).7 Before becoming an authority figure, Ratzinger was a force in the Second 
Vatican Council. Present for all four sessions of the Council (1962–1965), he served as a 
theological expert, a peritas, for Cardinal Joseph Frings (Cologne, Germany), who was 
an influential cardinal at that time and represented one of the wealthiest archdioceses in 
Europe. During Vatican II, Ratzinger composed draft documents, organized coalitions, 
and prepared bishops for floor debates.8 He is also noted as influencing Dei Verbum (On 
the Word of God) and contributing to Lumen Gentium (the Dogmatic Constitution on the 
Church) at Vatican II.9 He was made a bishop and cardinal by Paul VI in 1977 and was 
appointed Prefect for the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) by John 
Paul II in 1981. This position in the CDF is regarded by some as the second most 
significant within the Catholic Church after that of the pope.10
                                                 
7 Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI 24; and Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The 
Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, 1. 
 He is also responsible for 
the new Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992). All of these experiences signify 
exposure to, and influence upon, Church policy that Ratzinger would be aware of; 
however, it is important to distinguish between the documents produced under his 
authority. For example, documents produced for the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith deserve different attention than those that take the form of lectures, addresses, 
interviews, and correspondence when he was acting as a private theologian. One also 
must acknowledge which hat Ratzinger is wearing when speaking or writing, though they 
should be consistent if he’s in alignment with the larger vision of the Church. Documents 
produced in a capacity of authority would likely have additional scrutiny and possible 
8 Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican’s Enforcer of the Faith, 46. 
9 Ibid, 56. 




collaborators, which is why I have deferred to works that would most likely be 
Ratzinger’s private thoughts and why this study looks at works produced by Ratzinger 
himself. 
Thematically, the basic criteria for inclusion in this study are works that contain 
issues of importance to a political theorist studying liberal democracy concerned with 
fundamental topics within the field of political philosophy, namely, objective-subjective 
distinctions, autonomy, and the common good. These represent high-level categories that 
the communitarian critique’s themes are either subsets within or the parent category of 
(i.e., autonomy). The events selected were all produced in the more recent portion of 
Ratzinger’s career and address challenges of the post-classical world: an encounter with 
Jürgen Habermas (2004), an exchange with Italian Senate president Marcello Pera 
(2004), Ratzinger’s “Crisis of Cultures” address (2005), and his Regensburg Lecture 
(formally known as “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections”) 
(2006).11
                                                 
11 While two of Benedict XVI’s first three encyclical letters, namely, Deus Caritas Est 
(2005) and Caritas in Veritate (2009), certainly contain messages that would have been 
of interest to this study, it is difficult to determine to what extent other Vatican hands 
might have helped to shape these documents. They are nonetheless further evidence of 
communitarian themes in the Church climate that I refer to anecdotally. 
 The first three events occurred prior to his papacy; the Regensburg Lecture is 
the only work delivered during his time as pope. Some of the events are supplemented 
with insights derived from some of his previous works to illuminate some of their key 
terms. Particularly, I often draw on three in-depth, monograph-length interviews 
Ratzinger gave prior to his papacy: The Ratzinger Report (1985), Salt of the Earth 
(1996), and God and the World (2000). The task of bringing to light in detail everything 




project. Still, those most germane are used to inform some of the events analyzed in this 
project. Ratzinger repeats many of his positions throughout his career; however, some are 
presented in more complex and developed works than others—these are the focus of this 
study. 
The Habermas encounter connects Ratzinger to a prominent contemporary 
theorist in a discussion in which each lays out the limits and role of religion in a secular 
society. In the end, both an atheist and a believer come to agreement on the limits society 
must place upon both the traditions of Enlightenment and religious doctrines—just as 
unchecked religious orthodoxy presents a danger to society, so does reason without 
religious foundations. This event serves as a core piece to convey Ratzinger’s 
rationalism, which guides his thought through the other works. 
The Marcello Pera exchange was selected because Pera is both a professor and a 
notable public official in the Italian Senate who served as its president from 2001 to 
2006. The exchange touches on the role of God in public and private life, civil religion, 
and Pera’s own critique of relativism as a poison in the West. The exchange began 
several months after the Habermas encounter, with Ratzinger delivering a lecture in the 
Capital Room of the Italian Senate that covered a range of issues related to European 
identity, including the West’s abandonment of its spiritual roots, the challenges and 
values of multiculturalism, and cyclical theories on the rise and fall of civilizations. In 
short, the lecture sought to recover a social glue that once bound Europe together, which 
Ratzinger diagnosed as a respect for the sacred. Many of the sentiments in Ratzinger’s 
lecture ironically mirrored those delivered a day earlier by Italian secular philosopher and 




observers drew a connection between the two. Through independent premises, both 
lecturers linked the erosion of universal values in Europe to the rise of relativism in the 
West. When the similarities of the lectures were brought to the respective authors’ 
attention, it led to an exchange in which the two thinkers responded to one another and 
further delineated their respective approaches to civil religion, multiculturalism, and 
national identity. 
The “Crisis of Cultures” address provides an account of Ratzinger’s interpretation 
of the Enlightenment and Kant, as well as Ratzinger’s understanding of Christianity as 
the religion of reason. This event occurred more than a year after the Habermas 
encounter, and it is another attempt to resolve the tension between faith and reason and 
faith’s relationship to Europe’s cultural identity crisis. Here, Ratzinger describes 
Christianity as the religion of Logos, a faith he believes to be deeply influential in the 
origins of the Enlightenment. While highly critical of the legacy of the Enlightenment in 
this address, he stops short of rejecting it and the entire modern project of philosophy 
altogether. Instead, he co-opts the Enlightenment by attributing its underpinnings to 
Christianity, which acts as an attempt to help re-establish a Christian European identity 
when taken in combination with the Pera exchange. In doing so, Ratzinger has left 
himself in a very curious position—if Christianity is to be the religion of reason, how 
does this help to remove the political relativism of which Ratzinger and other Church 
figures are so critical? 
Ratzinger answers this question in the Regensburg Lecture by explaining the 
meaning of reason through the prologue of John’s Gospel in the Bible, using this text to 




Genesis’s beginning there was Logos and Logos is God.12
In all of these events, Ratzinger is reacting to the legacy of modernism and is 
looking for a way to reformulate the Church’s approach to current issues unforeseen in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as Europe’s identity and cultural crises, the 
limits of liberty, and the need to balance the extremes of faith and reason. 
 In explaining the importance 
of the Greek influence in scripture, Ratzinger tacitly puts forth a social glue for holding 
the West together, particularly its Christian population. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the mainstream reaction to a study of 
Ratzinger’s political thought would almost certainly stimulate an expectation that the 
Church’s pro-life position be a subject of discussion in this research project. It was with 
great hesitation that I included mention of the passages in Ratzinger’s works in which 
abortion is presented as an example of the human condition to dominate nature and the 
dangers of modern science. Such passages are indeed present in some of these works, 
though they are not the focal point. The topic of abortion has been manipulated by both 
pro-lifers and the pro-choice movement to no productive end to date. At the heart of this 
debate is the concept of autonomy interpreted through liberal entitlement, which both 
sides endorse, and often without self-awareness of this fact. While there are obvious 
political implications for the Church’s pro-life position in Ratzinger’s work, they are 
tangential in their relation to freedom in democratic society, and these issues are only 
raised within the context of the autonomous self. This study remains more fixed on the 
ideologies that guide the establishment and organization of democratic institutions, 
making any position in the pro-life movement a secondary issue in my work here. 
                                                 
12 Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and 




Approach, Organization, and Synopses 
 
The chapters that focus on the four events of Ratzinger are organized 
chronologically. This organizing principle does not infer progressive development in 
Ratzinger’s political thought. Rather, there are core topics throughout the works 
presented here that are slightly more developed or insightful than the previous treatment 
of each event as discussed in the previous chapter. This development is by selection and 
coincidence, though it seems fitting since there could be institutional constraints imposed 
upon the professional context in which Ratzinger is writing. Organizing the events this 
way allows one to investigate whether shifts occur, as we see works prior to his papacy 
(Pera and Habermas exchanges) immediately before his elevation, which would be at a 
time of assessing career aspirations (Crisis); and following his rise to head of the Roman 
Catholic Church (Regensburg). There is a generally consistent body of work throughout 
these events that is at odds with modern liberalism, though the European cultural crisis 
(or even simpler—the issue of pluralism) is an evolving dialogue throughout. 
 The goal of this introduction, chapter 1, is to set the groundwork for why the field 
of political philosophy should be interested in the writings of Joseph Ratzinger and to 
clarify the organization of this project. Chapter 2, “The Communitarian Baseline: 
Critiquing the Liberal Self,” sets up how a “communitarian critique” standard will be 
constructed to measure the four events that follow. This sets the primer to understanding 
how Ratzinger’s treatments of reason and revelation, the Enlightenment, universal values, 
identity, and pluralism are engaged with the same set of concepts addressed in the 
communitarian critique. This chapter looks at the reaction to the original position in 




and Utopia, as contained in the works of the following authors often associated with the 
communitarian critique: Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Walzer’s Spheres 
of Justice, Taylor’s “Atomism,” and MacIntyre’s After Virtue. To do justice to the 
arguments of the authors linked to communitarian political theory, this chapter presents 
the general thesis of their works, as well as a discussion of central themes that connect 
them. In the chapters that follow, which discuss Ratzinger’s works, the themes collected 
in the communitarian critique develop into his own three-part communitarianism: 
humility, obligation, and obsolescence.  
Chapter 3, “Faith, Reason, and Law in the Habermas Encounter,” looks at a 2004 
exchange between Ratzinger and political theorist Jürgen Habermas that primarily 
addressed the relationship between revelation and reason, the tension at the center of 
modernity’s break with the theological roots of its philosophic past, and any genuine 
legacy dependencies that may need to be revived. The tension between faith and reason is 
one front on which two seemingly incompatible views collide in a pluralistic world and 
the relevance of revelation and religion in modern and contemporary civilizations is often 
debated. In this chapter, this takes the form of objective-subjective distinctions, the 
inevitable relationship between faith and reason, and the subject at the heart of all of 
these tensions—first principles. This tension is demonstrated as commensurate with the 
issue at the core of the rationalist debate of the communitarian critique: universalism 
versus particularism. It also brings to light rationalist insufficiency and what role humility 
plays, as each side in the faith-reason debate must release itself from complete autonomy. 
To understand the theological backdrop of Ratzinger’s view on faith and reason, this 




Reason), and the definitions of two key terms used in Ratzinger’s Munich essay as used 
in his previous writings—faith and reason—before then moving on to the encounter with 
Habermas. 
Chapter 4, “Social Solidarity, Identity, and the Challenge of Pluralism in the Pera 
Exchange” analyzes a 2004 exchange between Ratzinger and then president of the Italian 
Senate Marcello Pera. The exchange is a dialogue on the challenge that competing 
identities pose for the respect of accepted virtues, customs, and mores, which Ratzinger 
describes in this event as a sense of the sacred. His exchange with Pera picks up the 
discussion of reason and how the Enlightenment and modern rationalism contributed to 
the proliferation of contemporary relativism and a decaying European identity via the 
dilution or obsolescence of the sacred. The communitarian critique’s focus on the 
individual decision-making process in the perceived neutral original position highlights 
several core oversights of Rawls that are germane to Ratzinger’s dialogue with Pera. This 
includes such concepts from the communitarian critique as broken moral language, the 
varying value of social goods such as identity, the acceptance of communal obligations, 
and the recurring criticism of autonomy, which in the Pera exchange can be understood 
as the catalyst of philosophic plurality. 
 With this need for a strong cultural identity established, chapter 5, “Modernity, 
Enlightenment, and Familiar Social Glue,” then examines Ratzinger’s 2005 Crisis of 
Cultures address and the 2006 Regensburg Lecture to determine which story should 
fulfill the sense of a sacred and serve as a communal narrative in the West to create a 
sense of civic obligation. In my analysis of this chapter, I conclude that Ratzinger’s final 




begin with ancient Greek civilization, continue into early Christianity, and struggle to 
survive in the Enlightenment—an era he believes is in need of great redefinition. Since 
each chapter serves as a building block up to this point, this section of the chapter 
includes some analysis, but does not mark the end of this study. This section’s analysis 
returns to the previous events—the Habermas encounter and Pera exchange—to explain 
why there is pressure to reverse the de-Hellenization of Christianity at large, or at least 
reinforce why the Catholic Church has taken a position that places the Bible within an 
academic system of supplementary literature and history. This proposed system uses 
instruments of common language to help counter a European cultural crisis, especially if 
Ratzinger is serious about Hellenized Christianity. The narrative approach from the 
communitarian critique also comes into play here since it contributes to group and 
individual productivity via a sense of obligation that fosters an environment suitable for 
fulfilling human potentials. 
My conclusion, chapter 6, compares Ratzinger to the communitarian critique at 
both a macro-level theme assessment to show how the main themes of that critique are 
developed in Ratzinger’s works as humility, obligation, and obsolescence, as well as at a 
one-on-one comparison with each of the four political theorists. This chapter also reviews 
the Catholic Church’s anti-liberal and anti-modern outputs over the past hundred and fifty 
years and the influence of St. Thomas on the Church’s long-standing promotion of the 
common good to identify some potential explanatory factors in the intellectual climate of 
the Church that make Ratzinger’s placement within the dialogue of the communitarian 
critique of Rawls and Nozick a logical designation. This final chapter also explores 




the Church’s anti-liberal output but also from other forms of garden variety 
communitarianism in political theory. 
I ultimately conclude that MacIntyre and Taylor are most similar to Ratzinger, 
particularly in their notions of the improvability of human nature and the existence of 
obligations; while Sandel is a voice that Ratzinger would be well served to listen to with 
regard to how the Church can compete in a marketplace of ideas and beliefs, and 
Walzer’s discussion of changing definitions of social identity and membership present a 
worst-case scenario for the uphill journey Ratzinger has in re-crafting a Western identity 
that will reject relativism and extreme individualism in a way that is not seen as 
antiquated. I also find that Walzer’s system of distributive justice could easily be 
discussed in conjunction with the Church’s social doctrine on economics and labor, 
particularly as it relates to how the definition of power changes over time and the 
Church’s adjustments to account for this. 
 
Impact and Contribution 
 
When this research project began, I sought to demonstrate that Ratzinger was a 
political thinker engaged with resolving some of the central issues that contemporary 
political theory wrestles with. However, something more nuanced was revealed after 
researching his writings—he seemed to be sorting through the same topics as late 
twentieth–century communitarians and liberals from a theological perspective, and his 
understanding of political philosophy was well demonstrated. With any new pope, there 
are predictions of whether he will be drawn to either the Thomistic or Augustinian poles 




marginalizes the issues each pope will have to confront during his papacy. It also leaves 
their relevance and standing in regard to modernism and the post-modern world curiously 
absent. 
My hope is that this research project will contribute to the field of political 
philosophy in several ways, all of which are related to the communitarian critique. First, 
the topic of liberal entitlement and its effects on identity are still open for discussion; in 
Ratzinger we see a Western example of this discussion represented by a theologian, and 
later a state executor, working through the challenges of pluralism and identity. Second, 
this project’s examination of Ratzinger’s attempts to re-bridge a gap between philosophy 
and religion offers a discussion of whether one can mend the connection once severed by 
the Enlightenment movement. Third, as this research project dusts off the communitarian 
critique, three crucial themes are revealed, which are also at the core of Ratzinger’s own 
communitarianism: humility, obligation, and obsolescence. These lost concepts are of 
timely significance given the recent collapse of global financial markets. If one interprets 
the Great Recession as a demonstration of the limits of economic liberalism, it should 
stimulate discussions on the role and reach of government, or how to install properly 
conditioned citizens to govern a just government regardless of that government’s 
structure. While further restrictions on individual freedoms would be an act of dialing 
back political progression, one ought to consider what might be done to tame the 
libertarian spirit as it is bound up in both collective narratives and identity and fosters an 
intellectual climate unwelcoming to humility, obligation, connections to previous 
generations and their culture, and, ultimately, charity. While this moves the discussion 




concepts of narrative, identity, and social glue are what create a sense of obligation and 
solidarity to account for the interests of all and not simply when they have fallen on hard 
times. Prevention of catastrophes is at issue. 
As Pope Benedict XVI, Ratzinger describes charity in his third encyclical letter, 
Caritas in Veritate (2009), as the heart of Catholic social doctrine and an act that “goes 
beyond justice.” Further, it “demands justice: recognition and respect for the legitimate 
rights of individuals and peoples” (no. 2). These statements should not be confused with 
state socialism; rather, they represent a human condition that is compelled to keep the 
interests of the common good in focus. This also means there will be fringes and edges of 
law and distribution where one will have to look to a higher law. In Benedict’s first 
encyclical, Deus Caritas (2005), he reminds us that: “Instead of contributing through 
individual works of charity to maintaining the status quo, we need to build a just social 
order in which all receive their share of the world’s goods and no longer have to depend 
on charity” (no. 26). In the communitarian critique, claims of charity and economic 
justice are certainly squarely aimed at Nozick, since Rawls is better understood as a 
welfare-state liberal, though their principle driver is the same—liberal entitlement as 
produced and evolved from modernity. While Ratzinger is focused on a cultural and 
moral crisis, this liberal entitlement has important implications for other crises, including 
economic ones which one can say were driven by human failure to see the importance of 
societal and generational bonds. As autonomous individuals reinvent themselves as 
simply they alone choose and dispose of the possibility of human insufficiency, there 
exists a potential to forgo the connection that exists between identity and accountability, 








Communitarian Critique Overview 
The communitarian critique in political philosophy is largely considered a period 
of writing in the late twentieth century that embodies a response to the transcendental 
liberal self constructed in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) as well as the 
libertarian spirit of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), which was itself 
a critical reaction to Rawls, albeit one that challenged Rawls’s system of distributive 
justice. While these two writers represent considerably different, and one might even 
argue incompatible views—Rawls, a welfare state liberal, and Nozick, a minimalist–state 
libertarian—both ground their works with the philosophical underpinning of a liberal 
entitlement that elevates the primacy of individual rights over communal considerations. 
This chapter looks at significant writings from four authors who represent an initial 
reaction to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and, somewhat tangentially, Nozick’s Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia.13
                                                 
13 Michael Sandel primarily takes on Rawls almost line by line in Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice (1982), though he does bring Nozick into this discussion. Michael 
Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983) was the result of co-teaching a course with Robert 
Nozick, though great tribute is paid to Rawls in the Acknowledgments of this work for 
providing the philosophical backdrop in which Walzer was writing. Charles Taylor’s 
essay “Atomism” is directed at Nozick, though the concepts can also be applied to the 
general communitarian spirit attacks on Rawls taking place at this time. Lastly, Alasadair 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) often pairs the incompatible positions of Rawls and 
Nozick as representatives of contemporary philosophy lacking conceptions of classical 
virtue. 
 Included are Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 




(1979), and Alasadair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981).14
Six themes emerge in the writings of Sandel, Walzer, Taylor, and MacIntyre, 
many of which are intertwined: 1) the insufficiency of human nature; 2) the 
Enlightenment and its legacy as an origin of moral rot; 3) a challenge to individual 
autonomy; 4) responsibilities and obligations; 5) the primacy of history, particularism, 
and anti-hypotheticals; and 6) the power of narrative and language. 
 These four communitarian 
political theorists are broadly addressing how polities enter a negotiation with the 
autonomous individual of liberal society while still preserving a concept of the common 
good. How can autonomy, or at least its illusion, be preserved while maintaining a non-
coercive social order that does not lead to the neglect of one’s fellow humans because of 
liberal entitlement? One solution derived from this span of communitarian literature leads 
to the power of narrative, to language, and to the conditional identities that show 
responsibilities and obligations are just as important as rights. 
These themes are also common to other studies15
                                                 
14 Citations to the texts of political theorists are abbreviated as follows: 
 on communitarian thinkers of 
this era, although this research project’s analysis of them differs greatly in that more 
AV: After Virtue (MacIntyre); ASU: Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick); LLJ: 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Sandel); and SOJ: Sphere of Justice (Walzer). 
 
15 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift’s Liberals & Communitarians (1996) presents five 
agendas, or themes, in the communitarian response to Rawls: 1) the “antecedently 
individuated or unencumbered” conception of a person; 2) asocial individualism and the 
relationship of individuals to their community, particularly the extent to which societies 
shape identities and values and communal conceptions of the good; 3) a universalism that 
is too broad, undercutting the importance of culture specificity; 4) subjectivism vs. 
objectivism and the idea that “that individual’s choice of ends, values, and conceptions of 
the good are arbitrary expressions of preference, essentially incapable of rational 
justification”; and 5) anti-perfectionism and neutrality (158–160). David Morrice’s 
article, “The Liberal-Communitarian Debate in Contemporary Political Philosophy and 




emphasis is placed upon narrative and language and how they help create a sense of 
obligation among citizens, as well as criticism of the philosophic amnesia caused by the 
Enlightenment, since for Ratzinger these offer potential solutions to his own 
communitarian challenges. This chapter also focuses on only the initial communitarian 
reaction to Rawls and not clarifications made by Rawls in later works.16
                                                                                                                                                 
communitarians as emanating from three common claims: the social nature of humans, 
“normative claims about the value of community,” and “meta-ethical claims about the 
status and justification of political principles as shared values of the community” (235). 
In a similar condensed approach, Daniel Bell’s “Communitarianism” (2009) entry in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy uses three broad categories to explain 
communitarianism in the late twentieth century: 1) the importance of cultural 
considerations, seen as the debate of “Universalism Versus Particularism” that counters 
the universalist claims of liberalism and illuminates the impact culture has on 
constructing rights; 2) Rawls’s “overly individualistic conception of the self,” which Bell 
puts under the category of “The Debate Over the Self;” and 3) “The Politics of 
Community,” which turns to the communitarians of the 1990s—such as Amitai 
Etizioni—who promoted policies that sought to balance between rights and 
responsibilities in liberal society and relieve the atomistic, self-directed, and lonely 
characteristics of citizens. 
 In succeeding 
chapters, parallels are demonstrated between the six themes mentioned above and 
Ratzinger’s concerns regarding how to reconcile the Church with the modern and post-
modern worlds. In his literature, these communitarian themes are seen in his discussions 
of identity, universalism versus particularism, objective-subjective distinctions, the 
Hellenized Christian narrative, reconciliation of the Enlightenment and modernity, 
extreme individualism, and the challenges of pluralism. Ultimately, these topics coalesce 
into Ratzinger’s own communitarian political theory, with the distinctive themes of 
humility, obligation, and a challenge to philosophic obsolescence brought on by the 
Enlightenment and its successors. Humility surfaces in the communitarian topics of the 
16 For example, those that further refined the precepts of A Theory of Justice contained in 
the article, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” from Philosophy & Public 




insufficiency of human nature and the challenge of autonomy. Obligation is a theme 
itself, but it also absorbs the discussions of narrative method and power of language as 
means for fostering a sense of obligation. The counter to obsolescence is seen in criticism 
of the Enlightenment and its successors and the importance of history and particularism 
in achieving a social solidarity.  
 
Reacting to Rawls and Nozick 
Much of the criticism directed at Rawls challenges the hypothetical self in the 
“original position” that resides behind, and is sustained by, the “veil of ignorance.” This 
original position is an impartial and ahistorical condition that Rawls believes will help 
achieve a state of clear deliberation in which individuals discover objective, timeless 
principles of justice. The veil of ignorance facilitates and enhances this state, as all 
impediments to objective observation are dropped: “no one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” (ATJ, 12). Beyond the 
immediate situation under evaluation in the original position, Rawls hopes this condition 
will create a point of clarity that transcends even generational differences (ATJ, 137). 
This transcendence infers universalism, and communitarians take issue with this, as this 
objection is represented by the number of particularist approaches that question both the 
practicality and value of the Rawlsian original position. Impractical, because this state of 
clarity is simply unattainable; valueless, because the omission of historical and cultural 
details removes the meanings and considerations needed for understanding the 




Communitarians contend that Rawls asks too much of the hypothetical individual, 
for his narrow portrait of the self obscures the effects a community and its values, 
identity, history, obligations, and contingencies have on the abstracted actor. Part of the 
Kantian allure in the original position assumes the individual will choose just actions, so 
in some ways the veil of ignorance and the original position are parts of a contrarian 
version of the Socratic Paradox, which claims no person would willingly commit unjust 
acts voluntarily.17
                                                 
17 See Plato’s Gorigias (509e), in which Socrates asks Callicles to confirm their earlier 
agreement that “no-one acts unjustly on purpose, but that all those who act unjustly do so 
unwillingly”; and Protagoras (345d-e) in which Socrates states: “For my part, I’m pretty 
much of the opinion that no wise person thinks anyone in the world goes wrong willingly, 
or performs disgraceful or evil actions willingly. They are well aware that all those who 
do disgraceful and evil things do them involuntarily.” 
 Any unjust act is involuntary because if individuals consciously 
understood the consequences of their actions, Socrates believes they would choose 
otherwise. The Socratic Paradox infers that individuals become enlightened through the 
acquisition of a complete—or at the very least a robust—set of knowledge and facts that 
aids in predicting the exact implications their actions place and sometimes intrude upon 
others. Therefore, if they knew unintended consequences of their choices would produce 
unjust acts (or evil), they would surely alter their actions to avoid undesirable outcomes. 
It is not an involuntary act done out of compulsion of duty or even force, but rather out of 
ignorance and error. Socrates’s view is forgiving because it infers that humans will more 
often than not choose just outcomes when they know the precise consequences of their 
actions, making it difficult to hold them accountable. It is it hard to hold persons culpable 
if they are ignorant of the good, the just, and the noble. Rawls takes a similar forgiving 
view of human nature, but prefers to sterilize the assumptions and influences that keep 




position, particulars are removed from the deliberative state. With this universalist 
approach to decision-making in mind, one can see why the communitarian critique aims 
to reconcile issues with identity and virtue in the Rawlsian self. Rawls subtracts certain 
aspects of sociological make-up that communitarians believe are impossible to bracket 
out of an individual’s decision-making process. For Sandel, this reconciliation means 
reflection without distance; for MacIntyre, it is resuscitating Aristotelian virtue to 
alleviate moral ambiguity; for Taylor, this is the generational obligation connection he 
sees between freedom and responsibility; and for Walzer, it is cultivating self-respect in 
the individual and setting up silos of power to limit realms of domination. 
While these writers do not engage in the antics of Aristophanean comedy, they are 
indeed grounding a philosopher’s abstracted postulations to remove the philosopher from 
the clouds so they can deal with more conditional material. It is easy to see why 
sociological and narrative solutions are posed in response to Rawls. MacIntyre, Sandel, 
and, to a degree, Taylor, offer a critique of the Rawlsian self18
                                                 
18 For MacIntyre, this not explicitly directed at Rawls in the text but can be considered 
the modern emotivist self who seeks nothing more than autonomy in determining moral 
obligations. 
 that focuses on the role 
community plays in shaping one’s identity, the obligations and responsibilities one owes 
fellow citizens, and the power of narrative and language. Similarly, Walzer is concerned 
with cultural factors that shape the meaning of social goods and justice, though he is most 
concerned with developing a system of distributive justice to curb the human disposition 
to dominate others. As such, and true to his self-described particularist approach, the 




investigations into how to deal with schools, neighborhoods, goods in the marketplace, 
and other areas. 
The criticism from this initial set of communitarian literature directed at Nozick 
and the libertarian spirit is generally concerned with the degree to which Nozick so freely 
articulates arguments that run contrary to a common good and the encouragement of 
altruistic behavior. Sweeping sentiments and the implications of this work are 
encapsulated in such claims as “[t]here is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others” 
and that using an individual to the benefit of others simply uses him/her. Nozick even 
goes so far as to suggest that a common good is nothing more than a tool for 
manipulation when one makes a sacrifice for the sake of others. The individual coerced 
or compelled to act in this situation receives no “overbalancing good from his sacrifice, 
and no one is entitled to force this upon him—least of all a state or government that 
claims his allegiance” (ASU, 33). Communitarians, notably Taylor, see this as 
shortsighted, since individuals surely must acknowledge the benefits received from their 
forefathers and what this entails for providing for the next generation. 
Nozick first justifies the minimal state (night-watchman), which arises out of 
protective associations, initially as a dominant protective association and then as an 
association with territory, for which the state becomes responsible. The state provides 
basic protections to its citizens but forgoes any attempts at redistributing property, for this 
would also be an act of violation based on Nozick’s entitlement theory that goods are 
secured through either just transfer or acquisition of holdings (even if this means one has 
acquired a disproportionate share of resources), or rectification of injustices. Walzer’s 




through competitive exchanges, it runs amuck when individuals or entities become 
excessively wealthy and powerful under two conditions: 1) “the extraction not only of 
wealth but of prestige and influence from the market” and 2) “the deployment of power 
within it” (SOJ, 11). A discussion of such distributive matters is material for another 
project, but certainly finds itself within the communitarian perspective since it touches on 
the common good, as well as Church literature that takes a pro-labor position.19
                                                 
19 Several encyclical letters take a pro-labor rights position. Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum 
(1891) supports the right of workers to organize and explores how to find a middle 
ground between socialism and unbridled capitalism. The encyclical is later echoed on its 
90th anniversary by John Paul II in Laborem Exercens (1981). In Quadragesimo Ano 
(1931), Pius XI condemns capitalism and communism, but argues, “Wage earners should 
become sharers in ownership or management or participate in some fashion in the profits 
received” (no. 65). And in Caritas in Veritate (2007), Ratzinger as Benedict XVI calls for 
unions to “be open to the new perspectives that are emerging in the world of work” while 
reminding the letter’s audience that it’s important to remember that the Church has 
always encouraged labor unions (no. 64). 
 This is 
not a subject discussed in the four Ratzinger works analyzed in the chapters that follow in 
this research project. That said, criticism of Nozick largely focuses on two topics: his 
neglect for generational obligations in Anarchy and that work’s general libertarian spirit. 
His system of rights and acquisition lacks humility, for one must surely acknowledge, for 
example, that others may be better skilled at determining how taxes could be spent for 
equitable distribution and the most effective return on investments. There is a prideful 
inability to accept a sense of hierarchy and diversity of skills. He does recognize a chaotic 
form of hierarchy—one that benefits those predisposed by nature who either possess a 






This chapter summarizes the major arguments of each of the four selected 
communitarian texts and then moves into a dialogue of major common concepts found in 
these writings. These concepts are not only essential to understanding the arguments of 
the communitarian critique, but also to understanding subsequent chapters in which the 
concepts resurface to demonstrate that Ratzinger is in dialogue with the same issues and, 
in many cases, is taking a communitarian position as he seeks to engage the modern and 
post-modern worlds. In short, this chapter serves as the measuring stick to evaluate key 
events at the peak of Ratzinger’s career. These topics also resurface in the analysis 
chapter of this project to determine where Ratzinger falls within this communitarian 
dialogue and Catholic communitarian-spirited sentiments. 
 
The Basic Arguments 
 
MacIntyre: Unity, Narrative, and Moral Disorder 
In After Virtue (1981), Alasadair MacIntyre argues that contemporary moral 
language has reached a state of disorder due to a loss of common language and history 
that stems from two related subjects—emotivism and the democratized self born out of 
the Enlightenment and its intellectual successors—replacing objective standards with the 
expression of individual preferences. MacIntyre argues that this post-modern self began 
when the Enlightenment replaced the Aristotelian notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realized-his-essential-nature (and, later, the medieval addition of telos to this phrase) 




seeks nothing more than survival and circumventing perceived manipulation by authority. 
As a result, various virtues—one could argue Aristotelian virtue as derived from the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which is also found in theistic variations in Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism—are now lost. 
These lost virtues, or standards, often are “found” embedded and reflected in a 
culture’s stories and common language. The characters within these narratives find their 
roles fixed and defined, and the characters serve as contributors to a larger living-and-
breathing communal organism. The absence of characters in the post-Enlightenment 
world brought on a purging of the critical criteria and expectations that once provided a 
cohesive and equitable background for setting societal expectations and diffusing 
disputes. Identifying, or creating, a source for conflict resolution is particularly important 
among pluralistic sets of first principles, which appear no better or worse than one 
another. One way to bring these pluralistic viewpoints into conversation is through 
narrative, for it places members of a community into the stories of others, thereby 
creating a sense of obligation and, ultimately, a unity that buffers the pure 
individualistically driven self. The most ironic part of After Virtue is the absence of a 
head-on examination of pluralism, though pluralism is part of the very issue MacIntyre 
grapples with: How to make divergent opinions commensurable, or, rather, how to reduce 
or eliminate incommensurable and ever-changing perspectives? While this may not be his 
intention, the narrative method overlays homogeneity upon values and purposes, which in 
the end addresses the subject of pluralism. 
Pluralism also has to be reconciled with history and context. If these are 




critical reflection on one’s predecessors and further supports the idea that one’s history—
whether composed of scientific or moral language—cannot simply be tossed out and 
rewritten. This premise is advanced from the very outset of After Virtue as MacIntyre 
asks his readers to imagine a world in which all recorded scientific knowledge has been 
lost; he then asks readers to consider the same scenario for the arena of moral language 
and the Western philosophic tradition that informs choices. Recognition of the past 
allows the virtues presented by the ancients to stand; however, there is a paradox—how 
are humans to import these virtues, if say, for example, virtue as Aristotle understood it 
was set within the intellectual context of ancient Greece? To adjust for this, MacIntyre 
must believe in some sort of objective, divine understanding of moral language that 
descends upon man through language relevant to a particular time. The general concepts 
of a book such as the Nicomachean Ethics can stand (i.e., virtue, contemplation, 
happiness as it relates to contemplation), but they must find a new home among new 
narratives and characters for a particular time and culture. 
 
Sandel: Reflection, Identity, and Language 
In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), Michael Sandel challenges 
deontological liberals such as Rawls and Kant by taking issue with their conception of the 
insulated and autonomous person, exposing their failure to account for the relationship 
individuals hold to their group and how this might impact their actions. Sandel’s 
Liberalism also questions the priority Rawls and Kant give to “right over the good” (LLJ, 
177). One problem with Kantian philosophy, though there are many that Sandel reveals, 




were coerced by the values of others, rather than one where the needs of each harmonized 
with the ends of all” (LLJ, 5). In such a society in which the primacy of rights acts as the 
driver for individual deliberation, there is skepticism that the common good or interests 
of others will be taken into account. Instead, as the various proposals in the marketplace 
of ideas are considered, there is a very good chance that individuals will simply choose 
the option most familiar to them. Sandel views this as a “sociological objection” to the 
Kantian view and argues that deontological liberalism only “affirms individualistic values 
while pretending to hold a position of neutrality which can never be achieved” (LLJ, 11). 
Sandel argues that if humans are composed of combinations of experiences and 
who, as a result, have great difficulty in reaching any sort of transcendental “standing 
outside of society or experience” to make claims of objectivity, then sufficient reflection 
and deliberation cannot be as distant as proposed by Rawls (LLJ, 11). Sandel’s charge 
against this false neutrality is particularly important because it points to a naiveté in 
deontological liberalism and to why communitarians are asking for something more 
specific. The value-sterile position advanced by Rawls and others is seen as unrealistic 
and discouraging of even the state from embarking on an accountable level of reflection. 
 
Taylor: Primacy of Rights, Potential and Obligations, and Human Insufficiency 
Charles Taylor’s essay, “Atomism” (1979), takes on the doctrines of social 
contract theory generated in the seventeenth century, namely, those of Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke, as well as their successors. These doctrines narrowly focus on the 
primacy of rights and attribute human success and fulfillment to lone individual efforts. 




who justified them through the primacy of rights (Atomism, 39). The concept of primacy 
of rights also is part of the criticism aimed at Rawls, though Taylor’s essay is positioned 
as a reaction to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, which Taylor believes took primacy of certain 
individual rights to an extreme by using this primacy as a fundamental and conditional 
principle of libertarian political theory while denying the same rank to belonging and 
obligation (Atomism, 40). For Taylor, the flaw in this is that the freedoms that Nozick 
and others in the libertarian spirit ascribe to the primacy of rights doctrine overlook the 
relationship among freedom, obligation, and fulfillment of potential among humans and 
other sentient beings. Freedoms can only be sustained through societal obligations to 
maintain the structures that protect these freedoms. 
Central to Taylor’s argument is the acceptance as established principle of the 
Aristotelian notion of innate human insufficiency—no individual person could survive 
alone, or at least not for long and in a meaningful condition. There is little room to 
dispute this. To take survival a step further, Taylor advances this line of thought to 
cultivation, resembling Aristotle’s concept that humans ought to design a society in 
which potentials can be achieved. There are no natural conditions that allow humans to 
do this alone. At the very least, humans are connected through generations, and as such, 
this renders a great natural and ethical obligation to share this benefit of generational 
luxuries with their contemporaries and legacies. There is no exemption from this duty, as 
the next person’s future and equality of opportunity is dependent on the commitment of 
his/her predecessors. 
In regard to Taylor’s discussion on social contractors, Locke and Hobbes are his 




deserves more attention, particularly its echo of Nozick’s minimalist state and Rousseau’s 
concerns over governmental encroachment. Rousseau is important to note for this 
research project since his notion of a “general will” shows that social contractors were 
not completely devoid of commentary on the common good. He saw the need for 
individuals to submit their will for the good of the whole; however, Rousseau’s tone is 
one of resignation to this submission.20
 
 However, he is difficult to integrate into this 
discussion as either an ally or foe of the atomistic self and other parts of the 
communitarian critique. While Rousseau saw humans as happy in their natural isolated 
state, he was deeply concerned about how to sustain virtuous citizens, which can be seen 
in his own attacks on the Enlightenment in his First Discourse. His Second Discourse 
explored the power of language as a necessity for civilizing humans after leaving the state 
of nature, a view which draws him closer to the likes of MacIntyre. Complexities such as 
these make it difficult for Rousseau to be a direct target like Locke, although his attitude 
toward the preservation of the individual plays along the perimeter of this discussion. 
Nonetheless, when reading Taylor’s essay it should be remembered that he is primarily 
writing about Locke and Hobbes. 
                                                 
20 For example, in the Social Contract, Rousseau saw man as unnaturally situated in the 
constraints of government and civilization (Book I, ch. i), yet he recognized that some 
sort of social compact is necessary to protect humans and their common interests. 
Rousseau’s notion of the general will—the result achieved by popular sovereignty is the 
only legitimate form of government (Book I, Ch. vi)—is his method of defining and 
achieving a common good. Without the consent of the general will, obeying the law is a 
begrudging surrender since it is neither natural nor logical. In Rousseau’s words: “To 
renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s status as a man, the rights of humanity and 
even its duties” (Book I, Ch. iv). His solution to this was the idea that through the general 
will individuals transfer their interests, including their will, to those of the whole with the 




Walzer: Particularism, Self-Respect, and Distribution of Social Goods 
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983) can be viewed as an intimate 
response to Nozick—the two co-taught a class together in 1970–1971 on “Capitalism and 
Socialism.” One result of this co-teaching experience was Spheres, making it not a 
detailed response to Nozick’s Anarchy, but rather a reaction to and dialogue about 
Nozick’s philosophic approach in general. Rawls looms in the background as Walzer 
notes in his Acknowledgments that his work mostly disagrees with A Theory of Justice.21
His argument is self-described as “radically particularist” (SOJ, xiv), and, like 
Sandel, he pro-actively avoids the use of hypotheticals. Instead, Walzer uses historical 
and contemporary issues as part of his anthropological defense. For him, the meaning of 
social goods—including justice—changes over time and means different things to 
different groups in different places. One way to look at his conception of justice is that 
goods should be distributed through silos, whereby injustice only occurs when one group 
attempts to control another silo. “Silo” seems more appropriate than spheres since the 
concept of spheres carries with it the possibility of overlap, especially in political 
discussions, and if the intent is truly to thwart tyrants who wish to conquer more than 
 
Spheres puts forth a distributive system of justice to temper the extremely liberal, laissez-
faire approach to power acquisition that tends to arise in liberal democracies. Walzer’s 
primary desire is to remove domination in hopes that this will produce political 
egalitarianism in society. His counter to the liberal individualism of Rawls and Nozick is 
best understood through the distribution of justice and power he proposes be set into 
motion through complex equality—the spheres of powers. 
                                                 




their designated, silo’d industry. Silos of power are demarcated with clear boundaries; 
transgression of another silo should be considered a reproachable breach and an act of 
tyranny. The silos are created by identifying the social goods most important to a 
particular society. This system is not perfect, as groups can dominate within each 
silo/sphere, but at least their domination is limited. The larger-scaled dependency 
between silos/spheres also serves as a model to influence micro-level behaviors where 
domination could occur. 
 
Communitarian Concepts for Dialogue 
 
Human Nature, Freedom, and Potential 
Several communitarians envision character molding and caretaking as necessary 
activities for people to both thrive at a meaningful level of existence and perfect the 
human condition. Taylor believes that in the natural state humans are insufficiently 
equipped for survival, so the creation of government—and one with a sense of 
obligation—is essential to both realizing humans’ fullest potential and protecting their 
freedoms. MacIntyre regards individuals as works-in-progress in need of external 
guidance and an accessible set of stories that foster virtuous attributes, which, in turn, 
help humans reach their ends. Walzer sees a hypercompetitive disposition in humans to 
dominate others and believes that one way to curb this is by distributing power in a way 
that creates limited autonomy. To help sustain this distributive system, Walzer is a 
proponent of cultivating a sense of self-respect within individuals so they do not act out 




of human insufficiency: if left alone, humans will inevitably undermine themselves and 
others, but the human condition is improvable, and, in this case, insecurity can be 
transitioned into self-respect. 
Taylor begins with the common Aristotelian declaration that man is a social and 
political animal incapable of self-sufficiency outside of a polis (Atomism, 41). Even 
social contract theorists—the atomists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that 
Taylor critiques—saw a similar insufficiency in terms of humans and survivalism. As 
evidence, Taylor turns to Hobbes, reminding us that this political philosopher and other 
social contract theorists of the time believed that the state of nature left man with a life 
that was “nasty, brutish, and short,” and that they “stressed the great and irresistible 
advantages that men gained from entering society” (Atomism, 42).22
                                                 
22 Taylor, “Atomism,” 42. The first part of this quote (“nasty, brutish, and short”) is no 
doubt a reference to the passage from Hobbes’s Leviathan that states that life before 
society was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, Part I, chapter 13, 
paragraph 12). It’s interesting to note that Taylor removed the “solitary” portion from the 
original phrase. Perhaps this is so other social contract theorists could fit this category, or 
perhaps “solitary” spoke to a natural inclination that Hobbes saw in humans as 
individualistic, solitary creatures, which is antagonistic to the communitarian view of 
human nature’s need for cooperation. 
 Taylor therefore 
uses both perspectives—the motivations of contract theorists and those founded in the 
Aristotelian view of nature—to take the next logical step and conclude that society is 
needed not only for survival but also to develop the talents of humans (Atomism, 42). To 
take Taylor’s argument seriously, one must accept that humans possess potential. To 
fulfill this potential, humans should have the protections of a political infrastructure to 
guarantee that they can make choices on a less-inhibited path to pursuing their ends. To 
sustain this system over time, a natural civic duty is required: humans are obligated to 




follow. Taylor says the trouble for the “ultra-liberal” perspective—one could also 
interpret this as libertarian since the most direct target in Taylor’s essay is Nozick—is a 
“fear that the affirming of any obligations will offer a pretext for the restriction of 
freedom” (Atomism, 48). 
Here, Taylor reveals a peculiar insecurity in Nozick’s work, namely, a great 
unwillingness to subscribe to the virtue of humility. Nozick’s argument is that 
compulsory decrees are a violation of individual freedoms. Even taxation by extension 
falls into this charge. Nozick writes: “Taxation of earnings from labor is on par with 
forced labor” (ASU, 169). Those compelled to act for others become victims, according 
Nozick: “Peaceful individuals minding their own business are not violating the rights of 
others” (ASU, 52). Nozick overlooks the social contract aspect of the protections made 
possible by the state if one is participating in society. Certainly, someone paved the way 
for the society one lives in now, so there are benefits and privileges one receives without 
payment. One way to pay these benefits and privileges back is by leaving the same 
conditions so the next group can prosper. If individuals accept that their success is not 
entirely their own doing—surely, groundwork was laid to allow their labor to produce 
results of some sort—they will recognize a civic duty tantamount to protective rights. 
This is not to argue that Nozick does not also recognize some level of wickedness in the 
state of nature, but it is with great reluctance that he does so, dragging the polity through 
refutations of protective associations before arriving at the minimal night-watchman 
state, whose reach is narrowed “to protecting persons against murder, assault, theft, fraud, 
and so forth” (ASU, 162). For Nozick, the state is inevitable rather than essential and 




In reading Nozick, it seems that he wants to believe humans can thrive without 
the force of government, but he eventually concedes to a severely limited model based on 
protections and endless contract exchanges without foresight and deference to specialty. 
At some point, one has to recognize the expertise of others to carry on activities on their 
behalf: How ought humans devise a fair and effective education system? What is the best 
approach for planning sustainable cities? What safeguards are necessary for protecting 
the health of the people? All of these are activities that will need to be run by the state 
since they protect the public, require taxation to fund, and help maintain the general 
security and welfare of the state’s citizens, and, ultimately, the fulfillment of potentials 
and ends. 
Similar to Taylor’s obligation-potential linkage, MacIntyre sees humans as part of 
a developing process who are in need of external guidance and whose true ends are not 
achieved in the temporal world. Without virtue, the modern self no longer has an end: 
“the peculiarly modern self, the emotivist self, in acquiring sovereignty in its own realm 
lost its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life as 
ordered to a given end” (AV, 34). Hence, moral language finds itself in great disorder. 
The study of ethics and proper reasoning fills this void, guiding one’s ordering of desires 
and emotions so that habits of action can transform human nature as it is into something 
that it could be—human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos (AV, 52–53). This 
places the tenets of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—the distinction between man-as-he-
happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature—within the 
framework of a society constructed to help individuals fulfill their potentials, or telos. 




done and without alteration to “theistic beliefs, whether Christian, as with Aquinas, or 
Jewish with Maimonides, or Islamic with Ibn Roschd.” MacIntyre sees this as a synthesis 
between virtue and vice, and between sin and Aristotle’s concept of error (AV, 53). 
Walzer’s distributive system of power is a statement on human nature since his 
general premise for segmenting power is that distribution is the source of all social 
conflicts. In reading Walzer, one takes away that he is asserting that competing factions 
are perennially at war to determine distribution of goods (land, capital, technical skills 
and assets, education, and so forth). Domination, therefore, is inevitable: “[s]ome group 
of men and women—class, caste, strata, estate, alliance, or social formation—comes to 
enjoy a monopoly or a near monopoly of some dominant good; or, a coalition of groups 
comes to enjoy, and so on” (SOJ, 12). Excessive accumulation of wealth is also suspect if 
it is built up to fund efforts to intrude upon other spheres. To remedy this, power should 
be distributed across spheres, segments, or, more aptly described, silos. Walzer refers to 
this as complex equality, the opposite of tyranny. By distributing social goods and 
responsibilities, one group or individual will find it difficult to dominate all aspects. As 
Walzer, puts it: “Good fences make just societies” (SOJ, 319). 
For Walzer, human nature is improvable through education, particularly the 
development of self-respect. He arrives at cultivating self-respect after contemplating 
how one will successfully keep persons at bay in a distributive system of justice. What 
will prevent individuals from intruding upon others? What motivates intrusion? Since 
Walzer sees domination as the ugly side of human nature, one must infer there is an 
insecurity bubbling up in individuals that drives them to acquire more than their fair share 




urge. Autonomy, however, is not entirely lost in this distributive system: individuals can 
exercise autonomy by advancing through their sphere. There is also an element of 
reciprocity in regard to self-respect. It depends on “one’s character, qualities, and 
actions” as well as a connection to the group, which, in turn, makes individuals not only 
responsible to themselves but to their “fellow citizens” (SOJ, 278–279). Self-respecting 
persons are autonomous in that they are voluntarily participating members who know 
when to limit their power and not hold “claims [on] other goods…not earned, to which 
[they have] no right,” as such is the behavior of a tyrant, who is the very opposite of the 
self-respecting person (SOJ, 279). Again, autonomy of the spheres is essential—this is a 
foil to the overambitious individual who would become a tyrant. Such individuals may 
dominate their sphere, but it will only be their sphere. Domination and injustice occur 
when these individuals breach their sphere. To reiterate: self-respect is one check that 
Walzer hopes will overcome the natural ambition of humans to dominate. The inference 
here is that some acts of domination are driven by fear, lack of self-esteem, or a general 
feeling that control and autonomy are up for grabs. 
 
Challenge to Autonomy 
Both MacIntyre and Sandel question the level of autonomy that Rawls ascribes to 
the hypothetical self. These two writers argue that what actually happens in the original 
position is a re-affirmation of values already embedded in the self, rather than the 
selection of just principles from a transcendental place that allows the self to objectively 
identify the issue and value at hand. By removing the particulars of the situations, the self 




a similar opposition to autonomy, questioning why moderns made the leap from natural 
property rights to primacy of rights in general, leaving behind the notion of insufficiency. 
Taylor’s assessment—and claims by other communitarians against Rawls, and especially 
Nozick—points to a fundamental insecurity in humans and an absence of humility in the 
emotivist/modern/post-modern self. 
The emotivist self that MacIntyre describes is the sovereign being who desires to 
be free from hierarchy and teleology (AV, 62). This individual is an “autonomous moral 
agent” who wishes not to be manipulated, and, paradoxically, finds no other way to do 
this than “by directing towards others those very manipulative modes of relationship 
which each of us aspires to resist in our own case” (AV, 68). The self is valued above all 
else, especially authority and, tangentially by result, community and responsibility. 
MacIntyre sees this type of individualism as contradictory and an “incoherent conceptual 
scheme which we have inherited” (AV, 68). This flawed inheritance contributes to the 
disorder of moral language he sees in the world. 
The modern self, the emotivist, finds no limit on that which he or she can pass 
judgment and feels free to criticize “from whatever standpoint the self has adopted, 
including the self’s choice of standpoint to adopt” (AV, 31), rendering one’s own 
positions moot for further explanation. It is under this framework that emotivists 
undermine even their own position. At times, MacIntyre’s description of emotivism 
sounds like a repackaged version of relativism. For example, he writes: “[T]here are and 
can be no valid rational justifications for any claims that objective and impersonal moral 




While emotivism claims to be a system for moral judgment based on the meaning 
of sentences, it ends up producing judgments based merely on the expression of one’s 
attitudes and preferences (AV, 13). Thus, its process is circular, non-reflective, and 
simply dependent on itself. Each individual, believing that every attempt to “provide a 
rational justification for an objective morality has in fact failed,” adopts his or her own 
first principles by choice, unguided by any criteria (AV, 19–20). The connection one must 
make here is that through the Enlightenment’s disentanglement of the individual’s will 
from hierarchy and obligation, modern individuals feel further emboldened and qualified 
to make these claims. They operate under the illusion of free will and select an 
embedded, socialized preference that in many cases is simply drawn from a set of limited 
choices. It’s not clear which came first here—the release from authority or the spread of 
emotivism—but, nonetheless, moral judgments become the carriers of a great deal of 
arbitrariness. 
Sandel takes a position similar to that of MacIntyre in regard to the failure of 
autonomy and individual choice when he concludes that distant reflection is a source of 
error. Sandel argues that agents believe they actually decide what they want most, 
assessing their preferences and reaffirming something already there, which Sandel calls 
“pre-existing desires” and a complete façade for any “voluntarist aspect of agency” in the 
original position (LLJ, 162). So, behind the veil of ignorance, there is little reflection, 
choices have been pre-determined, and ends are simply matched against “pre-existing 
desires, undifferentiated as to worth, with the best available means of satisfying them” 
(LLJ, 178). In other words, there is no validation or contemplation of a conception of the 




this is that such “co-operative virtues” as altruism and benevolence are “least likely to 
flourish in a society founded on individualistic assumptions” (LLJ, 11). This explains 
Sandel’s call for proper reflection and not simply “superficial introspection, just ‘inward’ 
enough to survey uncritically the motives and desires with which the accidents of my 
circumstance have left me” (LLJ, 163). A sense of inner discovery is lost with Rawls if 
we are to merely view man as a being “who chooses his ends rather than a being, as the 
ancients conceived him, who discovers his ends for conditions of self-knowledge” (LLJ, 
22). Sandel wants something more. 
Sandel also challenges autonomy by pointing out the intricacies in identity 
formation and the self’s connections to community that follow. Overlapping circles of 
identity and influence bind and limit an individual’s motivations and acceptable choices. 
Identities take the form of memberships in family, a particular community, or a nation or 
people that share a history. The choices produced on account of these memberships are 
more than “natural duties” individuals owe their fellow humans or even agreements—
they are actually products of the “enduring attachments and commitments which taken 
together partly define the person” (LLJ, 179). 
Sandel charges that Rawls’s self is so independent that “it rules out the possibility 
that common purposes and ends could inspire more or less expansive self-
understandings.” These shared aspirations are obscured by Rawls’s failure to see what 
Sandel calls “intersubjective” and “intrasubjective” forms of self-understanding. By 
intersubjective, Sandel means that at times the self will embrace more than a single 
identity and its contingent obligations to family, community, class, or nation. By 




within a single, individual human being, as when we account for inner deliberation in 
terms of the pull of competing identities” (LLJ, 62–63). 
Taylor addresses false autonomy on the historical-philosophical front. He is 
perplexed at the elevation of the primacy of rights, arguing that in “an earlier phase of 
Western civilization…these arguments would have seemed wildly eccentric and 
implausible” (Atomism, 41). Taylor’s purpose in his essay is to explore how this situation 
came to be and offer a refutation by rethinking the human condition’s obligations that 
sustain and make individual rights possible. Atomism fostered this elevation of the 
primacy of rights through its view of human nature, which asserts that man/woman alone 
is indeed self-sufficient through the goods he/she is able to obtain independently by 
mixing labor with unacquired resources, but the force of law is needed to protect this 
natural right. By protecting this natural right, individual rights are ascribed primacy. One 
can see this view stems from Locke’s Second Treatise, but it is curious how Taylor links 
this view to Hobbes since in his essay Taylor also connects Hobbes’s view on the chaos 
of nature to Hobbes’s justification for society. Nevertheless, the concept of atomism still 
sustains its general premise of self-sufficiency, which Taylor sees as part of “a very 
questionable thesis” (Atomism, 41). He never uses the word “humility,” nor do any of the 
communitarians who write in reaction to Rawls and Nozick, but it is a broad umbrella 
under which to place liberal entitlement and is certainly an underlying charge that should 
have been levied against atomists and the like—why has individual pride reached such 
heights in modern and post-modern humanity where humbleness has vanished? The 





Primacy of History, Particularism, and Anti-Hypotheticals 
Sandel and Walzer provide two different accounts of how history matters, 
advancing particularist and anti-hypothetical stances in contrast to Rawls. For Sandel, the 
lack of close reflection prevents individuals from really understanding themselves and 
their relation to their community and how this influences their internal decision-making 
process in the original position. For Walzer, distributive justice is anchored in the 
meanings of social goods, membership requirements, and the boundaries of power 
segmentation, which are based on cultural circumstances. 
According to Sandel, just as the original position lacks an account of how the 
individual understands him/herself in relation to personal experiences and community, it 
similarly fails to account for the socialization embedded in individuals that originates 
from the historical context in which they live and the connections they form in their 
world. Men and women can reflect on their history and attempt to distance their view, 
“but the distance is always precarious and provisional…never finally secured outside the 
history itself” (LLJ, 179). It’s not clear if Sandel classifies this as insurmountable, but it 
looks challenging for the Rawlsian creature. 
Walzer makes clear from the very start that he intends to stay away from 
abstractions as much as possible, for in the abstracted plateau everyone agrees but 
particulars produce different choices. It is myopic to take seriously the outlook that 
humans can “choose impartially, knowing nothing of their own situation, barred from 
making particularist claims, confronting an abstract set of goods.” Walzer wants to know 
how individuals make choices in front of a backdrop of shared culture and 




For Walzer, justice is conditional, a human construction, so he doubts there can be 
only one way to approach it. Spheres’s theory of justice is directed toward social goods. 
In his six principles of justice, the particularist dependencies of distributive justice are 
seen in pluralistic terms, including objects in some cultures carry sentiments; men and 
women have distinct and defined identities because of the way they use social goods, as 
well as the way they stand in relation to others; there are different goods from one 
civilization to another, whether moral or material; the distribution of goods is relative to 
social meanings and the goods themselves; the meaning of just and unjust distributions 
changes over time; and what happens within one distributive arena can affect what 
happens in others, so there is only relative autonomy within each sphere (SOJ, 7–10). 
These six principles provide tangible criteria for determining justice within a certain 
society at a given period of time. One could argue that Walzer constructed a complex 
system for relativism, leaving objectivity behind. 
The basis for goods dispersion, like Walzer’s circumvention of universalism, must 
be based on a particular social world, not, as he calls it, “an ideal map or master plan but, 
rather, a map and a plan appropriate to the people for whom it is drawn, whose common 
life it reflects” (SOJ, 26). The boundaries are derived from shared social meanings in 
language, culture, and history and demarcate what cannot be transgressed. They can also 
be drawn by membership, which possesses a political-historical component in how a 
community is constituted, taking into account choices and existing membership 
distributions from “existing contacts, connections, alliances” and the effects the group 




Communities are strong when anchored in a culture that explains boundaries, but 
these stories, like boundaries, can shift. Community is a good in and of itself, arguably 
the most important one. It infers membership, whether official or implied, and is “a good 
that can only be distributed by taking people in,” physically and politically (SOJ, 29). 
The precise structure of community can come in the form of culture, religion, or 
politics and is determined by what is necessary for the group’s “common life” and a 
feeling that the contract is about more than simply “mutual aid.” Therefore, the needs a 
community satisfies are as the members understand those needs. Membership then not 
only provides general security and welfare, it also distinguishes between members and 
strangers (SOJ, 64–65). In recognizing this history, individuals recognize that by joining 
a group they must remember what circumstances drove their membership, re-enforcing 
the idea that the community is more than just rights but also responsibilities to fulfill the 
original intent of the collective vision. In other words, the existence of the community 
precedes the individual and its scope exceeds the individual’s immediate interests and 
concerns. 
 
The Power of Narrative and Language 
Narrative and the meaning of language are closely related to the importance of 
history, as they provide the social context and characters in which one makes sense of 
things. This is primarily linked to MacIntyre, though Sandel also offers insights on the 
power of language in creating a shared vision within a community. 
For MacIntyre, narrative is a natural method for learning, as it is a process that 




our lives and [it is] because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that 
we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of 
others” (AV, 212). History demonstrates the utility of stories. MacIntyre cites ancient 
Greece, the medieval era, and the Renaissance as eras that used stories as the “chief 
means of moral education.” The same applied in areas in which religion prevailed, be that 
Christianity, Judaism, or Islam (AV, 121). Through narrative, one becomes locked into 
the stories of others, creating obligations and commitments: 
I am not only accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an account, 
who can put others to the question. I am part of their story, as they are part of 
mine. The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives (AV, 
218). 
 
The idea here is that stories provide common criteria that allow people to make sounder 
moral judgments since they are tied to some network of roles, purposes, ends, and 
character. The characters in the narrative form play an important role: “a character is an 
object of regard by the members of the culture generally or by some significant segment 
of them” who “furnishes them with a cultural and moral ideal” and “morally legitimates a 
mode of social existence” (AV, 29). Characters provide “those social roles which provide 
a culture with its moral definitions” (AV, 31). Characters create the common criteria to 
resolve disagreements regarding morality; they do not deploy moral beliefs. One 
weakness of MacIntyre’s argument about which the reader should ask: Has he simply 
replaced first principles with the acceptance of narrative? Either way, characters and their 
particular meanings are a part of the common language that have been lost. 
Just as narrative and the meaning of language reveal the false promise of the 




culture’s common stories, they also serve as preventatives from treating philosophy at 
large as a contributing factor to an objective discussion. MacIntyre gives pause to the 
idea that philosophies from different eras can be treated as participants in the same 
dialogue. Specifically, he takes issue with the idea that moral philosophers such as Plato, 
Hume, Mill, and even the reader can be treated as contemporaries. By placing them in the 
same dialogue, one abstracts “these writers from the cultural and social milieus in which 
they lived and thought and so the history of their thought acquires a false independence 
from the rest of the culture” (AV, 11). 
The most peculiar part of MacIntyre’s argument is how he connects the narrative 
approach to Aristotelian virtue. One could argue: Why not simply ask that the works of 
Aristotle be read to produce more virtuous citizens? This is most likely because, as just 
noted, MacIntyre sees how context matters, as it sets a common ground and parameters 
for parties to negotiate. 
Sandel looks to language and vocabulary as a means to strengthen community. A 
healthy community: 
is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, 
or even certain “shared final ends” alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse 
and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the 
opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved. 
 
Here, Sandel takes a step back from the view that “shared final ends” are a centerpiece to 
the traditional communitarian ideology to insist that humans cannot even reach this stage 
if they cannot reach a consensus on, or at least take steps toward, understanding a 
culture’s common definitions. This could be both moral as well as institutional since 




participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute of 
certain of the participants’ plans of life” (LLJ, 172–173). In other words, part of the 
strength of the political apparatus rests on is the citizens’ understanding of it. 
 
Critical Vision of the Enlightenment 
Some communitarians pinpoint the Enlightenment as the source of the errors they 
find with Rawls and the new liberal self—its misguided individualistic aims that neglect 
the common good and its vague hypothetical state that disregards identity and the 
influence of community and obligations. For MacIntyre, the Enlightenment led to the 
emotivist self, who falsely believes it can forgo generations of thought development and 
the experiences of its predecessors. This idea that history and context do not matter finds 
its origin in the Enlightenment and its thinkers, who inferred that philosophers from all 
time periods could be treated as contemporaries engaging in the same dialogue, which 
MacIntyre also refutes. Sandel’s criticism hones in on the hypothetical tone of contract 
theory and its voluntaristic nature, which we can connect through inference to the 
Enlightenment and modernity. 
As noted, for MacIntyre, the Enlightenment was the beginning of the emotivist 
self’s tendency to evade basic logic and history. Since the Enlightenment was an era that 
emphasized the collection and development of knowledge, this is an ironic contradiction 
to have been spawned from the period. In the opening of After Virtue, MacIntyre calls on 
his readers to imagine a world from which all scientific knowledge has been lost. He then 





Sandel does not take direct issue with the Enlightenment but is very critical of one 
of its legacies, the elevation of contract theory. He categorizes Rawls’s theory of justice 
as general contract theory, a hypothetical situation in which groups determine what is just 
and unjust, which can be traced back to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Since there is no real 
contract, and, secondly, since choices have already been made (i.e., established law, 
 In the case of science, the world is led astray because its great 
collections of data and the established scientific standards that once existed are reduced 
to fragments and informal, verbal understandings of the general principles once verified 
and accepted by communities of experts. In the case of philosophy, contemporary, 
individualistic political units now see themselves as autonomous in the individual 
decision-making process, free from the development and history of philosophy. Using 
this parallel, MacIntyre believes the Enlightenment failed because Kierkegaard, Kant, 
Diderot, Hume, Smith, and similar contemporaries from this era constructed arguments 
regarding authority and moral rules and precepts from premises on “human nature as they 
understood it to be,” but failed to see how their own positions may have been connected 
to, or at least should have been spoken to, “in light of their own history” (AV, 52). It is 
easy to see why, from this historical oversight, MacIntyre views the narrative as a way to 
find common ground in the contemporary world to resolve its own tensions, since 
narrative accounts for history and how it shapes moral judgments. The Enlightenment not 
only pushed stories to the side, but also classical virtue, which explains MacIntyre’s hope 
that the Aristotelian tradition can be restored in today’s world. 
                                                 




culture, identities, communities, etc.) Rawls’s theory becomes painfully hypothetical. In 
one of Sandel’s most aggressive passages he writes: 
Not only did his contract never really happen; it is imagined to take place among 
the sorts of beings who never really existed, that is, being struck with the kind of 
complicated amnesia necessary to the veil of ignorance (LLJ, 105). 
 
Since there is no real contract, there is neither a call to a higher good nor even a 
sense of reciprocity. The contract is nothing more than an act of autonomy and will. 
Rawls’s contract either assumes reciprocity will be achieved, or he has taken for granted 
what humans might succumb to in a free-for-all of contracting. Justice then becomes, in a 
sense, individual obligation created through a contract. As Sandel sees it, Rawls’s 
conception of justice is too voluntaristic—just behavior is for humans to choose, not a 
requirement or responsibility. One must recognize the irony in Sandel’s assertion here, 
for while he claims that justice is too voluntaristic he also argues that behind the veil of 
ignorance one is matching a potential choice of ends against one’s pre-existing desires, 
which previously inferred no such choice existed. 
Sandel’s critique of Rawls is heavy on contract theory, and through this, reveals 
some thoughts on objective-subjective matters. He sees contracts as a matter of 
philosophy of law that originates from first principles. Contracts are dependent on and 
attached to prior agreements, just as laws are backed by legislation. As such, further 
questions regarding the origins of each arrangement can never end until an arrangement 
eventually reaches some first principle, which in most cases finds its origins in social 
contracts, which Sandel notes as either appealing to natural law or the “law of God and 
Nature.” Rawls fails to accommodate for this, and Sandel says that Rawls is unable to 




substantial theological and metaphysical commitment than Rawls is prepared to assume” 
(LLJ, 115–116). One is then left to wonder: How will agreement ever be met in the 
original position? 
 
Responsibilities and Obligations 
An overarching theme that emerges when all of these common communitarian 
concepts are taken in the aggregate is the implication these concepts have for human 
behavior and motivations. What will development of virtue yield? If humans are bounded 
by narrative, what improvements can we expect? How can obligations be seen as 
compulsory? Sandel’s aforementioned contract theory demonstrates the impractical 
nature of navigating through life’s many relationships via contract reliance. Walzer’s 
vision is less about deriving a system to which to attach feelings of responsibility and 
obligation than it is about curbing the innate human trait of dominance—an opposition to 
benevolent behavior—through a system of distributive justice and power segmentation. 
Taylor and McIntyre are the most explicit in illuminating the relationship between 
community and responsibility without compromise to individual rights. Taylor’s three-
part connection involving freedom, obligation, and potential points to some of the 
limitations of the autonomous self and the libertarian disregard for generational luxury. 
MacIntyre’s call for narrative clearly shows the relationship among virtue and obligation, 
responsibility, and accountability. In some ways, this final theme of responsibility and 
obligation is the end product of communitarian theory. 
Taylor argues there are many obligations that even proponents of primacy of 




specifically those of parents and children (Atomism, 54–55). This can also be applied at a 
societal level since future generations will need today’s civilization to reach their 
aspirations. Therefore, Taylor says that if we have benefited from these associations and 
“have been enabled to become free agents ourselves,” one has a compelling obligation to 
make the same opportunities available to others (Atomism, 57). In short, anyone who has 
benefited from the privilege of generational luxury has an obligation to provide the same 
for future generations. Taylor’s usage of “free agents” marks the beginning of an 
argument that ties freedom (individual autonomy) into the concept of responsibility. 
Taylor sees freedom and culture as intertwined subjects, and it is uncertain which 
comes first, hence his debate with primacy of rights, but this does not reject the concept 
of autonomy altogether. “If realizing our freedom partly depends on the society and 
culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the 
shape of this society and culture” (Atomism, 59). Taylor is not suggesting an 
authoritarian approach to either restrict autonomy or use it as the instrument to disperse 
freedom. Rather, there is a symbiotic relationship. The ultimate form of autonomy, self-
understanding, is “partly defined in conversation with others or through the common 
understanding which underlies the practices of our society” (Atomism, 60). The flat, 
hypothetical self in the works of Rawls and Nozick provides far too little accommodation 
of identity, a non-natural and conditional element of human agency. 
For MacIntyre, narrative provides the guiding light for accountability and 
responsibility: “to be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death 
is…to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life” 




unity. As individuals build their own stories within a larger narrative, this requires each 
individual’s own self-interest to be a part of the larger narrative. However, how does one 
encourage such altruistic behavior, without simply making the group interest a new self-
motivated interest? 
MacIntyre’s answer suggests that virtue is part of the answer to this question since 
virtue itself—in the sense of perfecting one’s self—should be the ultimate end for one’s 
life. For MacIntyre, it is a return to Aristotle, whose teachings were lost after the 
Enlightenment. Humans would be better served using reason to instruct rather than a 
specific end or value when thinking of the Aristotelian distinction between man-as-he-
happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. The study of 
ethics helps humans make this transition and reinforces the ideas of potentiality and 
human telos. The motivation for reaching potentiality is happiness. To not reach one’s 
potential ends is to feel “frustrated and incomplete, to fail to achieve that good of rational 
happiness which it is peculiarly ours as a species to pursue” (AV, 52). In its simplest 
form, to regain a sense of accountability means to return to these classical notions and the 
value of virtue. For MacIntyre, this is the best way to begin encouraging responsibility. 
 
Application of the Six Principles 
In the chapters that follow, these six main principles of the communitarian 
critique—the insufficiency of human nature; the Enlightenment and its legacy as an 
origin of moral rot; a challenge to individual autonomy; responsibilities and obligations; 
the primacy of history, particularism, and anti-hypotheticals; and the power of narrative 




Ratzinger. The insufficiency of human nature and a challenge to limitless individual 
autonomy surface in Ratzinger’s works as the sense of humility he finds through the 
debate between faith and reason. For Ratzinger, self-autonomy at its extreme stifles 
humility and moves obligation to the periphery, and responsibilities and obligation are 
paired with the narrative tool and the importance of language and cultural considerations. 
Similarly, his own criticism of the Enlightenment and subsequent re-interpretation of it, 
along with the re-discovery of a culture’s sense of the sacred, speak to the primacy of 
history, particularism, and anti-hypotheticals. Through all of this, Ratzinger is exploring 
how a traditional institution such as the Church can sustain itself as a civilization changes 





Chapter 3: Faith, Reason, and Law in the Habermas Encounter 
 
For a self totally detached from its empirically-given features would seem no more than a 
kind of abstract consciousness (conscious of what?), a radically situated subject given 
way to a radically disembodied one. 
– Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
 
Introduction 
Humility in Universalism vs. Particularism, First Principles, and Internal Deliberation 
This first event, Joseph Ratzinger’s encounter with Jürgen Habermas, addresses 
one of the issues at the core of the rationalist debate from the communitarian critique: 
universalism versus particularism, which is comparable in the Ratzinger-Habermas event 
to objective-subjective distinctions, the inevitable relationship between faith and reason, 
and the subject at the heart of all of these tensions—first principles. Distinct from 
Ratzinger’s own communitarian thought, this event demonstrates his sense of humility 
and the sensitive and compromising role such a sense of humility plays in circumventing 
obsolescence of the Church and supplementing classical philosophy. To avoid 
obsolescence in the secular world, faith is spoken of as a partner with reason rather than 
an adversary. Ratzinger’s own understanding of faith possesses a sense of humility, as it 
is placed within a cooperative relationship with reason and described as a work in 
progress in need of perennial renewal, resembling MacIntyre’s suggestion that the post-
modern self has lost sight of virtue development and the pursuit of fulfilling human 




autonomy and recognizes a deficiency in knowledge of the whole, as deference is given 
to belief in a divine act experienced by others. 
The parallel relationship between subjectivism and objectivism and that of reason 
and faith makes sense if one views revelation as a subset of objectivism. Faith is 
deference to broadly understood revelation in the void of rational observation and is the 
belief in God and revelation, inferring an acceptance of some sort of universal standards. 
Therefore, we can also see how this resembles the contrast between particularism and 
universalism, as objective claims start to look like a call for universal or natural laws, and 
particularist claims look like those belonging to subjectivism. In either relationship, there 
are occasions when concessions are made and the infallibility of autonomy is brought 
into question. 
Some of the writers (most notably MacIntyre and Taylor) discussed in the initial 
communitarian critique of Rawls and Nozick trace reason’s triumph over faith back to the 
Enlightenment. From that era forward, the elevation of individual autonomy placed 
moderns and post-moderns on a path that underscored the Enlightenment’s emphasis on 
observation and the preference for reason over opinion and the metaphysical musings of 
anachronistic times in philosophy. The faith-reason debate calls into question the 
Enlightenment’s removal of God and revelation in the internal reasoning process, or at 
the very least tolerance between the two viewpoints and whether it is prudent to falsify 
either. Communitarian thought, particularly the criticism of emotivism (MacIntyre) and 
atomism (Taylor), describes this as the subjective disorder that can exist as self-autonomy 




backdrop. This in turn leads to social disconnection and the atomized self and, eventually, 
to the motivation to feel a sense of obligation to one’s fellow humans. 
Sandel’s challenge to autonomy can also be applied in this encounter as the 
balance between faith and reason, particularly the role that choice plays in navigating the 
two. Using Sandel as a lens, one can argue that as much as individuals believe they are 
employing a deliberate usage of faith or reason, or even a combination thereof, each 
merely generates choices that confirm embedded values. Neither the neutrality of reason, 
nor the deference to revelation plays a role in the decision-making process. However, per 
Sandel, one might say that revelation or any belief system (even atheism) is actually more 
likely to be confirmed since it is part of a socialization process by which individuals 
develop their core beliefs. This is one of the obstacles to Rawls’s original position found 
in Ratzinger’s encounter with Habermas. Common experiences need to be taken into 
consideration, as well as a rigorous level of reflection so as to step back from superficial 
understandings of one’s self that only validate previously held values. Sandel’s emphasis 
on non-distant reflection is one way to approach the objective and subjective secular 
worlds that Ratzinger and Habermas are working to reconcile. The question that arises in 
this reconciliation is: Where do the first principles of these competing worlds come from? 
In this encounter, these two worlds are represented by the devout faithful and those 
primarily guided by secular reason. Ratzinger views reason as the guiding hand that leads 
from the foremost principle, which is revelation for the faithful. His position here is 
consistent with previous philosophic outputs from the Church that designate the 
supremacy of faith and revelation over reason. Reason is represented by the dangers 




and understanding of virtue can be thought of as complete. Ratzinger sees a necessary 
check between the two. 
The importance of this event lies in more than identifying similarities between 
Habermas and Ratzinger, or the loose link between Habermas and communitarians since 
he can be perceived as a tangential ally through his own criticism of John Rawls.24
A similar discussion of faith and reason was notably framed in political 
philosophy by Leo Strauss as the tension between Athens (reason) and Jerusalem 
(revelation). Strauss put forth the idea that one should be open to both reason and faith, 
but the West experienced a great deal of setbacks, as the Bible and Greek philosophy 
were two irreconcilable codes of conduct. His solution was that the two camps needed to 
be open to one another in matters involving speculation since it was impossible to be both 
a philosopher and a theologian in the West, or a synthesis of both (1979 [1954], 111). 
This seems a reasonable proposition since siding with philosophy does require a certain 
 This 
event connects two perspectives deemed mutually exclusive throughout the modern era—
in this case, those of a believer and an atheist. In a similar manner, it also displays a 
gravitation between two poles within political philosophy—the objective and subjective. 
The event holds significant relevance for the field of political philosophy because the 
modern era has cast aside the merits of faith and providence in favor of reason, and we 
now have an example of two notable figures re-examining some of the outputs of 
modernity, namely, the West’s elevation of individual autonomy and the obsolescence of 
religion. 
                                                 
24 See Habermas’s essays, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason” and 
“‘Reasonable’ versus ‘True,’ or the Morality of Worldview,” in Inclusion of the Other 
(1998) These essays critique much of Rawls’s career, with particular focus on his A 




level of faith. Additionally, neither approach is capable of achieving knowledge of the 
whole by itself—a common thread throughout much of Strauss’s work. All of this can be 
viewed as one—and possibly the most crucial—subject of debate in the internal 
deliberation in Rawls’s original position. The openness advocated in Strauss’s 
understanding of the Athens-Jerusalem debate is similarly mirrored in the humbleness of 
the checks and limitations proposed in the Habermas encounter. Ratzinger’s and 
Habermas’s resolution to this relationship—a reciprocal checks-and-balances affair—
eventually lead to a demonstration of how religion can stabilize pluralistic societies. 
 
Context of the Encounter 
Ratzinger’s exchange with Habermas did not trigger direct, written responses; 
however, both speakers were called to present papers on the same topic—The Pre-
Political Moral Foundations of a Free State—so the event represented an exchange in so 
far as they were the sole presenters, with one another in mind as a key audience. For that 
reason, it is preferable to call this an encounter, rather than an exchange. Both lectures 
were prepared in advance, and there is an instance25
Ratzinger was serving as the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith 
and was invited by the Catholic Academy of Bavaria, along with Habermas, to speak in 
 in which Ratzinger directly mentions 
he is in agreement with Habermas on the need for “self-limitation” of both sides of the 
faith-reason debate in post-secular society, so this may have been an on-the-spot addition 
made after digesting Habermas’s lecture. 
                                                 
25 See p. 77 of Ratzinger’s essay, “That Which Holds the World Together: The Pre-
Political Moral Foundations of a Free State,” in The Dialectics of Secularization: On 




Munich on January 19, 2004. Habermas, widely known as antagonistic toward religion 
earlier in his career, arrived at conclusions similar to those of Ratzinger, a theologian and 
scholar responsible for molding the critical theological output of the Church in the second 
half of the twentieth century. This is not a striking observation since Habermas’s new soft 
spot for religion and its usefulness for consolation and social cohesion has been 
thoroughly noted by others. William Meyer’s article, “Private Faith or Public Religion? 
An Assessment of Habermas’s Changing View of Religion” (1995), describes this as a 
more tolerable view of religion since it provided humans with a way to “come to grips 
with the shattering experiences that crash in on the profane character of everyday life” 
(Meyer 1995, 376). Maeve Cooke’s article, “Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic 
Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas’s Postmetaphysical Proposal” (2006), 
finds the shift in Habermas’s view on post-metaphysical philosophy’s relationship with 
religion as one from dismissive to receptive based on two changes observed in 
Habermas’s writings. First, religion was viewed as a legitimate contributor to politics, 
especially if translated into a secular language, and second, the religious traditions 
offered “the evocative images, exemplary figures, and inspirational narratives it needs for 
its social and political projects” (Cooke 2006, 187). These insights into Habermas’s view 
on the utility of religion, which coincidentally also includes the value of narrative 
context, is not meant to infer Habermas belongs within the camp of the communitarian 
critique, but he is certainly engaged in the same topics, such as the power of narrative and 
particularism and how to deal with pluralism. In the Munich encounter, Habermas found 
himself acknowledging gross oversights of modern political philosophy, which discarded 




examined the dangers religious fundamentalism poses without the proper oversight of 
reason. In this event, both authors seek to find a balance between the claims of 
universalism and particularism, and do so in a spirit similar to that debated in the 
communitarian critique. 
 
Challenges and Chapter Organization 
Before discussing the Habermas event, this chapter presents two background 
sections: 1) a review of Pope John Paul II’s 1998 encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio (Faith 
and Reason), and 2) the definitions of two key terms—faith and reason—used in 
Ratzinger’s Munich essay as used in his previous writings. To understand the theological 
backdrop of Ratzinger’s view on faith and reason, one must first understand John Paul’s 
Fides et Ratio.26
                                                 
26 Pope Leo XII's encyclical letter, Aeterni Patris (1879), is also essential for 
understanding the Church’s quest to bring faith and reason into dialogue with another, as 
even John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio cites the letter’s central point that philosophy informs 
faith and theology and its praise of St. Thomas as the “Angelic Doctor” (John Paul II 
1998, no. 57). 
 The letter merits a discussion in this chapter, as well this research 
project in general, for two reasons. First, it represents a potential constraint that Ratzinger 
would be operating under if he wishes to maintain message accuracy with the Church. 
Second, it offers a glimpse into the Church’s position via John Paul on pluralism, linking 
this chapter to the previous communitarian chapter, since it raises questions regarding the 
necessity of homogenous societies, whether in a population’s thought or its cultural and 
ethnic origins. The discussion of pluralism also continues in the Pera exchange and Crisis 




Through background, this chapter outlines key topics (reason, faith, relativism) 
and their definitions, which are not only useful for interpreting this event and those that 
follow but also serve as a baseline from which to identify a significant change in 
Ratzinger’s works. These topics will continue to resurface throughout this research 
project. With Ratzinger having written so extensively, it may be possible to find obscure 
passages in contradiction, but the works cited here do establish a baseline from which to 
measure whether he has shifted from his previous views of the Church’s last major work 
on this subject, Fides. While the history of the faith-reason dialogue in the Church is a 
secondary fruit of this chapter—the primary being the demonstration of Ratzinger’s 
rationalism to show how this becomes the driver for placing him within the 
communitarian critique—it is nonetheless necessary since it represents a potential 
constraint for him. One does observe a small deviation between John Paul and Ratzinger. 
Whereas Fides sees a reciprocal relationship that puts revelation first, Ratzinger’s 
Munich essay introduces the idea of limitations between faith and reason. This doesn’t 
mean he rejects revelation as the starting point of first principles, but rather that he allows 
for a slight caveat—limitations as a safeguard. Given the circumstances of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, both Ratzinger and Habermas recognize this as a 
necessary escape hatch. 
The biggest challenge in examining the works discussed in this chapter is in 
distinguishing between faith and revelation, which is why this chapter includes a section 
on how Ratzinger has used these terms in his previous writings. Faith can easily be 
conflated with revelation because the distinction is not always clear, and there are 




one takes and sustains in believing and contemplating information provided through the 
divine act of revelation. Revelation can be understood as the result of when God or 
another higher entity transmits knowledge that is undiscoverable to a particular person, 
who then knows what he/she has just learned is unattainable due to the limits of the 
human intellect (Ward 1994, 16). There is a temptation to simply describe the tension in 
the Ratzinger and Habermas encounter as one of revelation and reason rather than faith 
and reason; however, it is preferable to discuss this in terms of faith since this requires 
believers to release a significant part of their self-autonomy to accept a personally 
unobserved act in deference to a divine act experienced by others. 
One could argue the harmony Ratzinger and John Paul describe between faith and 
reason only works if they (faith and revelation) are seen as one and the same. Ratzinger 
suffers from this dilemma, though to a lesser degree than John Paul. Fides and 
Ratzinger’s pre-Munich works make sense only if revelation is seen as a starting point, 
since both Ratzinger and John Paul want faith to be rational, logical, and in harmony with 
reason. Faith accepts at its core unobservable premises in the form of revelation via the 
Word of God, the Gospel. Ratzinger’s works prior to the Habermas event are certainly in 
line with this perspective, but the Munich essay suggests a slight deviation. That essay 
calls for faith and reason to put limits on one another. Rather than simply position reason 
as a process that guides faith, which is what both Ratzinger’s earlier works and Fides 
assert, in the Munich essay he puts into place a safeguard to check faith and religion 
when either becomes an irrational fundamentalist version of itself. Surprisingly, 




level, as he calls on religious doctrines and the rationalism born of the Enlightenment to 
place limits on one another. 
Ratzinger’s work is cut out for him in attempting to reconcile revelation and 
reason. Catholic scholar and theologian Fr. James Schall notes that “[f]aith and the 
intellectual life of man are often posed as if they were in conflict with each other, as if we 
had to choose one or the other.” Instead, Schall sees revelation as capable of enriching 
the intellectual life since it offers a more expansive set of knowledge to unanswered 
questions. In addition, one might say that when the “natural intellect” is perfected and the 
what is in the world is understood, philosophy becomes prepared to receive revelation 
(Schall 2004, 103–6). The idea here is that by way of faith, revelation fills a gap that 
reason or philosophy simply cannot. Ratzinger’s proposed limitations on faith and reason 
are means to preserve the idea of a knowledge gap, and the humility one must accept so 
as not to overstep one’s bounds and succumb to any form of extremism, religious or 
secular. 
 
Fides et Ratio: A Predecessor’s View on Truth, Pluralism, and Inculturation 
 
In Fides et Ratio, Ratzinger’s papal predecessor argues that faith, reason, and the 
“contemplation of truth” owe much to pre-modern philosophy (no. 47). John Paul leans 
heavily on St. Thomas Aquinas’s idea that there can be no contradiction between faith 
and reason (no. 43). Both must live in harmony without fear of the other and should 
provide mutual support (no. 100).27
                                                 
27 John Paul cites the First Vatican Ecumenical Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the 
Catholic Faith, Dei Filius, IV: DS 3019. 




position of the Church and “an authentic model for all who seek the truth.” This phrase of 
endorsement is immediately followed with further praise on Thomas’s ability achieve this 
harmony: 
In his thinking, the demands of reason and the power of faith found the most 
elevated synthesis ever attained by human thought, for he could defend the radical 
newness introduced by Revelation without ever demeaning the venture proper to 
reason (no. 78). 
 
Similar to the postulations of Ratzinger and Habermas in their encounter, Fides explains 
the radical ideologies that can develop when either faith or reason is taken to its most 
extreme form. A rationalism in which reason ventures to an extreme becomes nihilism, 
whereas faith without reason is capable of “withering into myth or superstition” (no. 46–
48). Rationalism’s extreme is nihilistic because values become completely subjective and 
a matter of victory for convincing rhetoric or force whose outcomes are just as vulnerable 
as those they refuted. This creates a feeling of meaninglessness and continual unease. 
Myth and superstition are grounds for caution since they can inspire actions through 
emotion rather than sound logic and reflection. Fides works to alleviate these concerns by 
developing a reciprocal relationship between reason and faith but treats Christian 
revelation as the ultimate clarifier in the pursuit of truth, so long as theology and 
philosophy are aided by reason. While John Paul II calls this a reciprocal and circular 
relationship, reason is subordinated to faith since the revealed word of God is said to be 
the contemplative starting point: 
Christian Revelation becomes the true point of encounter and engagement 
between philosophical and theological thinking in their reciprocal relationship. It 
is to be hoped therefore that theologians and philosophers will let themselves be 
guided by the authority of truth alone so that there will emerge a philosophy 




Christian faith and human cultures may meet, a point of understanding between 
believer and non-believer (no. 79). 
 
John Paul sees reason as a process that drives faith and contemplation. Put another 
way, faith should follow a logical path. Despite John Paul’s earlier stated optimism that 
the believer and non-believer may one day meet on commensurable grounds, he sees 
pluralism, skepticism, agnosticism, and relativism as dangerous byproducts of 
modernity’s pure reason, for they lead to a “lack of confidence in truth” (no. 5). 
Fides parallels Ratzinger’s work on the intersection of faith, reason, truth, and 
cultures, as John Paul takes on the challenge of how cultures can transcend boundaries 
and find common truth. The letter positions pluralism as a challenging multitude of 
viewpoints rather than simply reducing it to an issue of cultural differences. John Paul’s 
solution to the issue of pluralism revolves around the idea that there is a universality to 
the Roman Catholic tradition that applies to any society when it peels back its cultural 
circumstances and reveals the essence of itself. With regard to diversity in thought, the 
letter states that the rise of various doctrines and “plurality of positions,” all of which are 
held “equally valid,” has devalued truths once judged certain (no. 5). While John Paul 
and Ratzinger often associate weak confidence levels in the concept of truth with the rise 
of relativism, the root cause could easily be identified as the autonomous individual 
described in the communitarian critique. 
While acknowledging a basis of truth, the letter takes on cultural differences by 
contending that “no one culture can ever become the criterion of judgment, much less the 
ultimate criterion of truth with regard to God’s Revelation” (no. 71). In other words, one 




hear John Paul talk about plurality in this sense it is with regard to philosophical 
viewpoints, not the fitness or even superiority of one culture. The communitarian 
critique, however, would question what role culture plays in political socialization and 
what effect this has on viewpoint. There is also an irony here since John Paul goes on to 
talk about the influence of Greek philosophy on the Gospel and Catholic theology. He is 
concerned with the challenge cultural pluralism presents by denying the “universal value 
of the Church’s philosophical heritage”; however, he recognizes that “[i]n preaching the 
Gospel, Christianity first encountered Greek philosophy; but this does not mean at all that 
other approaches are precluded” (no. 69–72). So, did Christianity experience its own 
inculturation when it came into contact with Greek philosophy? Or, was Greek 
philosophy and language already a part of Christianity? John Paul answers these 
questions in the following passage, suggesting that the Church experienced its own 
inculturation with the Greco-Latin world: 
in engaging great cultures for the first time, the Church cannot abandon what she 
has gained from her inculturation in the world of Greco-Latin thought. To reject 
this heritage would be to deny the providential plan of God who guides his 
Church down the paths of time and history (no. 72). 
 
There is an inference here that the Church added its own contribution to philosophy at 
this point of inculturation. 
For the most part, Ratzinger’s work during John Paul’s reign and after—up until 
the Munich event—is in sync with Fides. Ratzinger’s more developed pieces place faith 
and reason within contemporary political thought, as he attempts to find a home for his 




relativism (philosophic pluralism), but Ratzinger’s rationalism leaves the window of 
reason open a little wider than John Paul’s. 
Ratzinger’s own awareness and admiration of the letter is seen in his article, 
“Culture of Truth: Some Reflections on the Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio,” in which he 
explains Fides and its call to examine the “ultimate questions” about such topics as sin 
and grace and death and eternal life, lest man begins to forget what is “authentically 
human” (Ratzinger 1999, 376). One can only expect that Ratzinger would fully endorse 
the letter. Any deviation from Fides to Ratzinger’s Munich paper, whether intended or 
not, is not necessarily a contradiction of Fides or Ratzinger’s previous writings but rather 
a refinement—an evolution in sync with Ratzinger’s earlier writings that contends new 
dimensions are to be discovered through faith when led by reason. Attention should be 
called to the year Ratzinger’s views on Fides were written, 1999. The world experienced 
a dramatic change after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, so again, the shift 
seen is a wider opening for the role of reason. 
 
Ratzinger’s Previous Works on Faith and Reason 
 
 The Habermas exchange represents a culmination of decades of Ratzinger’s work 
on the intersection of law with faith and reason. What separates this exchange from 
previous writings is that Ratzinger puts into place a new system—the cooperative 
limitations faith and reason may place on one another—to evaluate truth claims and 
reconcile faith with reason in the public sphere rather than through theology or the 




with broadly, but the re-emergence of religion-inspired violence revealed a need for 
further examination. The essay presented in Munich to Habermas and others provides a 
new solution. 
Prior to his papacy, Ratzinger gave three in-depth interviews,28
In the Habermas event, many of Ratzinger’s thoughts on faith and reason 
crystallize into a compact explanation of how the tension between the two played out in 
the beginning of the twenty-first century in the context of religious fundamentalism, in 
this case a radical Islam that inspired the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which 
 which offer 
insights into his thoughts and writings. These interviews and other key texts of his help 
bring definition to the core philosophical concepts used throughout the Habermas event. 
They also show a consistent pattern in Ratzinger’s treatment of faith and reason, a 
general consonance with Fides, and evidence of the many years he has spent thinking 
about this subject—much of which reflects his own personal struggles with the tension 
between faith and reason. In all of Ratzinger’s writings on faith and reason we see a 
similarity to MacIntyre’s assertion that reason is a tool to be used to instruct rather than 
an end or value in and of itself, as it helps transform humans from how they happen to be 
by aiding them in realizing their potential. This is evident in Ratzinger’s view that faith is 
something that must be renewed and nurtured to reach its end and the idea that reason 
informs a process to reach spiritual perfection. This point also reaches to the element of 
humility found in Ratzinger’s understanding of faith. 
                                                 
28 God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time: A Conversation with Peter 
Seewald (2002); Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium: An 
Interview with Peter Seewald (1997); and The Ratzinger Report: An Exclusive Interview 
on the State of the Church with Vittorio Messori (1985). Before English translations were 




can be looked at as an example of corrupted faith. Ratzinger had dealt with religion-
inspired political extremism in the 1980s as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith when he confronted the phenomenon of liberation theology in South American 
Catholicism. Reflecting back on this political-religious hybrid, he states in his Salt of the 
Earth interview with Peter Seewald that with liberation theology “there was the threat of 
politicization of the faith that would have forced it into an irresponsible political 
partisanship, thus destroying the properly religious dimension” (1996b, 94). He expresses 
a similar sentiment in a 1996 address to the presidents of the Doctrinal Commissions of 
the Bishops’ Conference of Latin America, where he noted: “The fact is that when 
politics are used to bring redemption, they promise too much. When they presume to do 
God’s work, they become not divine but diabolical” (1996a, 228). Both the 2001 terrorist 
attacks and liberation theology can be looked on as materialized examples of corrupted 
faith, out-of-sync with Ratzinger and John Paul’s normative understandings of faith and 
reason. 
 
Defining Reason in Previous Works 
Ratzinger’s previous works discuss reason in regard to sufficiency, its utility in 
discovering truth, and what happens when it takes on an extreme form such as relativism, 
also described as consequentialism and proportionalism. Most important, reason is not 
completely detached from faith, as Ratzinger rolls up reason as a component of faith—
this is discussed as the third point in the next section, in which he defines his 




The self-sufficiency of philosophy has been on Ratzinger’s mind as far back as 
his post-doctoral work, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (1971), a study of the 
relationship between history and metaphysics as understood by Bonaventure. The study 
does little to interject Ratzinger’s own position on the relationship between faith and 
reason, but one can interpret a lack of critique of Bonaventure—a theologian whose 
writings are ripe in anti-Aristotelianism and the subordination of philosophy as a self-
sufficient method to theology—as an insight into Ratzinger’s own views at the time. 
 Locking down a clear definition of reason as a tool is less about what it is and 
more about what it looks like when left unchained and without the backdrop of revelation 
as a starting point. Rather than viewing reason as an end in and of itself, it is simply 
sound logic that builds off premises. One accepts that premises (also understood as first 
principles) are verified by some truth criterion or observation. This is a tricky subject for 
faith since there is little room for verification of revelation. One target of modernity with 
a purported scientific foundation that resurfaces throughout Ratzinger’s writings is the 
Marxist enterprise, which he often links, albeit in a tangential way, to relativism. In the 
same address to the Bishops’ Conference of Latin America mentioned earlier, he uses the 
technique of observation—the historically demonstrated failure of the Marxist system—
to strip it of merit while also linking it to relativism. He believes the ideology’s key 
failure was its reliance on scientific method and knowledge of world history to underpin 
its promises. The failure of this “scientifically based system for solving human problems 
could only justify nihilism or, at the least, total relativism” (1996a, 228). There is a clear 




 Ratzinger’s approach to relativism also offers some insights into his own 
communitarian leanings and critique of liberal democracy, particularly the moral disorder 
that MacIntyre describes in After Virtue. Ratzinger calls relativism “the philosophical 
foundation of democracy” (1996a, 229). He claims the reason for this is that in a 
democracy: 
no one can presume to know the true way, and it is enriched by the fact that all 
roads are mutually recognized as fragments of the effort toward that which is 
better. Therefore, all roads seek something common in dialogue, and they also 
compete regarding knowledge that cannot be compatible in one common form. A 
system of freedom ought to be essentially a system of positions that are connected 
with one another because they are relative, as well as dependent on historical 
situations open to new developments. (1996a, 229). 
 
While Ratzinger understands relativism to be the cause of value incompatibility, 
which we could easily equate to the same moral disorder described by MacIntyre, it is 
actually the result. The driver is better understood in MacIntyre’s terms as the 
disappearance of common language and narrative. This passage also lays out the 
challenges communitarians believe individuals face in judging actions and the political 
institutions that support the freedom for one to make these judgments. The ability to set 
up such a system is dependent on the capability to define truth or the moral codes by 
which one would construct (a pragmatic-, positivist-, or subjectivist-understood 
perspective) or discover (objectivist perspective) a society. 
Ratzinger is aware of the objective-subjective challenge, often connecting it to the 
pursuit of truth. In his interview with Peter Seewald, he states that through the rise of 
relativism “it seems to modern man undemocratic, intolerant, and also incompatible with 
the scientist’s necessary skepticism to say that we have the truth and that something else 




interview with Vittorio Messori, he defines relativism as “consequentialism” and 
“proportionalism” whereby the former discovers the goodness of an act as a condition 
dependent on its foreseeable end and consequences, and the latter evaluates moral 
conduct based on the “‘proportion’ between good and evil” of the effects that an act will 
yield (1985, 90). 
 In the Habermas event, as well as the Pera exchange, Ratzinger carves out a place 
for God and faith in society. In previous writings, he takes on modern thinkers such as 
Nietzsche, who sought to push divine forces from the public sphere.29
 
 This thought 
carried over into contemporary times and is now compounded by what Ratzinger 
describes in his God and the World interview as a “culture of technology, and welfare 
[that] rests on the belief that basically we can do anything,” which, in turn, causes the 
role of God to leave the stage (2000, 27). 
Defining Faith in Previous Works 
Ratzinger’s writings prior to the Munich event contain three prominent elements 
of faith that are pertinent to this study’s definition of faith in a philosophical context: 
personal transcendence, perennial renewal, and reason as a component of faith. Overall, 
these three elements contribute to a feeling of humility when it comes to faith and 
spiritual perfection. One finds his descriptions of faith to be as an imperfect yet resilient 
entity that functions like a living, breathing organism that must be nourished, practiced, 
and challenged to remain healthy. Ratzinger’s “On the Meaning of Faith” describes 
“chief points of faith” that include “God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, grace and sin, 
                                                 




sacraments and church, death and eternal life,” all of which “are never outmoded” (1997, 
211). His feeling is that faith is here to stay since there is something about the human 
condition that has allowed it to persist. 
When faith is in action, it provides personal transcendence through either a 
communal or divine transformation—communal through participation in the Church, 
divine by connecting to God through communion. Personal to communal transcendence 
is important because it shows an attempt on the part of the Church to preserve the 
individual sphere and elements of the self, but only with regard to what this means for the 
group, which ultimately places one closer to God. “On the Meaning of Faith” also 
describes faith as a personal act that transcends and liberates the self, bringing it into 
communion with God through communion with Christ (1997, 212). In his Salt of the 
Earth interview Ratzinger states that when one finally encounters Christ, God who is a 
man, “a culture of faith arises” (1996b, 35). This is the same culture of faith that 
Ratzinger speaks to in the Pera exchange, and this then becomes a sense of the sacred, so 
the implication is larger than application to the Habermas event in understanding what 
Ratzinger means by “faith.” 
 To sustain the life of faith, it must “be constantly renewed,” according to 
Ratzinger in “On the Meaning of Faith” (1997, 211). This can be quite challenging, and is 
intended to be more than simply self-preservation. In the God and the World interview, 
Ratzinger states that faith is always under pressure and threat, and if dealt with properly 
can strengthen individuals’ beliefs as they mature through the various stages of life. As 
such, faith never turns into what Ratzinger calls a “convenient ideology” (2000, 36). In 




avoid succumbing to religious fundamentalism or blind quests to harness the incorporeal. 
In the Salt interview Ratzinger warns against the dangers of “[t]he quest for certainty and 
simplicity,” stating that these efforts have the potential to result in “fanaticism and 
narrow-mindedness” (1996b, 137). One accepts both a hierarchical placement in the awe 
of God and the idea that faith is a work-in-progress that embodies even the view of non-
believers and skeptics, making humility an important part of the faithful life. 
Furthermore, there is never an end to knowledge acquisition, especially of the divine, as 
he states in the God and the World interview: “It is never the case that we can say, ‘Now 
we know everything; now the knowledge of Christianity is complete.’ There are 
unfathomable depths both in God and in human life, so that there are always new 
dimensions to faith” (2000, 38). Ratzinger believes that what man (and this includes the 
Church) asserts he does know about God through revelation and the Gospel is likely an 
incomplete interpretation; however, this interpretation becomes clearer as each generation 
discovers new dimensions about God (2000, 38). All of these thoughts on faith’s 
imperfections lead to an overarching and humbling sense that while faith is the 
acceptance of an unscientific measurement, it is still satisfactory. Ratzinger calls on 
religion to acknowledge its own limits, but he still recognizes and accepts the unscientific 
nature of faith. He understands that “faith cannot be rationally demonstrated” (2000, 48) 
and that “faith in God is not a form of knowledge that can be learned like chemistry or 
mathematics, but remains a belief” (2000, 33). To become dependent on scientific 
knowledge, one can only see what is tangible, preventing one from seeing what science 
cannot measure, God. The take-away from Ratzinger’s emphasis on this is that he doesn’t 




faith—it is sufficient in and of itself, so long as it is guided by reason and prudence and 
does not lead to fanaticism, so it is no coincidence that reason is seen as a component of 
faith, making it consistent with John Paul’s Fides encyclical. For Ratzinger, faith and 
reason must live in harmony, especially in the pursuit of truth. In the Salt interview he 
states that faith comes from God who is reason itself, and by submitting in faith to him, 
even though one will not understand him, one opens the door to understanding (1996b, 
33). What’s more, “[f]aith demands to be understood” according to Ratzinger in his God 
and the World interview (2000, 47). 
 
Jürgen Habermas’s Munich Essay: “Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic 
Constitutional State” 
 
Before analyzing Ratzinger’s essay, this chapter looks at Habermas’s piece 
presented at the same occasion. The essay begins by asking whether law as de facto 
legislation, and nothing else, is still capable of providing “a secular justification of 
political rule…that is nonreligious or postmetaphysical” (22). This query injects the 
principal issue Habermas works to resolve in his essay: How can religion be integrated 
into democratic constitutional states that, to an extent, depend on a state shedding 
religious or metaphysical baggage, when many of its constituents still possess such 
artifacts in the form of religious practices or the deeply ingrained beliefs unassociated 
with any religious affiliation? The difficulty lies in the fact that an environment that 
easily reconciles opposing views cannot be fostered when citizens subscribe to beliefs 
grounded in non-observable phenomena. The integration of religion into democracy 




of premises and evidence is hard to locate. This makes any viewpoint as valid as the next, 
whether it is metaphysical viewpoints standing against one another or metaphysical views 
standing against post-metaphysical views, such as those born out of the Enlightenment 
and the modern era. This is the same challenge noted in the communitarian critique as 
competing, independent first principles, particularly when a multitude exist through 
disparate sets of moral language. For MacIntyre, this is the idea that when we trace back 
rival conclusions to their premises (first principles) we often find them nothing more than 
assertions (AV, 8). The trouble with this is that one assertion is just as sound as the next. 
The communitarian critique at large points to the Enlightenment as the trigger for this 
confusion. Habermas’s essay does not take on the cause, but rather addresses how to 
reconcile the existing conditions of the objective-subjective divide in post-secular 
societies. 
To produce a more sustainable and effective system in the post-secular world, 
Habermas suggests that “both the traditions of the Enlightenment and the religious 
doctrines reflect on their own respective limits.” His solution is based on the idea that for 
a liberal society to thrive, there must be a solidarity among its citizens. To do this, liberal 
states will have to account for the values of both believers and unbelievers (22–23). 
 
Habermas on Catholicism 
Given that Ratzinger and the Catholic Academy of Bavaria are in prime focus, 
Habermas takes time to connect the role of reason in establishing law with the Catholic 
tradition, noting that the Church has found ways to construct laws outside of the 




reason guided by natural light)—to justify either morality or law independent of 
revelation (25). It is not known whether Ratzinger was provided a copy of Habermas’s 
essay prior to writing his piece, but it is important to highlight that Ratzinger draws on 
this same method in his essay when recalling how the Church encouraged Catholic 
politicians to handle the matter of abortion in a non-metaphysical sense. Habermas is also 
aware of the challenges Catholicism faces in confronting the Enlightenment and 
liberalism, and he highlights some of the very issues Ratzinger addresses later in the 
Crisis of Cultures address and Regensburg Lecture, particularly Ratzinger’s co-opt of the 
Enlightenment. It is difficult to correlate the Habermas exchange with Ratzinger's 
discussions of modernity and the Enlightenment in subsequent chapters, but the following 
passage from Habermas’s essay gets to the heart of Ratzinger’s predicament in 
addressing the modern world: 
A radical skepticism vis-à-vis reason is profoundly alien to the Catholic tradition; 
but until the 1960s, Catholicism had great difficulties in understanding the secular 
thinking of humanism, the Enlightenment, and political liberalism. And this is 
why, even today, there is a ready audience for the theory that the remorseful 
modern age can find its way out of the blind alley only by means of the religious 
orientation to a transcendent point of reference (37). 
 
Habermas on Shaping Solidarity 
Habermas believes the liberal state demands a constitution independent of 
religious and metaphysical traditions and can only be created through a democratic 
process. The constitution is authored by its citizens, who expect those addressed by the 
law to not transgress its barriers. At the same time, the citizens are expected to make use 
of their rights to free speech and participation in government for both their own interests 




making solidarity difficult to achieve; however, this solidarity is essential for a healthy 
democracy. Law based on embedded cultural values makes solidarity a conceptual 
reality: “An abstract solidarity, mediated by the law, arises among citizens only when the 
principles of justice have penetrated more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations 
in a given culture” (34). As evidence, Habermas uses his native country, Germany, and 
the history of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Constitution as an 
example of “a common language, and, above all, [a] newly awakened national 
consciousness, help[ing to] create a highly abstract solidarity on the part of citizens” (32). 
Civil bonds can break when citizens act “on the basis of their own self-interest” 
and use “subjective rights only as weapons against each other,” or when markets take 
control of the global economy (35–36). What Habermas sees here is the corruption of 
autonomy—whether on the individual citizen level in a rights-based war against all, or 
more broadly the winner-take-all system of an unregulated global marketplace. In either 
case, these entities are emboldened to dominate without consideration or law to guide 
behaviors. If the jurisprudential arguments for laws that would counter this were to be 
constructed, they would need to take into account both philosophy and religion, and this 
understanding is the centerpiece of Habermas’s essay. Philosophy must take the 
phenomenon of religion in a secularized environment seriously, and as a challenge (38). 
 
Habermas’s Munich Rationalism 
 While calling on philosophy to take religion seriously, the principal driver for 
Habermas’s own rationalism is not clear in his essay, but one wonders whether he 




reflects on its deepest foundations, it discovers that it owes its origins to something else” 
(40). At first glance, one might be led to believe that Habermas is inferring some type of 
metaphysical transcendence such as the Active Intellect, but upon further inspection this 
looks more like an acknowledgment of the impact cultural influences have on reason. In 
that vein, philosophy and religion should do more than simply respect one another—they 
should be willing to learn from one another, as they are intertwined in intricate ways that 
both the believer and unbeliever may be unable to see. Habermas believes philosophy 
itself has both functional and substantial reasons to remain open to this. Using the 
Western mode of philosophy as an example of the “mutual compenetration of 
Christianity and Greek metaphysics,” he says that this can be seen in Hellenized 
Christianity and the absorption of Christian ideas into philosophy (44). This 
understanding explains Habermas’s conclusion that secularist citizens play an important 
role in liberal societies. Secularists act as interpreters of believers, translating “relevant 
contributions from the religious language into a language that is accessible to the public 
as a whole” (52).30
                                                 
30 Habermas cites his own work in this closing idea: J. Habermas, Glauben und Wissen 
(Frankfurt am Main, 2001). 
 This can only be made possible under a state-supported umbrella of 
tolerance that protects both unbelievers and diverse sets of believers. Under these 
conditions, believers should expect public resistance and secularists should give 
consideration to the idea that truth can be expressed through religious imagery (50–51). 




method of tiered interpretations expressed by medievalists such as Maimonides in the 
Guide of the Perplexed,31
 
 or the power of narrative described by communitarians. 
Joseph Ratzinger’s Munich Essay: “That Which Holds the World Together: The Pre-
Political Moral Foundations of a Free State” 
 
Ratzinger’s essay seeks to reconcile the issues that arise out of the relationship 
between faith and reason, particularly in pluralistic societies. He is aware that the quest 
for a universal culture or way of thinking to connect disparate, and even similar, peoples 
has long been a challenge for the Church. The concepts in his essay belong to a long 
tradition in political philosophy that begins with Aristotle’s notion of human 
insufficiency, the concept of rule of law, and justice’s relationship to truth, and moves as 
far forward as Strauss’s discussion of the conflict between the biblical and Greek 
philosophic and even further to the discussions in late twentieth–century 
communitarianism. Specifically, the essay touches on communitarian notions that state 
that individual morals are constructed, or at least influenced by, the community to which 
they belong. Related, the essay also exposes the dangers that extreme individualism born 
out of the post-Enlightenment era can lead to. Early in Ratzinger’s essay he makes a 
passing mention of Catholic theologian and priest Hans Küng’s proposal of a “world 
ethos,” which sets the expectation that Ratzinger will explore the idea of a global social 
glue—a subject at the heart of Ratzinger’s mature political writings and well established 
in some of the basic fundamental questions of political philosophy. 
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 It is difficult to determine what a world ethos would look like for Ratzinger in this 
essay, but he does assert what should not be a part of the process to create it, namely, 
science, since it “played a role in the collapse of the old moral certainties” (56). One 
wishes Ratzinger would have pushed this concept of world ethos further—whether in 
criticism of or support for—but other works of his fill this void, specifically, those that 
address inculturation, as seen in the Regensburg Lecture (see chapter 5). Ratzinger likely 
held his tongue on pursuing either since a critique would have brought into question the 
universal nature of the Church, while explicitly advocating this would have placed 
himself too close to Küng, who a year earlier had begun seeking to restore his teaching 
rights in Catholic universities.32
Despite Ratzinger’s mitigation of science, he does acknowledge the value of the 
discipline in relation to philosophy. Science provides the criteria to distinguish scientific 
from non-scientific findings, while, similarly, philosophy possesses an artful eye and 
comprehensive humanistic outlook for extracting the non-scientific elements from 
scientific results (57). While Ratzinger is clearly acknowledging the merits of science, he 
is still assigning it a subordinate role since knowledge of the whole is made possible by 
philosophy. His essay aims to clarify this equivocal technique of sterilizing scientific 
results. Along the way, it offers a number of insights into Ratzinger’s political mind on 
such topics as the origins of law, majority consensus, human rights, and, most important, 
the role of reason in both democracy and religion. Ratzinger understands that he is 
presenting to a dual audience—Habermas and the Catholic Academy of Bavaria—and 
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uses this opportunity to develop what can be viewed as a compact synthesis of years of 
academic development and theological output on how he believes religion intersects with 
secularism in society and its laws. His discussions of universal religion and law represent 
the apex of his piece and are essential for defining communities global or local. The 
world has been globalizing throughout Ratzinger’s career—a fact he notes in the opening 
sentences of the essay—and the Church is in a unique position to address this as it is both 
a state and an organization with an international ideological reach into the attitudes and 
behavior of its followers. Ratzinger’s ideas on reason and the implications for identity 
and community organizing are applicable to local communities, states, and even 
continental or global identities such as those connected through common religious 
denominations. He is certainly speaking to a Western, specifically European, audience, 
but one could easily apply these principles on a global scale or at least regionally within 
Europe, as is the case in the Marcello Pera exchange, in which Ratzinger calls for 
resurrecting a sense of the sacred to mold communities and even law. 
 
Importance of the Origins of Law 
Law is an important discussion point for reason and revelation since it represents 
an output formed through their interactions and the general culture surrounding them. For 
Ratzinger, power without the anchor of law takes on an arbitrary nature. In discussing 
law, freedom, and anarchy, Ratzinger challenges what could be seen as the 
Thrasymachus position on power33
                                                 
33 See Book I, section 338c–341a, of Plato’s Republic. 
 as advanced by this interlocutor of Socrates in Plato’s 




reference to Plato’s work in Ratzinger’s essay, but the target is the same as he takes aim 
at this position: “[Power] is not the law of the stronger, but the strength of the law that 
must hold sway” (58). His interpretation also embodies elements from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics,34
Power as structured by law, and at the service of the law, is the antithesis of 
violence, which is a lawless power that opposes the law. This is why it is 
important for every society to overcome any suspicion that is cast on the law and 
its regulations, for it is only in this way that arbitrariness can be excluded and 
freedom can be experienced as a freedom shared in common with others. 
Freedom without law is anarchy and, hence, the destruction of freedom (58). 
 as he emphasizes the buffer that law must perform on power: 
 
There is no freedom without law, for when law is designed properly it ensures basic 
fundamental rights of human equality. How Ratzinger would employ law to mold 
fundamental characteristics of a civilization’s culture becomes clear later—he sees law as 
a call to bring a sense of the sacred back into the public sphere. 
 Although law might be used to shape a society, it also must represent the interests 
of the many. Ratzinger posits a deference to common interests that carries with it an 
understanding that there are times when self-interest and belief in one’s expertise must be 
set aside. He argues that law should be formulated by the group instead of the few. This 
represents both a “democratic will” and an “expression of the common interest of all” 
(59). Just how democratic Ratzinger intends this formulation to be takes into account the 
dispositions of majorities. 
                                                 
34 In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes that his concept of the highest 
and most complete moral virtues—beautiful actions perfected through a life of 
contemplation—must be emphasized through law since this is the best way they can 
become habitual (1179b). In short, law becomes the stabilizing force that promotes moral 
action. In the final words of the Ethics, Aristotle introduces the core subject of his next 
work, Politics, and the idea that certain constitutions can preserve cities and under what 




As Ratzinger explores how law is formed, and the effects majorities have in 
forming it, a communitarian balancing act between the group and the individual emerges, 
as well as the classic dilemma in political philosophy laid out by Aristotle regarding the 
rule of law (the one, few, or many).35
Human rights are an example of this, as they are an objective, universal standard 
that transcends time; they are “self-subsistent values that flow from the essence of what it 
is to be a man, and are therefore inviolable: no other man can infringe them” (61). The 
idea here is that humans are entitled to certain rights, whether by a natural order as one 
would find in Lockean property dialogue or those set by God through revelation. This is 
not an uncommon idea, as human rights are also referred to as universal in the political 
and legal sectors.
 Ratzinger reminds his audience that a majority, 
even a statistically potent one, does not guarantee that the law that strong majority crafts 
is free from neglecting the consideration of minorities. Regardless of who forms the law, 
there is still an objective standard for which Ratzinger suggests lawmakers aim. He calls 
this “something that is antecedent to every majority decision and must be respected by all 
such decisions” (60). 
36
                                                 
35 See Book III, chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Politics, in which he lays out three types of 
constitutions, both right and wrong: kingship (one), aristocracy (few), and constitutional 
government or polity (many) as the right types; and tyranny (one), oligarchy (few), and 
democracy (many) as the wrong types. 
 However, Ratzinger does question whether these values can be 
36 For example, in 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations’s “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” articulated certain “inalienable rights of the human 
family” (preamble) that include a number of rights taken to be universal: rights extend to 
all regardless of background and makeup (Article 2); “the right to life, liberty, and the 
security of person” (Article 3); freedom from slavery (Article 4) and inhuman treatment 
and punishment (Article 5); freedom of movement and residence (Article 12); property 
ownership (Article 17), and freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19). There are 
other articles that would also apply, but those listed here are certainly universal and point 




sustained since they are not regarded as the same in every culture (61). Without providing 
specific examples of deviations, Ratzinger notes that, for instance, Islam’s catalog of 
human rights differs from that of the West (61). 
Human rights are a product of natural law, and Ratzinger thinks this discovery 
could be pushed further. This is not surprising, given the emphasis he has placed on the 
concept of human dignity throughout his career when promoting the pro-life movement. 
Ratzinger views human rights as a matter of “human obligation and of human 
limitations” (71). This is a very notable proclamation, considering the implications for 
liberal entitlement theory, which focuses on protecting the personal sphere. Curbing this 
freedom further places Ratzinger within the communitarian camp of balancing the 
individual with the group; in this case, a slight restraint on personal freedom fulfills an 
obligation to preserve the group. If obligations to a group or natural law exist, Ratzinger 
hopes we might see parallel structures across cultures that point to a rational nature, and 
hence, to the possibility that a rational law is present for different groups throughout the 
world: 
For Christians, this dialogue would speak of the creation and the Creator. In the 
Indian world, this would correspond to the concept of “dharma,” the inner law 
that regulates all Being; in the Chinese tradition, it would correspond to the idea 
of the structures ordained in heaven (72). 
 
Given the range of global diversity—whether in philosophic thought, religion, or 
its intertwined cultural differences—Ratzinger doubts that either a universal religion or a 
single secular rational model could unite the world. He concludes that Küng’s world 
ethos proposition “remains an abstraction” (76). This conclusion is consistent with a 




equilibrium between the secular and faithful is reached. It is not simply a case of one side 
willing itself over the other. 
 
Terrorism and Religious Fundamentalism: When Reason Becomes Will 
The subject of terrorism seems an odd insertion for a discussion on law, except 
for the threat that terrorism rooted in religious fundamentalism poses for the purity of 
religion and law. Terrorism operates outside of the framework of law and social 
compacts, sometimes taking inspiration in contrast to the consensus of the majority who 
defines laws and governmental systems. Ratzinger is deeply concerned with what he calls 
the “anonymous powers of terror, which can be present anywhere, and are strong enough 
to pursue everyone into the sphere of everyday life” (63). In comparison, fears born out 
of the aftermath of the Second World War, namely, the fear of nuclear annihilation, were 
kept in check by “[t]he mutual limitation of power, and the fear for one’s own survival 
proved powerful enough to save the world” (62–63). In other words, the equality of threat 
and mutual agreement stopped possible nuclear conflicts. Twenty-first-century terrorism, 
on the other hand, operates on a different, less transparent level—terrorists are largely 
anonymous and not directly linked to a state or easily identifiable pipeline for retribution. 
What Ratzinger is getting at is that ideology may be the only centralized origin for both 
loose and linked terrorist associations. Terrorist motivations further complicate this 
matter since they often include a “defense of religious tradition against the godlessness of 
Western Society” (64). It is this link between religion and political action that has 




this moment in the essay. Ratzinger’s solution is that reason must act as a policing force 
on religious fanaticism: 
If one of the sources of terrorism is religious fanaticism—and this is in fact the 
case—is then religion a healing and saving force? Or is it not rather an archaic 
and dangerous force that builds up false universalisms, thereby leading to 
intolerance and acts of terrorism? Must not religion, therefore, be placed under the 
guardianship of reason, and its boundaries carefully marked off? (64) 
 
Likewise, Ratzinger believes that religion should police unrestrained reason. To 
illustrate a contemporary example of this, he notes mankind’s ability to create humans in 
laboratories and develop weapons of mass destruction as products of unrestrained reason, 
all of which he believes question the “reliability of reason” (65). Ratzinger’s proposal is 
to consider whether religion and reason ought to “restrict each other and remind each 
other where their limits are” (65–66). These concerns sound familiar to the 
communitarian discussion of first principles and criticism of modernity’s primacy of will, 
choice, and self-autonomy. Humans create, and use, the atomic bomb because they can. 
Simply put, unchecked reason turns into pure will. MacIntyre similarly states this point 
by arguing that reason has been replaced by choice and will (AV, 47). Reason takes over 
for ethics and objective standards, and then when reason fails, will takes over. In either 
case, that of Ratzinger or MacIntyre and other communitarians, self-autonomy is 
identified as the driver. 
 
Ratzinger’s New Rationalism? 
 Ratzinger’s rationalism in this essay presents itself as one that believes that 




reason) must employ the concept of “self-limitation,” be open to learning from each 
other, acknowledge they need one another, and “purify and help one another” (77–78). 
The first two parts (openness and self-limitation) of this rationalism are explicitly noted 
by Ratzinger as being in general agreement with Habermas, and the second two 
(acknowledgment and purification) could be thought to comport as well. For Ratzinger, 
this is a slight refinement to the rationalism developed in his earlier writings. It’s also a 
significant recognition of the reach that pluralism has had throughout the West, as well as 
how this should be dealt with philosophically. Ratzinger is calling on faith and reason to 
set proper limits on one another, establishing what seems like a complimentary pairing. 
This is the biggest development in his view of rationalism over time. Where before he 
took John Paul’s cue from Fides and set faith and reason to live in harmony by 
positioning reason as a component and driver of faith, Ratzinger now adds the caveat that 
each should be used to set limits on the other. There is a temptation to declare that 
Ratzinger has placed these concepts on equal footing, but since the situation is described 
in terms of restraint, albeit a circular one, it is better understood as a caveat or add-on to 
Fides and Ratzinger’s previous writings. Most important for this research project, 
Ratzinger has gone to great depths to address subjective-objective distinctions and the 
role that reflection, which includes self-limitation and acceptance of a deficient 
knowledge of the whole, plays in resolving this matter. 
The power of restraint can also be understood as proper and comprehensive 
reflection, particularly the form advanced by Sandel when he challenges the rigidness of 
Rawls’s original position and its transcendental, objective claims. In such a state, Sandel 




interests or preferences can exist at the same time even when rationalized back to first 
premises (LLJ, 128). The original position, like the state of religious fundamentalists or 
those who choose reason and will as their primary drivers, forgoes any possibility of 
falsification, and in the end, humility. Additionally, Sandel would argue that no choice 
has been made at all. Rather, one merely confirms familiar ideas. To restrain the 
individual from this disposition, Sandel treats this issue as a matter of identity, in which 
individuals must sort through their various socialized and natural components by looking 
inward. His description here mentions nothing of faith, but resembles the robust 
reflection process for which Ratzinger and Habermas are reaching. Sandel writes: 
Unlike the capacity for choice, which enables the self to reach beyond itself, the 
capacity for reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward upon itself, to 
inquire into its constitutive nature, to survey its various attachments and 
acknowledge their respective claims, to sort out the bounds—now expansive, now 
constrained—between the self and the other, to arrive at a subjectivity less fluid if 
never finally fixed, and so gradually through a lifetime, to participate in the 
constitution of its identity (LLJ, 153). 
 
Identity becomes the subjective matter to sort through in the reflective process described 
by Sandel. In the Pera exchange, we’ll also see how this change in perception, according 
to Ratzinger and Pera, has led to the spread of relativism in Europe and the destruction of 
a meaningful identity. 
 Ratzinger’s Munich essay ends with a brief analysis of the global cultural 
implications that arise from the relationship between faith and reason in the West, 
particularly the idea that the West’s push-and-pull system of Christian faith and secular 
rationality is indicative of Eurocentrism or even superiority. Instead, as the West learns to 
view faith and reason as complimentary, it should re-appropriate this relationship as a 




offer compelling evidence that Ratzinger doubts a world ethos is possible, he does think 
that a philosophic approach that borrows from the act of balancing faith and reason could 
also be applied to harmonizing cultural differences. As Ratzinger closes his essay, one 
wonders if he is suggesting a purification process that produces homogeneity, or one that 
genuinely accepts diversity with the understanding that there are necessary tools for 
tolerance that make such relations possible. Since Ratzinger has been careful not to assert 
a Eurocentric view, one should interpret that he is not entirely endorsing the model of 
homogeneity. This is important to remember before examining the Marcello Pera 
exchange. There, Pera takes liberties with some of Ratzinger’s writings on relativism and 
combines them with evaluating one culture against another, something that is at great 
odds with Ratzinger’s closing remarks in the Munich essay and which forces Ratzinger to 
then clarify his stance in his responses to Pera. In the Pera exchange, we see how 
Ratzinger’s rationalism leads him to navigate what he considers to be the cloudy waters 




Chapter 4: Social Solidarity, Identity, and the Challenge of 
Pluralism in the Pera Exchange 
 
Since the free individual can only maintain his identity within a society/culture of a 
certain kind, he has to be concerned about the shape of this society/culture as a whole. 




Obligation through Identity and Sacred Common Denominators 
 
Joseph Ratzinger’s 2004 exchange with then president of the Italian Senate 
Marcello Pera examines a materialized demonstration of the challenge competing 
identities pose in respect to accepted virtues, customs, and mores in Europe, or as 
Ratzinger describes this concept in this event—a sense of the sacred. Unique to 
Ratzinger’s political teaching, the sacred—historical values, mores, and codes of conduct 
often intertwined with those religious beliefs most highly respected in a society—is about 
not letting one’s heritage become obsolete, which would culminate in the termination of 
cultural and philosophic predecessors. The sacred fosters a sense of obligation through 
the generational connections found when re-discovering one’s culture. For Ratzinger, it 
speaks to how a traditional institution such as the Church can remain relevant as a 
civilization changes and how citizens can be drawn to moral action as attachments to 
those around them are loosened through a diluted identity. 
The two interlocutors in this exchange are addressing pluralism reduced to its 
simplest form. The Pera event picks up the discussion of reason and what role the 
Enlightenment and modern rationalism might have played in the proliferation of 




In this exchange, relativism can be understood as that which allows culture, philosophy, 
and even the Church to be treated as products that deprecate or, at the very least, become 
less useful over time. The communitarian critique’s focus on the individual decision-
making process in the perceived neutral original position highlights several core 
oversights of Rawls’s that are also germane to Ratzinger and Pera’s dialogue on 
relativism. These include broken moral language (MacIntyre), the varying value of social 
goods such as identity (Walzer), the acceptance of communal obligations (Taylor), and 
the recurring criticism of autonomy, which in the Pera exchange can be understood as the 
catalyst of philosophic plurality. 
Ratzinger and Pera, like thinkers from the communitarian critique, find that 
particularism—in this case a continent’s history—is important to the way morality and 
values are shaped and sustained in a society. Similar to the disorder MacIntyre found 
with moral language, both Ratzinger and Pera believe that as Europeans lost sight of their 
history and identity, they lost the common ground needed to communicate on matters of 
morality. In communitarian terms, this can be understood as the disappearance of a 
collective narrative. This presents the state with the difficult task of constituting laws, 
given diverse sets of values often grounded in foundations that are foreign to one another. 
The same issues of objective-subjective distinctions found in the Habermas encounter 
raise questions for this task: Is there an objective standard for communities to draw on? 
Are there subjective cultural factors that must be taken into consideration? Do these 
subjective and particular conditions point back to a universal or objective standard? There 
is a temptation to understand the objective route as that which Rawls advanced in the 




decision-making. This environment resembles Pera’s approach since he believes his 
arguments are based on sound logic and little else. For Ratzinger, however, this is better 
thought of as timeless principles of justice handed down through revelation. As for the 
subjective conditions, this means looking at group identity and local customs and mores. 
In connecting these to an identity, there is hope that one will feel an obligation to others 
that, in turn, will foster an environment in which all persons can thrive. This mirrors 
Taylor’s idea that society should allow all human capacities to grow. Ratzinger’s sense of 
a sacred aims for the same spirit of self- and group cultivation. In the exploration of 
one’s heritage—the route to discovering the sacred—individuals would likely begin 
developing meaningful obligations to their community after seeing the connections 
between one’s contemporaries and their ancestors. A feeling of connection alleviates the 
need for the state to compel citizens into the role of the virtuous citizen since it becomes 
non-coercive. This can be a difficult task for legislators when crafting laws that address 
human needs and are mindful of sacred values or beliefs of the public, so there is a 
substantial reliance on the individual’s behavior. This mirrors the same challenge 
between faith and reason in the Habermas encounter. Stepping further back in the history 
of political philosophy, Montesquieu offers pointed commentary on this in The Spirit of 
Laws, describing it in terms of a classic legislative challenge: “One should not enact by 
divine laws that which should be enacted by human laws, or regulate [by] human laws 
that which should be regulated by divine laws” (Book 26, chapter 2). One way to guide 
behavior in the direction of obligation regardless of law is through identity. 
The communitarian critique views identity and social understandings as important 




of “the shared understandings of the participants and embodied in their institutional 
arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the participants’ plans of life” (LLJ, 
173). Similarly, Ratzinger and Pera look to increase the potency of European identity by 
examining its presence, or lack thereof, in the European Union’s Charter. Walzer’s 
commentary on identity makes Ratzinger look less communitarian in designation, but 
certainly places his concerns firmly within the communitarian dialogue. Walzer treats 
identity as the social good of membership; he sees identity as a flexible commodity that 
produces a “collective consciousness” of common meanings such as language, history, 
and culture. These meanings create a national character; however, this collective identity 
is not fixed (SOJ, 28), and this is where Ratzinger differs. On an individual level, Walzer 
explains that identities form out of the relationship between people and the social goods, 
which have a history of transactions in both the moral and material worlds (SOJ, 8). 
Ratzinger’s history lessons are launched with a similar aim of explaining Europe’s 
current situation by looking at how the individual psyche and morals relate to the 
movements of cultural institutions. 
The institutional movements of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and 
modernity are of significant note since they point to an underlying driver of autonomy 
that Ratzinger and Pera, as well as communitarians connect to breakdowns in 
communication. The rise of autonomy provides individuals with almost unlimited latitude 
to create their own identity, forgoing acceptance of larger conceptions of identity and 
obligation. Fr. James Schall describes this predicament as the idea that humans do not 
know themselves because they only know what they made themselves to be, not what 




mastery of nature” (Schall 2004, 122). Using Schall’s concept, one finds a great irony in 
modern man’s efforts to construct his identity. Rather than taking what is about human 
nature, dispositions, and intellectual limits, man asserts himself ahead of observation and 
wills his own understanding of himself. This is a challenge unspoken by Ratzinger and 
Pera, but it certainly lays beneath the surface, connecting their charges against relativism 
with identity. 
 
Ratzinger vs. Pera 
 
There are a number of links between the two parties in dialogue here. There are 
the obvious connections, as seen in Pera’s quotations of Ratzinger in his opening lecture 
and the fact that the two initial pieces were delivered within a day of one another. 
However, there also are a number of key differences between the two that are worth 
noting for understanding their dialogue. Each author launches an attack on relativism, 
charging that it contributed to a cultural crisis in Europe. Ratzinger’s and Pera’s 
criticisms of relativism have their finger on autonomy, but, unfortunately, do not call it 
out. Instead, it’s described as the idea that all ideas are to be held equally valid. Their 
charges against relativism resemble MacIntyre’s discussion of emotivism, which asserts 
that “there are and can be no valid rational justifications for any claims that objective and 
impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards” (19). 
Both writers tread a fine line between recognizing pluralism on one side and 
ethnocentric, European regionalism on the other. Ratzinger lands more on the side of 




the cultural exchange embedded in multiculturalism since they have abandoned learning 
about, and embracing, their own history. Peculiar links arise in how both authors connect 
cultural identity with an assault on universal rights and a quest for truth to triumph over 
relativism. Ratzinger would like to replace relativism with a sense of the sacred—
defining the values, codes, and beliefs each society holds most high—whereas Pera 
advocates the establishment of a civil religion in the Charter of the European Union. Pera 
is a secularist, and his solution is consistent with this designation since it seeks to solidify 
common foundations and points of reference. His hope is that such points of reference 
will heal Europe from what he believes is a paralysis that prevents its citizens from 
making value judgments in issues of morality. A civil religion would fill a communal 
void and become the central point of reference for morality, making it a quasi-secular 
solution that hinges on the non-faithful finding it permissible on pragmatic grounds and 
not an infringement of church-state relations. 
While Ratzinger is also a critic of relativism and concerned for the vitality of 
European identity, his proposition of the sacred also separates him from the comparative 
nature of Pera, in that by finding one’s own sense of the sacred the individual will 
inevitably recognize that others may hold a similar intensity of reverence to their own 
belief system. This process of self-discovery is non-coercive and places less importance, 
if any at all, in comparing one religion to another. It is also less likely to discard a 
religion upon introduction of an alternative or radical transformation. Pera, on the other 
hand, believes that a single system can be selected when a multitude of options exist, and 
identity and spiritual cultivation is best grown through governmental facilitation of a non-




are based on the premise that identity is necessary for a population to thrive. Pera derives 
his civil religion from an evolutionary approach that asserts a “better” model naturally 
progresses in any society. He believes that the government can, and should, encourage 
this system—albeit a non-denominational version—via a clear and formal declaration. In 
comparison, Ratzinger believes that cultural heritage is an underlying social glue and 
found by discovering a sense of the sacred, which consists of beliefs held most high from 
generation to generation bound up in historical and cultural developments. As such, 
Ratzinger withholds the requirement of state endorsement and argues that a 
denominational model is more effective and durable since it promotes the sacred through 
detailed precepts that call for commitment. This process begins with dedicated 
individuals, which Ratzinger describes using the terms of Arnold Tonybee as “creative 
minorities,” who commit to these precepts and who through their example encourage 
others to join their faith. One might also say that Taylor’s notion of generational 
obligations is created through this. To secure firm connections, and in this case 
denominational commitment, Ratzinger’s position can be backed by MacIntyre. When 
reference points do exist but are obscured, individuals are unable to reach them due to the 
breakdown of moral language, whereby one is left with only “fragments of a conceptual 
scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived” (AV, 
2). The detailed precepts of a denomination will allow all of the relevant cultural history 
to flow through. Despite Ratzinger’s preference for the denominational model, one 





Controlling Cyclical Development 
 
Both Ratzinger and Pera believe that Europe’s declines in identity attachment, 
population growth, and awareness of cultural history are regressions that should be 
corrected. Why ought one care about this? This could easily be understood as a natural 
stage in the development of a civilization, similar to Ibn Khaldun’s fourteenth-century 
theory on civilizations in The Muqaddimah, which posits that all civilizations (dynasties) 
proceed through the sequential stages of rise, peak social solidarity, decline, and eventual 
dissolution. In the exchange analyzed in this chapter, both Pera and Ratzinger find 
themselves on similar territory as Ibn Khaldun’s theory when they discuss conflicting 
opinions on the nature of civilization, specifically those of Oswald Spengler and Arnold 
Toynbee. 
While the debate here is between cyclical or amendable stages of development, 
the discussions of relativism should not be forgotten. Like other critiques of the modern 
era in political philosophy, both men are concerned that humans have boldly sought to 
master nature where no mastery was to be had. The catalyst for this quest that they fail to 
identify is the autonomous willful individual, as described in the communitarian critique. 
The irony that develops in Ratzinger and Pera’s exchange is that in fighting a natural 
progression in civilization development, one might wonder whether the two men are also 
attempting to conquer nature. If Ratzinger is attempting to master nature, perhaps he is 
serious about the inferences he makes for re-examining the modern era in the Crisis and 
Regensburg events (chapter 5), even though he is likely unaware of this unintended 
implication. This either suggests that his political thought is shifting by the time he 




counter to the idea that spirituality, specifically Christianity, has become outmoded in the 
post-modern world. 
 
Chapter Organization and Document Selection 
 
While two of the four documents are not writings by Ratzinger himself, they must 
be analyzed as a group for two reasons: first, they bring context to what Ratzinger is 
responding to and progressing toward; second, some of Pera’s words can be seen as 
collateral support for Ratzinger’s positions since there are instances in which he simply 
acknowledges that he agrees on all counts with Pera’s view on a particular subject, most 
notably Pera’s attacks on relativism. The four documents, a combination of speeches and 
letters, were combined into one work, Without Roots. This collection is the source 
material examined in this chapter—the two initial lectures, followed by response letters 
from each author. The lectures were presented on separate occasions, so neither 
interlocutor directly addressed the other. Pera’s was delivered at the Pontifical Lateran 
University on May 12, 2004, followed by Ratzinger’s one day later in the Capital Room 
of the Italian Senate. According to Pera in the Preface to Without Roots, the similarity of 
content in the two speeches was pure chance. The two met privately later to discuss their 
ideas on Europe and the West and decided to exchange letters to clarify and better 
understand each other’s positions. Pera’s initial lecture in this collection appears in a 
revised and longer form than that which was delivered at the university. 
This chapter analyzes each of the four works in this exchange, beginning with 




sections that follow this chapter’s introduction are organized in this same order and 
conclude with a brief discussion of where Ratzinger’s political thought is headed. The 
exchange ends in an impasse, with Pera’s state-endorsed non-denominational Christianity 
standing in contrast to Ratzinger’s call for denominational commitment. The weakness of 
Pera’s model begs the question of whether he misses the mark for state neutrality, as the 
state is perceived as punting morality and judgments to the public, absolving the state 
from responsibility. Ironically, the state appears nihilistic, and it is not realistic that the 
state would be able to sustain such a neutral position while protecting both majority and 
minority interests. This also calls into question how a secularist such as Pera can 
reconcile his critical view of relativism since the state has absolved itself from certain 
matters of morality. This observation of Pera is important because it explains why 
Ratzinger wonders if something more sticky, such as Hellenized Christianity, is needed, 
and hence, Ratzinger’s skepticism of Pera’s non-denominational Christianity. By 
emphasizing the Hellenistic roots of Christianity, Ratzinger begins to set the stage for 
how the Bible should be interpreted, which circumvents denominational ambiguity. In the 
end, this places the Church in a unique position as the heir to a Hellenized line of 
interpretation. The purpose of this chapter is to get to this sticking point, so that the Crisis 













Marcello Pera’s essay, Relativism, Christianity, and the West, consists of three 
parts: 1) the West’s relationship with Islam, 2) a refutation of what Pera believes are two 
philosophical versions of Western relativism, and 3) the consequences of relativism on 
European identity and its Christian roots. The main thrust of this essay is that the 
universal nature of the West’s institutional inventions has withered at the hands of 
relativism and paralyzed a civilization from making value judgments, which Pera 
considers to be the act of taking responsibility when political action is necessary. 
Judgments can always be made and are bound up in societal definitions and the 
constraints followed by the players involved. This formula can be applied to any 
decision, even to conclude that the West’s institutions are superior to other models, and 
therefore it would not be logical to act otherwise. However, the West now faces a great 
paradox. While the contemporary world widely accepts many Western institutions that 
claim universality, such as modern science, liberalism, separation of church and state, the 
rule of law, democracy, and various bill of rights declarations, their universality is now 
seen as a mere illusion (2–3). Consequently, the West is under attack like never before. 
Pera applies his paralysis theory to the West’s relationship with Islam and the 
pushback the West received for asserting its political institutions were superior during the 
second Iraq war and other military initiatives in the Middle East led by then U.S. 




exporting democracy and other Western institutions. Pera denies that this exportation was 
tantamount to “cultural hegemony” or imperialism (2–3). He points out that most critics 
who embraced a critical view of “exporting” democracy did so on the simple grounds that 
the imposition was violent, since those imposed upon possessed an “equally legitimate, 
worthy, respectable form of life,” rather than drawing on more practical implementation 
challenges that would make such an application problematic, such as infusing or adapting 
democratic concepts (voting, laws, parliament, courts, etc.) within a local culture’s 
history (4). Still, he takes issue with the idea that individuals cannot assert that their “own 
culture is better or simply preferable” to another, and must out of politeness say that the 
two cultures and civilizations are different (5). Rejecting this ungrounded politeness—or 
as Pera calls it, political correctness—is one of the essay’s stated goals. Pera perceives 
political correctness as a new form of relativism and hypocrisy infecting Western culture 
with a numbness to act out of fear of appearing rude, even in the face of what one would 
believe to be evil (6–7). In the political climate in which Pera is writing, he applies this to 
the issue of whether it is appropriate to say that the Western model of democratic rule is 
better than an Islamic model that seeks to re-establish Islamic law, the sharia. Pera 
cautions that the answer would require an evaluation of “better” and that one would have 
to acknowledge that if such a judgment of a “better” model could be made, it would 
imply a course of action that would need to be taken. That said, for Pera this is not the 
case. Instead, he wants to make clear that judgment should not be conflated with action. 
While this is a nuanced and prudent approach, it seems out of balance with Pera’s 




According to Pera, the “dominant culture” in the West thinks that what one 
“ought” to do descends from the “is.” Pera contends there is an error in logic when one 
then infers what should be done once such a distinction is made—if one takes the 
position that “democracy is better than theocracy,” or parallel arguments such as a liberal 
constitution is better than sharia, or a sentence by an independent tribunal is better than a 
fatwa—that this means one ought to clash with the other party, which in this case is the 
Islamic world. One instead should weigh a spectrum of potential actions that range from 
tolerating, respecting, and dialoguing with Muslims to less friendly actions such as 
ignoring, obstructing, or eventually clashing with them. Unable to consider a gradation of 
options, Westerners become paralyzed twice over: once, because this inability self-
censors good reasons to believe the Western world can claim better institutions; a second 
time because if such reasons do exist, it follows that one must act (9–10). Put another 
way: the first paralysis comes from accepting that there are no merits for making 
comparisons; the second paralysis comes from inferring that if a comparison is made, it 
logically follows that one should then act. 
It is not quite clear how this argument helps Pera since he argues for a gradation 
of actions while at the same time criticizes the West for not acting at all. Pera’s veiled 
prudence eventually lifts in the case of comparing democracy with Islamic law if such a 
comparison led to escalated circumstances that compromised the West’s security. If 
offers to dialogue are rejected, or tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and respect are not 
reciprocated and are instead met with hostility or jihad, Pera contends that it would be 




Pera sees a connection between this passive and submissive behavior and the 
rampant spread of relativism and contextual reasoning. He is quite explicit as he declares 
“unequivocally that cultural critique of universalism has no solid grounds” (11). This 
stance is important because Ratzinger endorses Pera’s rejection of relativism, and later 
Pera employs quotations from Ratzinger to support his position. There is a level of 
civility between the two authors in this regard, but there is a more subtle distance that 
Ratzinger will place between himself and Pera. 
 
Pera and Meta-Criteria 
 
Without directly mentioning the democracy versus sharia comparison, a parallel is 
certainly evident, as Pera argues that common meta-criteria are not required for saying 
that culture A is better than culture B. Rather, taking what seems to be an attempt at 
employing the Socratic dialogue with analytical philosophy—some might even go so far 
as to say an unintentional dabbling from the field of philosophy of language—Pera states 
that the only requirement “is that the members of A and B wish to engage in a dialogue 
and submit to each other’s criticism.” Through this process, “one interlocutor will run 
into difficulty defending himself to the other,” and, eventually, a “better” (not necessarily 
true) position will arise. Often it is simply better or preferable on logical terms since the 
judgment is the result of weighing “a semantic property of sentences” that creates a 
stronger position for countering criticisms (13). 
 As evidence of such a comparison, Pera draws on the example of migration trends 




migration patterns from the West to the Islamic world, and this is reason to believe that 
there is something about the West that makes it clear to assert that A (the West and 
democracy) is better than B (the Islamic world and sharia). Pera’s logic should be 
questioned though, since the universe of causes for migration flows could be infinite, or 
at least multivariate. For example, in the case Pera provides, the cause for migration 
could simply be that it is easier to assimilate into, and participate in a diverse country 
than in a homogeneously populated one, thus making it a practical, rather than a 
philosophic matter of comparing the quality of life in a democracy versus one under 
sharia. It is ironic that Pera is not more aware of this flaw, as later in his essay he 
discusses the recollections of Fr. Piero Gheddo, who observed (and with similar 
sentiments as Pera) that in the West mosques are allowed to “flourish right next-door to 
our parish churches,” whereas “in almost no Muslim country are Christians allowed to 
build a church” (32). Gheddo’s argument is quite sweeping and would also take a great 
amount of data to verify—at what rate have new mosques opened in the West, how have 
churches grown respectively, in what areas (i.e., homogenous vs. heterogeneous) are 
mosques opening, have any non-Muslims converted to Islam, etc.? What one sees here is 
that Pera provides an example that acknowledges the difficulties of establishing a new 
religious presence, in this case Christianity, in the more homogeneous areas of Muslim 
countries. The irony is that the separation of church and state provides the conditions for 
mosques to flourish, making sharia a moot concept in the West. Quantifiable evidence in 
the form of statistical verification of this migration trend or qualitative surveys of the 
individuals involved in this migration observation are absent in Pera’s essay. This is not 




evidence is curious because Pera is aware of the value of facts, which explains why he 
has set relativism, contextualism, and deconstruction as such high targets, taking aim at 
Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, Nietzsche, and Derrida. His argument is that 
interpretation and contextual experience for theories are weak because facts outside of a 
text or situation do exist (21). This is a peculiar position for Pera, for if facts and 
elements outside of a text, or, say, a situation such as preferring A better to B, do indeed 
exist, then Pera could use this same line of reasoning to conclude that his own premise 
that democracy is preferable or better to Islamic law is not so simple as to be reduced to 
one cause. In short, single-cause analysis as presented in explaining the migration change 
is limited. 
 
Relativism, Political Malaise, and Democracy 
 
Pera introduces the work of Joseph Ratzinger to draw on a theological-political 
position against relativism, answering two inquiries once posed by Ratzinger in his work, 
Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions: Why is Christianity’s 
“synthesis of reason, faith, and life” no longer convincing? Related, why are Christianity 
and enlightenment (as in intellectual development) regarded as mutually exclusive? Pera 
explains that the West lost its belief in “foundations, proofs, justifications, good reasons,” 
and a sense of faith in Revelation. This might explain why Pera also adds that relativism 
found a home in Christian theology, and acceptance of the plurality of creeds and 
religions became commonplace. In the end, “hope in meta-criteria” was lost and, 




touches on something familiar to the common moral language discussed by MacIntyre in 
the communitarian critique. 
 Pera co-opts several quotes and general messaging points from Truth and 
Tolerance, such as the idea “that there is indeed a truth, valid and binding within history 
itself, in the figure of Jesus Christ and in the faith of the Church.” Pera, like Ratzinger, 
believes that to embrace this idea is perceived to be akin to submitting to 
fundamentalism, which the democratic world treats as the “eighth deadly sin.” To avoid 
this label, people have found it better to play the role of a relativist. 
Further borrowing from Truth and Tolerance, Pera arrives at the same conclusion 
as Ratzinger, positing that relativism is “the philosophical basis of democracy” (25). 
Given the development in Ratzinger’s career in the post-Habermas exchange, one could 
question the merits of Pera’s citations here. Although they are accurate and clearly 
represent a time in Ratzinger’s career, the Munich event points to a less rigid Ratzinger 
than Pera portrays. It is not known if at this time Pera was aware of Ratzinger’s exchange 
with Habermas, but he does miss the nuance presented in Ratzinger’s Munich work that 
calls for limitations on religion to avoid fundamentalism. Outside of Pera and Ratzinger’s 
text, one should question if Pera has conflated tolerance with relativism. Democratic 
institutions certainly contain such universal standards as Lockean protections for the 
pursuit of life, liberty, and property put forth in his Second Treatise. 
 One implication of relativism’s infiltration into Christianity that both Pera and 
Ratzinger see is that it causes believers to engage in self-censorship, since to say that 
Christ is the, or sole, truth would be considered “dogmatic and anti-historical,” as well as 




counterproductive for Christians.” Here, he hints at the universal nature of some 
democratic foundations that he ironically uses to levy a claim of falsehood against 
relativism, citing the value of “individual, dignity, equality, and respect.” The 
counterproductive charge is based on the idea that dialogue becomes unnecessary if one 
truth is equivalent to another (26). 
Pera also sees another connection between the passive conditions in democratic 
countries and the cultural and political malaise that he observes in the West, as people are 
fearful and unsure of acting. As Pera puts it: “Relativism has debilitated our Christian 
defense and prepared or inclined us for surrender. It has convinced us that there is 
nothing worth fighting for or risking” (38). 
 Ultimately, what Pera wants is dialogue among parties, with the hope that an open 
discussion will help them to find some common meta-criteria to build from. Pera 
concludes his essay by indicating that he is not “advocating a Western declaration of 
war” but rather wants a dialogue with those from Islamic countries who “wish to live in 
peaceful coexistence with the West.” However, Pera sets conditions for this dialogue: 
both parties cannot enter into talks believing that “one idea is as good as the other” (45). 
This reveals a key contingency in what dialogue means for Pera: to enter a dialogue 
means that parties are putting out their ideas to test and are open to the possibility that 
one of the parties may need to concede after its position is either falsified or proven to be 
the lesser of the options. What is not clear is whether Pera views the option of a hybrid 
idea between A and B. For him, there seems to be an “either-or” outcome. Through 
dialogue, one might view Pera’s conditions as the common language and points of 








Whereas Pera’s essay is concerned with political malaise, Ratzinger addresses a 
different malaise, a cultural one that neutralizes European identity. Bound up in this 
discussion is the modern movement’s effect on Europe, which brings with it the 
ideological baggage of relativism. One goal of Ratzinger’s essay is to establish a 
definition of Europe not geographically, but rather culturally and historically (52). That 
said, a large portion of the essay is a European history lesson on the continent’s cultural 
backbone, which Ratzinger believes can only be supported by a sense of the sacred—this 
is the most important concept advanced in this essay, and finds itself perfectly situated 
within the communitarian critique, as it speaks to identity, narrative, the role of reason in 
autonomy for individual Europeans, and, ultimately, social cohesion. The value Ratzinger 
places on monasticism helps to understand what he means by sacred. Contingent to any 
society throughout history is monasticism, which he describes as serving as an 
“indispensable bearer not only of cultural continuity but above all of fundamental 
religious and moral values, the ultimate guidance of humankind.” In addition, it is a “pre-
political and supra-political force” necessary for the “rebirths of culture and civilization” 
(55–56). This is delving into the core roots of a culture or civilization to discover what it 
held most high in terms of values, mores, and codes of conduct, and how this might be 
intertwined with religious beliefs. 
Through Ratzinger’s history lesson, he hopes to reveal the formation of Europe’s 




contemporary Europeans. He seeks to convince his audience that two measures are 
needed for preserving European identity in an era of multiculturalism: 1) to absorb the 
rationalism of the modern era back into the Church and 2) to embrace Europe’s heritage 
of the sacred. The latter goal is patently clear, while the first is less transparent and only 
noticeable through a more careful reading and is informed by the next chapter’s coverage 
of the Crisis and Regensburg events. 
Ratzinger believes a multitude of factors virtually wiped out a sense of the sacred 
from Europe: rationalism of the modern era, which elevated reason to the lone guiding 
principle for all aspects of life; the rise of technosecular culture in the West; Europeans 
looking to non-European countries for spirituality; and multiculturalism—a final wave 
that washed away pride for and knowledge of European history. This makes Ratzinger 
sound similar to Pera; however, it should be noted that it is not so easy to classify 
Ratzinger as a critic of multiculturalism, for he is indeed a proponent of the concept, at 
least with regard to the European side of the bargain in cultural exchange. What 
Ratzinger takes issue with is the inability of Europeans to live up to their side of 
multiculturalism’s implicit exchange. As he sees it, multiculturalism demands that 
Europeans fulfill an obligation to understand their own history, and they are failing at this 
task, undermining the very principle of multiculturalism that they hold in such high 
regard. 
European Shifts and the Modern Era 
 
 Three landmark moments occurred during the beginning of the European modern 




ancient Mediterranean continent which relocated populations farther north, the 
establishment of a Latin Western territory, and the transition from the ancient Roman 
Empire to Byzantium; 2) the division of Europe into two separate worlds, Germanic 
Protestant and Latin Catholic; and 3) the French Revolution. While the first moment 
largely consisted of nuts and bolts changes such as boundary shifts and power re-
distribution, it made sustaining a continental social glue a challenging task from a 
practical perspective. The second moment imposed roadblocks to thinking and relating to 
one another as further divisions within Christianity were created (59–60). The third 
moment—the French Revolution—shattered the spiritual framework that Europe 
provided and formed itself by extracting divine and spiritual elements from the public 
sphere and governmental bodies and then replacing them with reason alone. Both politics 
and ideals were changed: God no longer preceded history; the state was seen as purely 
secular, “grounded in rationalism and the will of the citizens”; and God became an issue 
relegated to the private sphere and irrelevant to the “democratic formation of the public 
will” (62–63). In removing God and religion from the public sphere, one could say that 
not only was common language scrapped, but that the ability to create anchors and 
reference points to tether pure reason also were cut. In MacIntyre terms, this is described 
as: 
In a world of secular rationality religion could no longer provide such a shared 
background and foundation for moral discourse and action; and the failure of 
philosophy to provide what religion could no longer furnish was an important 
cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role and becoming a marginal, 
narrowly academic subject (50). 
 
Ratzinger identifies the French Revolution as a crucial stage in the rise of 




Europe. The effects of such Enlightenment figures as Hume and Voltaire are an unstated, 
or at the least an insufficiently challenged, presence in Ratzinger’s criticisms of 
relativism in this exchange. Hume’s “association of ideas”—a concept even noted by 
Pera in a quick swipe at Nozick and Rawls37
In reading Ratzinger’s history lesson on Europe and modern rationalism, one must 
question if he is simply reporting observable facts or preparing a treatment for the 
—is the internal symbolic method that 
Ratzinger is up against from a very basic socio-psychological standpoint. Hume’s 
emphasis on impressions and perceptions contributed to the removal of values and 
standards (Hill 1987). Voltaire provided his own libertarian genesis in France and had a 
role in advancing empirical skepticism and Newtonian sciences as influential forces in 
the European intellect (Shank 2008), and this action looms as part of an understood 
disapproval of the era. Neither Hume nor Voltaire is taken to task by Ratzinger in the 
Pera exchange or later in the Crisis of Cultures address, in which the Enlightenment is 
spoken about in regard to Kant. While his focus on Kant does help to position Ratzinger 
within the communitarian critique’s focus on deontological liberalism, there is a notable 
absence of Enlightenment figures such as Hume and Voltaire, considering Ratzinger 
aligns himself with this movement. The identification of this omission is admittedly from 
a political theory slice of this movement, and does not unhinge Ratzinger’s broader 
argument regarding the use of reason, but it is an example of the multi-dimensional 
nature of the Enlightenment in that it touched politics, philosophy and science. It is also 
worth noting that Ratzinger may have glossed over Voltaire altogether due to the 
hedonistic nature of his work. 
                                                 




continent’s spiritual malaise by looking at its causes. This essay does not present a more 
overarching solution that incorporates reason—this end is better presented in the 
Habermas encounter—but Ratzinger does put forth several ideas for recapturing 
European identity that include re-examining and possibly absorbing the Enlightenment. 
When Ratzinger addresses reason in other works, it is to show that reason and faith are 
not mutually exclusive concepts for political design, and he is aware of other Christian 
denominations that were able to reach a balance between these two concepts. For 
example, his history lesson recognizes that Protestant Christianity “was initially able to 
accommodate liberal, [E]nlightenment ideas without jeopardizing the framework of a 
broad Christian consensus” (63). If other segments of Christianity were able to achieve 
some sort of balance, why not the Roman Catholic tradition? The Crisis and Regensburg 
events build on this idea and provide a specific mechanism for this balance in the 
European context—embracing the Enlightenment and promoting Hellenized 
Christianity—but this essay explains this by looking at spirituality in Asia, Africa, and 
the Islamic world. While secular thinking has begun to enter public life in these areas, 
their local religious institutions have not diminished. In fact, the opposite effect has taken 
place—“Islam has been reborn” and the mysticism of Buddhism has been elevated as a 
spiritual power. There is a hint of admiration by Ratzinger here, especially with regard to 
Islam’s rebirth, which he partially attributes to the new material wealth acquired by 
Islamic countries but even more to “people’s conviction that Islam can provide a valid 
spiritual foundation to their lives.” Europe, by contrast, has lost its foundation, despite its 
political and economic power, leaving Ratzinger to ask: 
[W]hat is European culture, and what has remained of it? Is European culture 




triumphantly across the planet? Or is it instead a post-European culture born on 
the ruins of the ancient European cultures? (64–65) 
 
Ratzinger’s answer is that technology is replacing Western spirituality, leaving 
Europeans searching elsewhere in the world for value systems and mysticism (66). One 
could also infer that reason and rationality are bound up in this explanation since they are 
a driver for technology. 
 
Healing Cultural Malaise 
 
Ratzinger’s prescription for Europe’s spiritual malaise begins with an 
investigation into theoretical explanations of the history of civilizations. He examines two 
opposing viewpoints—those of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Spengler’s theory 
is a determinism that asserts it has found a natural law to explain the lifecycle of any 
civilization’s cultural history. On the subject of cultural birth, Ratzinger summarizes 
Spengler’s critical moments as “gradual rise, flourishing, slow decline, aging and death.” 
Cultural demise is seen as inevitable, and Spengler predicts the West will eventually 
experience this fate as well. The most it can hope for is to pass down the best of its 
culture to the next generation. Toynbee presents an alternative to this fatalistic outlook, 
believing that one has to differentiate between technological progress and spiritual 
development. As Ratzinger interprets Toynbee (and agrees with him), spiritualization is 
“true progress.” In reading Ratzinger’s interpretation of Toynbee, a parallel emerges with 
Ratzinger’s critique of technology and culture at large. He co-opts Toynbee’s charge that 




Ratzinger describes, “the cult of technology, nationalism, and militarism” replaced 
religion (67–68). 
 Ratzinger covers his tracks to not explicitly state who he sides with but he seems 
taken with the idea that by identifying the cause of the illness, it will lead to a cure, since 
he wonders whether Europeans will need to determine which parts of their heritage will 
help secure a future (68). These determinations will bring about the synthesis (the 
“religious dimension”) and mark the beginning of the sense of a sacred. Ratzinger’s 
attraction to the prospect that the re-introduction of Western Christian heritage is the 
answer to Europe’s cultural malaise and identity crisis also suggests he gravitates toward 
Toynbee. If Toynbee is correct, Ratzinger urges Europeans to consider reintroducing a 
“religious dimension” that would be “a synthesis of residual Christianity and the religious 
heritage of humankind” (68). Ratzinger’s interpretation of the Spengler-Toynbee debate 
is important because he demonstrates that he believes Europe can correct its course. One 
need not take the Spengler route and simply let the cultural pieces fall as they may. How 
feasible this is remains to be seen, but if European identity can be steered back on course, 
it should be possible to see where secularism inserted itself and look for a new system to 
change the intellectual and cultural environment of Europe. Ratzinger’s position is 
important to note here since his refusal to accept the inevitability of civilization’s decline 
is another contribution to his battle with obsolescence. 
Reason and Social Solidarity 
 
The antidote for Europe’s cultural malaise, Ratzinger believes, can be found in the 




of government arose that distinguished state from religion, leaving religion for the private 
sphere and removing its relevance from the state’s foundation altogether. By removing 
religion and any remnants of spiritualism, the state was constructed on reason alone. 
Ratzinger’s criticism of secular systems is that “since reason is inherently fragile,” they 
are “easy targets for dictatorships.” As evidence, he points to the collapse of Prussian 
State Christianity and rise of the Nazi Party that followed in Germany (69). 
 Ratzinger goes on to discuss the two forms of socialism that emerged in Europe in 
the nineteenth century: one totalitarian and other democratic. He considers democratic 
socialism very close to Catholic social doctrine, and even goes so far as to say that it 
“made a remarkable contribution to the formation of a social consciousness.” However, 
he is not so kind to the totalitarian model, linking it to materialism and an aesthetic, 
deterministic view of history that lowered the collective bar for moral standards: 
Depending on circumstance, anything can become legitimate and even necessary; 
anything can become moral in the new sense of the term. Even humankind itself 
can be treated as an instrument, since the individual does not matter, only the 
future, the cruel deity adjudicating over one all (72–73). 
 
The totalitarian model becomes that which is atheistic and materialist. Ratzinger is 
certainly taking a position held in some circles of political philosophy, namely, that the 
Enlightenment undermined itself, which begs the question: Why does he return to this era 
and link it to Christ? While this connection is missing in this essay, it can be seen in other 
philosophical output of the Church, such as that handed down in Pope John Paul II’s 
encyclical, Fides et Ratio, and from Ratzinger himself, as seen in his essay in Dialectics 
of Secularization and in the Regensburg Lecture. Fides develops a reciprocal relationship 




clarifier for philosophy and truth. Dialectics is a bit more progressive, viewing faith and 
reason as purifiers of one another, while Regensburg ties the scientific ethos of the 
modern era to obedience and to the patient, diligent, and logical pursuit of discovering 
truth. 
To demonstrate the triangular relationship among reason, democracy, and 
religion, Ratzinger looks outside of Europe at a similar secular model proliferated at the 
expense of the Church. The “free churches” of the United States, as Ratzinger calls them, 
possess the ability “to create a moral consensus and form a democratic public will.” As a 
result, even American Catholics have: 
incorporated the traditions of the free church regarding the relationship between 
Church and politics, believing that a Church that is separate from the state better 
guarantees the moral foundation of the country. Hence the promotion of the 
democratic ideal is seen as a moral duty that is in profound compliance with the 
faith (70–71). 
 
The reader can only think that Ratzinger is highlighting these misfortunes to imply the 
Church should have better incorporated the new role of modern rationalism into its 
doctrine. 
Reconciling European Identity with Multiculturalism 
 
 While Ratzinger understands the dangers of absolutism, commitment to ideals is 
important for constructing a European identity. One vehicle for this identity is the 
European Constitution, though Ratzinger says that it is missing three basic moral 
elements central to European identity: 1) unconditional, pre-political human rights; 2) 




The first element, human rights and dignity, which also include broad rights such 
as freedom and equality, are unconditional and precede the state, belonging to a higher 
order. This category also includes solidarity. Because these rights cannot be altered, 
Ratzinger calls them the “the true guarantee of freedom” and demonstrations of “human 
greatness,” as well as “crucial to European identity.” Similar to his views on faith—seen 
as a living organism in the previous chapter—what sustains these principles is a 
“corresponding moral conscience that is in a state of constant renewal” (74–76). The 
constant renewal aspect of these rights helps Ratzinger solidify why a strong identity is 
needed for helping individuals to continue to believe in them and maintain a common 
language to do so. 
The third element of European identity, religion, is described as “fundamental to 
all cultures: respect for that which another group holds sacred, especially respect for the 
sacred in the highest sense, for God, which one can reasonably expect to find even among 
those who are not willing to believe in God.” The role of religion in society is crucial for 
Ratzinger, as he believes that when respect for religion is “violated in a society, 
something essential is lost” (78). 
 With these missing elements put forth, one must wonder: What is now to be done 
on a continent that consists of not only diverse viewpoints in homogenous groups, but 
also a growing sub-population of immigrants? Ratzinger’s answer is twofold: first, 
Europeans need to accept and embrace their history if they are to accept others, and 
second, a common base across cultures is the recognition of a sense of the sacred, even 




on self-discovery and learning about other cultures. There is an idea that in doing so some 
sort of universal principle(s) will be discovered. 
 Ratzinger is not going to reject multiculturalism, so he must figure out how to 
interact with it, as well as how to address the issue of pluralism in general, since these are 
the biggest challenges to social solidarity. Homogeneous societies are rare in the West, so 
he settles for the sacred as a rescue. He commends the West for “trying to be more open, 
to be more understanding of the values of outsiders”; however, he believes “it has lost all 
capacity for self-love.” Ratzinger is not inferring a causation here, namely, that openness 
to multiculturalism leads to a lack of self-love, but he believes that the West has reached 
a point at which it views its history as “despicable and…destructive” (78–79). This is a 
mental roadblock the West has created to appreciating its own gifts and heritage. The 
danger is that if Europe does not embrace its own heritage of the sacred, it not only fails 
to provide an identity for its people, but it also cheats the principle of multiculturalism 
(79–80). 
 Multiculturalism cannot survive without a respect for common foundations and 
the sacred. There must be a balance, for multiculturalism becomes self-defeating if faith 
and heritage are lost. One way to interpret this is that Ratzinger is charging that the West 
is not living up with its end of the bargain in a multicultural society. He explains this as: 
Multiculturalism teaches us to approach the sacred things of others with respect, 
but we can only do this if we, ourselves, are not estranged from the sacred, from 
God. We can and we must learn from that which is sacred to others. With regard 
to others, it is our duty to cultivate within ourselves respect for the sacred and to 
show the face of the revealed God, of the God who has compassion for the poor 






Pera’s Response to Ratzinger 
 
Pera’s letter to Ratzinger attempts to harmonize the senator’s secularist viewpoint 
with that of believers. The letter advocates constructing a form of Christianity to serve as 
a civil, non-denominational religion, resulting in what Ratzinger sees as an odd 
connection since Christianity relies on faith and commitment to specificity rather than a 
half promise. A related glaring irony for Pera’s civil religion emerges, as he desires a 
detailed description of European identity, possibly even in a vehicle such as the European 
Union’s Charter, while also advocating a generic, non-denominational civil religion. 
Aside from Ratzinger’s concern that one would even commit to such a broad form of 
religion, Pera’s construction becomes a denomination itself—a Christian sect as deemed 
relevant and acceptable by the state. While Pera does set a demarcation between the state 
and its religion, he doesn’t indicate at what point the state would intervene if the religion 
became corrupted. Therefore, there is a passive state endorsement here rather than the 
hands-off approach he describes. One might say this civil religion possesses similar aims 
of solidarity as Ratzinger’s quest to discover the sacred, except that Ratzinger’s endeavor 
is larger than simply religion since it seeks out anthropological and philosophical forms, 
the great movers that firm up a particular religion. In Ratzinger’s system, Christianity 
would be a subset of a larger group or cultural phenomena. Pera agrees with Ratzinger 
that there are “founding moral elements” that should be included in the EU’s Charter to 
help sustain European identity and “not merely a list of principles, values, and 
institutions” (83). This may explain the ambiguous nature of Pera’s civil religion. 
 Pera’s response letter is primarily concerned with what he sees as flaws in the 




flaws begin with Europe’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, which he says offers only 
vague descriptions of European identity and its “spiritual and moral heritage.” More 
precision is needed to locate common connections among European citizens, which he 
sees as a “Christian Europe” rather than an equivocal “religious Europe” (84). 
Pera charges that Europe’s failure to draft a true constitution—one that includes a 
declaration of Christian identity as its common spirit—is due to an “an epidemic of 
relativism” whereby all cultures are treated as equivalent. Pera believes European nations 
refuse to judge others because “to accept and defend one’s own culture would be an act 
of hegemony, of intolerance, that betrayed an anti-democratic, anti-liberal, disrespectful 
attitude toward the autonomy of other populations and individuals” (85–86). His 
understanding of multiculturalism is different than that of Ratzinger’s, for Pera sees it 
through the lens of victimization, whereas Ratzinger’s approach calls on Europe to live 
up to its side of the bargain in multicultural exchanges. Both share the idea that Europe’s 
lack of identity will lead to its demise, but Pera sees this as pacifism that thwarts self-
preservation, whereas Ratzinger views it as a breakdown of moral language in a 
civilization’s sense of the sacred. 
If Europe has failed to act, Pera wants to know what Christian believers can do to 
correct the course Europe has taken for more than two centuries. Pera, like Ratzinger, 
adopts Toynbee’s notion of creative minorities as instrumental to rejuvenating a culture 
and applies it to Christians in spiritual and philosophical terms. While European 





 Christians at large play a pivotal role in shaping Pera’s non-denominational 
Christianity through its decentralized administrative structure, as this system calls for 
more monasteries run by monks than central churches led by church officials. Pera’s civil 
religion is an effort to balance both the public and private spheres of life so as to avoid 
compromising the principle of church-state separation. The state carves out a space for a 
civil religion—this is its only guarantee, as it stays hands-off from there. This space 
allows Pera’s proposed civil religion to work its ways by “instill[ing] its values 
throughout the long chain that goes from the individual to the family, groups, 
associations, the community, and civil society, without passing through the political 
parties, government programs, and force of states” (95–96). 
 Christians cannot do this alone, however. Non-believers are needed, though it is 
not entirely clear what their role is unless it is viewed as one of a conscience to those who 
buy into the concept of a civil religion. Pera’s model of a civil religion fails unless it can 
accommodate non-believers by either finding them a role in the state or creating a civil 
religion in a way that allows for tolerance. Since the state is hands-off, the likelihood of 
tolerance is perceived to be greater. One should question whether this is really a tongue-
in-cheek act, a religious-institutional version of the noble lie advocated by Socrates in 
Plato’s Republic. Socrates speaks of fostering solidarity within a city by crafting a tale in 
which a god is believed to have fashioned rulers with a mixture of gold at birth, 
auxiliaries in silver, and farmers and other craftsmen in iron and bronze (Book II, section 
415). Pera’s civil religion similarly takes on the form of the noble lie in that it requires 
non-believers to either participate or go along with the charade. Those participating in the 




one of a pragmatic, sustainable peace. Part of the noble lie, according to Leo Strauss, is to 
make citizens forget the true character of their citizenship, demanding that they regard 
themselves as part of the same group, family, and land or particular city (1964, 102). The 
true nature of Pera’s civil religion, namely, political equilibrium, is covert. 
When the views of secularists and believers conflict over issues of morality, it is 
often rooted in the origins of their values, according to Pera. For secularists, values are 
constructed through human efforts, whereas believers derive their values from revelation 
provided by God (98). As a self-described secularist, one should question if this can be 
reconciled with Pera’s earlier attacks on relativism and subjectivism, for if values are 
constructed it should logically follow that differing, even competing, values could find 
themselves at times equally legitimate. This is what Pera says led to Europe’s paralysis—
accepting all positions as equals stifles political action. This is a curious line of reasoning, 
since it is a denial of relativity even as it uses a social baseline to make value judgments. 
The best explanation Pera offers is that non-believers play the role of a societal 
conscience based solely on a logic that draws on a romanticism of intellectuals—such as 
Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant—who found a way to integrate a mathematical nature 
to their approach to philosophy and ethics (104–105).  
Pera uses abortion as an example of this scientific approach and how the origins 
between secularists and believers differ but reach similar conclusions. If personhood 
cannot be understood as an empirical concept, “but rather [as] an axiologically loaded 
one,…from a philosophical and moral point of view, we must take a position that an 
embryo is a person from the moment of conception” (102). The understanding here is that 




science says a being has definitively become sentient. To intervene once conception has 
begun could be considered an irrational act for the secularist. While the subject of 
abortion relates very little to identity other than the role relativism plays in settling the 
issue, it is important to highlight Pera’s line of reasoning here since it is repeated by 
Ratzinger in his response to Pera. The position developed by both authors sets aside the 
abstract position of religion that often asserts life from the moment of conception in favor 
of non-metaphysical logic that the believer, non-believer, or agnostic can employ. For the 
political philosopher, the subject of abortion often becomes a base and problematic issue 
to resolve depending on how one constructs or discovers his/her first principles regarding 
the existence of God, a higher ordering, the soul, and the concept of personhood, though 
it does find itself situated within the idea of self-autonomy. Abortion is connected to the 
critique of self-autonomy, depending on whose autonomy is in question—that of the 
dependent being or that of the provider. It’s also loosely connected to Taylor’s discussion 
of sentient beings and how society ought to be set up to allow these creations to thrive. 
 
Ratzinger’s Response to Pera 
 
Ratzinger’s letter takes on Pera’s idea of a non-denominational Christian civil 
religion, illustrating the difficulties of implementing such a concept for two main reasons: 
1) denomination is needed to be truly faithful and 2) communities naturally evolve 
themselves and in a way that contains a history that cannot be forgotten. The letter also 
describes the complex relationships between the Church and various Christian groups, 




contributes additional insights into Ratzinger’s understanding of the Enlightenment and 
democracy. His earlier ideas on multiculturalism and tolerance are pushed further by 
positioning them in the realm of dogma—relativism becomes intolerance, for it 
prescribes itself as the way of thinking. Lastly, in a demonstration that resembles Pera’s 
own secularist viewpoint, Ratzinger restates an approach to abortion advocated by the 
Church that is less grounded in faith, and based more in logic, ethics, and law, ultimately 
reflecting a re-alignment between the Church and the rationalism of the Enlightenment 
and its legacies. 
 
Christian Consensus: America vs. Europe 
 
 Pera’s civil religion reminds Ratzinger of Alexis de Tocqueville’s analysis of 
religion in America’s early years, as described in Democracy in America. During that 
time, American democracy functioned well because Protestant Christianity was the 
assumed “spiritual foundation.” Religious and moral convictions did not have to be 
defined. At the same time, the country managed to foster an environment in which “no 
single denomination dominated public life.” This unique combination of religious 
freedom and social solidarity is what both Ratzinger and Pera are wrestling with. For 
Pera, it is how to create a government-guaranteed space for a non-denominational 
Christianity, since he regards this as Europe’s foundation when obvious differences 
among denominations exist. For Ratzinger, it is a cultural sacredness, a greater 
underlying common denominator. Despite its own accelerated secularization, Ratzinger 




Christian roots that is far greater than in Europe. Ratzinger warns that Europe is on a 
“collision course with its own history” when it denies “any possible public dimension for 
Christian values” (108–109). 
 Ratzinger wants to know why Europe cannot achieve a similar consensus. He 
believes the difference rests in the founding of the United States, which demanded 
separation of church and state, allowing various religions to congregate and thrive. This 
developed what Ratzinger calls a “free church model.” He writes: 
American society was built for the most part by groups that had fled from the 
system of state churches that reigned in Europe, and they found their religious 
communities outside of the state church. The foundations of American society 
were thus laid by the free churches, which by the tenets of their creed and their 
very structure are not a state church but rather a free assembly of individuals 
(110). 
 
A complimentary explanation to what Ratzinger is observing here via Tocqueville can be 
found in Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). Hartz’s thesis that 
socialist movements found acceptance difficult in the United States due to the new land’s 
lack of a feudalistic past like that of Europe might also explain why free churches 
prospered in the American religious landscape. The insertion of Tocqueville into this 
discussion is quite interesting for two reasons. First, the analysis of individualism 
provided by Tocqueville in Democracy in America can be thought of as a precursor to 
contemporary communitarian theory’s outlook on individualism; second, there are some 
striking comparisons between Ratzinger’s sense of the sacred and Tocqueville’s 
understandings of the “social state” and mores. 
Tocqueville observed a culture of atomism developing during the early years of 




“egoism,” calling it a “a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to 
isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and 
friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to 
look after itself” (Vol. II, part 2, chapter 2). One can see from this how social attachments 
came to be at a disadvantage in the United States. If Ratzinger is aware of the deeper 
themes in Democracy, Tocqueville’s critique of the atomized self could be an influence 
on him and explain some of the similarities between Ratzinger’s views and those of the 
communitarian critique concerning social obligation and extreme individualism. 
A second point of interest in regard to Tocqueville begins with his opening of the 
chapter, “Social State of the Anglo-Americans,” in Democracy. Tocqueville writes: 
The social state is commonly the result of circumstances, sometimes of laws, but 
most often a combination of the two. But once it has come into being, it may itself 
be considered the prime cause of most of the laws, customs, and ideas which 
control the nation’s behavior; it modifies even those things which it does not 
cause. Therefore one must first study their social state if one wants to understand 
a people’s laws and mores (Vol. I, part 1, chapter 3). 
 
While the social state is not entirely analogous to a sense of the sacred, the sacred 
is bound up in the social state in that it is part of a community’s customs and mores. One 
might look at this as the intellectual foundation on which any group rests. In Western 
democracies such as the United States, the challenge is that religion, including related 
philosophical issues, can be interwoven into the history of customs, even as separation of 
church and state is essential in a democracy. For Tocqueville, citizens must be tolerant, 
and mores determine the successful maintenance of a democratic republic such as the 
United States. In fact, he calls mores “the habits of the heart” and “the different notions 
possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, and the sum of ideas that 




Tocqueville discusses the differences between Catholics and Protestants as 
examples of mores at that early time in America. He regards Catholics as loyal and 
friends of democracy, calling them the “most republican and democratic of all the 
classes” in the early United States. They were obedient, whereas Protestants were highly 
independent. Even with this difference, however, no single religion in the United States 
was hostile to its democratic and republican institutions, and “[a]ll the clergy there speak 
the same language; opinions are in harmony with the laws, and there is, so to say, only 
one mental current” (Vol. I. part II, chapter 9).38
Ratzinger sees another example of the differences between the public (state)-
private sphere relationships of the United States and Europe in how each treats cultural 
institutions, which in the United States are mostly nongovernmental and left to the 
stewardship of universities or private organizations that support the arts (111). In total, 
this comparative lesson between the United States and Europe is designed to set up why 
Pera’s civil religion is not likely to succeed in contemporary Europe. The inference here 
is that Christianity has thrived longer in the United States than in Europe due to the 
nongovernmental nature of cultural institutions. Ratzinger may want to be cautious here 
if his goal is to preserve history and culture. American Catholic scholar and theologian 
Ernest L. Fortin regarded the Founding Fathers’ separation of church and state as an 
unintended removal of America’s own sacred conceptions. These Founding Fathers did 
not intend to remove religion from public life, only the wars it caused, yet the notion of 
the separation of church and state extended to the point where religion began to be 
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separated from society altogether. As a result, Fortin contends (and sounds very much 
like Ratzinger in doing so): “The signs of the sacred are gradually disappearing from our 
midst, and our cities continue to take on an ever more secular aspect (Fortin 1991, 274). 
Despite this disappearance—and this should be noted as something with which Ratzinger 
himself would agree—he still believes American Catholicism is a model for fostering 
church and state separation. 
Yet something does not sit well with this comparison, unless Ratzinger is 
asserting that American Catholics have been able to tread water above the hyper-evolving 
nature of free churches in the United States and remain anchored in their traditions. One 
possible explanation for his stance is the stability and meticulous nature of the Church to 
slowly assess itself before changing, since Ratzinger believes that radical transformations 
are common in the Protestant world, but the Catholic Church maintains a universal and 
unchanging nature. His charge is that Protestant communities continuously adapt to the 
secularized world, and, in doing so, lose “their internal cohesion and their ability to 
persuade” (112). This point is no doubt raised for application to Pera’s non-
denominational Christianity. One is to infer here that it is harder for a church to stand by 
universal principles when churches so easily reinvent themselves over time. Another 
potential and possibly simpler interpretation is that the obedient nature of Catholics, as 
already noted by Tocqueville, along with their understanding of subsidiarity—the 
principle allowing the lowest ranking or competent entity in a decentralized government 





 The Catholic/Protestant division is also discussed by Ratzinger, as he notes that 
after the Reformation, Europe was split into two spiritual groups—one Catholic, the other 
Protestant—which would come to be reflected later in the European colonies in the New 
World. Reformed churches were established as state churches, partly because the 
Reformation was introduced by monarchs. In contrast, the Catholic system aimed to be 
universal without association to any particular state. The Church’s reach and community 
would then be much broader, living in all nations. The effect this has is that “[i]t creates a 
community—above and beyond loyalty to one’s own country—that spreads beyond 
national borders” (114–115). 
 Ratzinger highlights another difference between Protestantism and Catholicism in 
the way each received the Enlightenment: “While the Enlightenment proclaimed 
autonomy of reason and its emancipation from traditional faith, the Catholic Church 
remained strongly attached to its heritage of faith, thereby locking the two in endless 
conflict” (115). In contrast, a kinship formed between the Enlightenment and 
Protestantism in the eighteenth century and still stands today (117). 
Protestantism as a whole has also been better able to intertwine itself with modern 
culture; however, Ratzinger notes, “This is both its strength and its weakness” as it 
“conform[s] to the times” (118). So, while free churches attract a great deal of members, 
Ratzinger contends that they lose followers as they “adapt themselves to the standards of 
secularization.” In other words, they can get close to the Enlightenment, but not too close. 
Although this calls into question the universality of a church and its objectivity, 
one wonders how an institution such as the Catholic Church should conduct itself as the 




about declines in membership. Ratzinger believes churches are most attractive when they 
have “a solid point of reference and a clear orientation.” Therefore, the concept of a 
“global ethos” or even a civil religion becomes ambiguous and “no more than a reflection 
of the majority’s convictions,” resulting in something with little or no meaning (119–
120). So here again, Ratzinger is calling for particularity, but at the same time hoping to 
sustain a universality. 
 
When Secularists Live with Believers 
 
 If a civil religion will fail due to a lack of strong reference points, Ratzinger offers 
his own path on how Christians can salvage their faith via four theses: 1) creative 
minorities within the Christian faith should be called upon to convincingly lead by 
example; 2) there is a human need for communities and they evolve themselves; 3) 
groups need a defined foundation, one that is divine and “duty bound”; and 4) secularists, 
Catholics, seekers, and believers can learn from one another (120–124). The first three 
theses have already been discussed in detail in the Pera exchange. The fourth thesis is 
markedly noteworthy since it connects to the Habermas exchange and shows that 
Ratzinger sees a role for secularists. Ideologically, they are clearly different from the 
Catholic world, but he believes the parties can learn from one another. He encourages 
secularists and Catholics, seekers and believers to move toward each other with a new 
openness. Ratzinger sees each of these groups as traveling on separate paths pursuing a 
similar end, namely, truth, and through their interactions they can learn from one another. 




truth should admired and seen in a similar light as the Catholic approach to knowledge 
acquisition: 
Secular people are not a rigid block. They do not constitute a set denomination, or 
worse, an “anti-denomination.”… Very often they are people who passionately 
seek truth, who are pained by the lack of truth in humankind. Consequently they 
return to the essential contents of culture and faith, and through their commitment 
often make these contents even more luminous than an unquestioned faith, 
accepted more out of habit than out of the sufferings of the conscience (123–124). 
 
The Unpersuasive Salesman: Christianity 
 
There are two main reasons why Christianity’s model for life is becoming 
unconvincing, according Ratzinger. First, people are not compelled to join through an 
open calling. For example, he notes that the Christian model of life does little to offer “a 
livable alternative to the increasingly vacuous entertainments of leisure-time society” 
(125–126). Christianity is at a real disadvantage here. On one hand, as Ratzinger 
suggests, it is too passive in its calling, but on the other hand, it cannot be coercive. This 
is important to highlight here because this is where the narrative method of the 
communitarian critique is of value to Ratzinger. The act of choice is also relevant, as the 
Church will need to position itself as representing recognizable principles. 
The second reason Christianity has become unconvincing is that science 
surpassed Christianity. The life of a Christian is now archaically viewed as “out-of-step 
with the rationalism of the modern era.” With science also comes the value of 
observation. Hence the credibility of the Bible’s divine origins is questioned, and as such 
the Christian faith is demoted to myth. The conditions of this new intellectual 




Christianity is seen as a non-functional way of life in recent times. 
 Religion and philosophy are not capable of replacing modern science, but they 
can play a role in addressing some of the big questions that overlap these seemingly 
mutually exclusive fields of study—the metaphysical and the observable. By placing 
them together, Ratzinger hopes that the divided European identity can be repaired. This 
distinction is not limited to the division caused by the Reformation, but also addresses an 
even greater division between secularists and the faithful at large. Particularly, this would 
mean understanding tough questions from the perspectives of both science and 
philosophy. Ratzinger poses these as: “Does matter create reason? Does pure chance 
produce meaning? Or do the intellect, logos, and reason come first, so that reason, 




 From the previous chapter that focused on the Habermas exchange, it is clear that 
Ratzinger believes faith and reason should place limitations on one another to avoid 
dangerous absolutisms. With Ratzinger’s letter to Pera, it can be inferred that dangerous 
absolutisms now include both religious fundamentalism and relativism. He tells Pera that 
he is most grateful for his lecture’s criticism of relativism. Ratzinger acknowledges that 
they are in complete agreement with one another on this matter, declaring that as 
relativism increasingly becomes the “generally accepted way of thinking, the more it 
tends toward intolerance, thereby becoming a new dogmatism.” The danger posed by 




intolerance. Ratzinger offers a strong call to arms as he states that “it is vital to oppose 
this imposition of a new pseudo-enlightenment, which threatens freedom of thought as 
well as freedom of religion” (128). 
 Toward the end of Ratzinger’s letter he takes a brief detour to address bioethical 
issues raised by Pera, making clear it will only be a few brief remarks, but nevertheless 
he emphasizes that his comments are relevant to understanding how both secularists and 
Catholics have reached similar positions. It is a highly sensitive issue that involves 
balancing beliefs of the personal sphere with the public sphere of choice, where a 
common, equitable ground must be found to make non-arbitrary choices for all 
participants. Ratzinger appreciates Pera’s unique position as a secularist to speak of the 
“person from the moment of conception” and his understanding of “the deep ethical 
difference between the relationship with persons and the relationship with things.” He 
notes that the Church’s Magisterium detailed a similar position when deciding how far 
the Church should press its anti-abortion demands on lawmakers. The Congregation for 
the Doctrine of Faith prepared a document that outlined the responsibilities of Catholic 
politicians in tackling the issue of abortion in their public service. The document 
informed Catholic lawmakers that they should not make laws that would “impose a 
hierarchy of values that can only be recognized and enacted within the faith.” Instead, 
they should only legislate based on what belongs to “human foundations accessible to 
reason and therefore essential to the construction of a sound legal order” (129). 
 Rather than insert a theological argument that either life or a soul begins from the 
moment of conception due to evidence through divine gifts such as the Bible, Ratzinger 




datum will ever be sufficient proof of the existence of a spiritual soul” (131). Hence, the 
claim that a soul exists cannot be falsified. Further, since an individual is an empirical 
term used to describe “an organism…completely dependent on the mother,” it becomes 
problematic to distinguish a human individual (any stage of a fetus) from a human person 
(132). Like Pera, Ratzinger is welcoming uncertainty in this line of reasoning to support a 
pro-life doctrine. Faith, in part, relies on uncertainty. 
According to Ratzinger, the right-to-life debate for legislators is not a matter of 
“ethics of faith, but rather of the ethics of reason.” Here, at a meeting point between the 
empirical and the philosophical level, the abortion debate has been solved by reason 
alone (132). The harmony between the ethics of faith and the ethics of reason that 
Ratzinger calls for in the Pera exchange is a re-purposing of the faith-reason position 
taken in the Habermas exchange, which is described as a mutual need between reason 





In the Pera exchange, there are two questions that arise for which answers are not 
directly provided: first, should the spirit of the Church be Ratzinger’s main concern 
instead of European history, or are they as interwoven as he thinks? Related, can a sense 
of the sacred, in this case, European Christianity, transcend national or ethnic 
boundaries? Answering these questions involves laying out the Hellenistic roots of the 
Catholic faith, which he addresses in the Regensburg Lecture. There, he drills down 
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further than the historical and biblical life of Christ to reveal Christianity’s Hellenistic 
roots, bringing forward an ongoing struggle the Church has had with integrating localized 
cultures within Church doctrine without “de-Hellenizing” the faith. In this sense, it will 
be shown that the works in Without Roots serve as a primer for the next two events, 
Ratzinger’s Crisis of Cultures Address and the Regensburg Lecture. The documents in 
Without Roots also connect Dialectics of Secularization, as Ratzinger’s rationalism is put 
to application in a number of materialized situations. 
The Enlightenment and modern era are both discussed throughout Ratzinger’s 
documents in this exchange, and they serve as the starting point for unpacking the 
European cultural crisis he is so concerned about, leading to an underlying feeling that 
the Church should re-embrace and absorb both of these movements, or, at the very least, 
find a way to better to integrate parts of them so it can re-enter conversations in 
philosophy that left it behind. 
Lastly, Ratzinger and Pera seek unity and are speaking about the common 
conditions that can unify the West. This event certainly targets relativism as an 
underlying cause of the West’s demise, but they would be better served in looking at the 
value of the narrative model on MacIntyre’s terms. It is natural to think of one’s self in 
the “narrative mode” and find that story within a history and tradition whether or not one 
accepts or recognizes this cultural inheritance (AV, 206 and 221). The narrative model 
provides the binding obligations that Ratzinger is looking for, as indicated in the 
weaknesses of Pera’s civil religion. The autonomous self is incapable of escaping these 




environments. A Hellenized model brings greater substance for what Ratzinger seeks as 




Chapter 5: Modernity, Enlightenment, and Familiar Social Glue 
 
Nonetheless, to think of a human life as a narrative unity is to think in a way alien 
to the dominant individualist and bureaucratic modes of modern culture. 




Recapping the Events: Preparations for Countering Obsolescence 
 
Before discussing the texts covered in this chapter—Ratzinger’s Christianity and 
the Crisis of Cultures address and the Regensburg Lecture—a quick recap of the primary 
sources analyzed so far should be presented. The Pera and Habermas events bring to light 
the problems pluralism and modernity’s rationalism pose to twenty-first-century 
European civilization and the Catholic Church. The Habermas event also offers a window 
into Ratzinger’s rationalism, which is largely consistent with Catholic theology’s 
understanding of the relationship between faith and reason: revelation is the starting point 
from which all philosophical inquiries begin, and these inquiries subsequently follow the 
same rational process that guides any line of sound reasoning. Ratzinger argues for the 
democratic guarantees of law and the need for limits on religious fundamentalism, with a 
suggestion that reason may act as more than simply a tool to guide philosophical 
inquiries—reason should serve as a check on religious fundamentalism, and it is here that 
we find the secure and forgiving nature of Ratzinger’s rationalism. In the Pera exchange, 
his concerns with pluralism are brought forth with regard to relativism, European 
identity, and the need for any community to have a strong cultural identity, which he 




generation that are bound up in historical and cultural developments. Identification with 
this deep sense of history becomes essential to both correcting the moral disorder of 
relativism and creating a sense of obligation to one’s contemporaries and their legacies. 
With this need for a cultural identity established, the Crisis of Cultures address and the 
Regensburg Lecture provide an approach for securing this solidarity—the narrative 
method and a rekindling of Hellenized Christianity—and answer the question of which 
story could fulfill the sense of a sacred and serve as a communal narrative in the West. In 
the end, these two pieces install the European citizen into a constellation of Western 
touch-points that begin with ancient Greek civilization, continue into early Christianity, 
and struggle to survive in the Enlightenment—an era he believes is in need of great 
redefinition.  
While the Ratzinger events are discussed in chronological order, this is not 
intended to suggest an arc of Ratzinger’s political thought. Three reasons give pause to 
this suggestion. First, the sampling in this project does not span his entire career—this 
would amount to a separate research project and most likely find itself as a reference 
work endeavor. Second, there are core topics throughout the works presented here (faith’s 
relationship with reason, modernism, the Enlightenment, pluralism) that are slightly more 
developed or insightful than the previous treatment of each event discussed in this 
project. Third, the ordering provides context for any esoteric reading that might be 
revealed in reading Ratzinger’s thoughts on the Western cultural crisis, as we see mature 
writings prior to his papacy (Pera and Habermas exchanges), immediately before his 
elevation and while pondering career aspirations (Crisis), and following his rise to the 




certain aspects of modern liberalism. What is unique about the two events in this chapter 
is that Ratzinger is forced to confront how to reconcile the Church with both religious 
pluralism and the Enlightenment with the integration of the topics of inculturation and 
Hellenized Christianity. Leading up to these two events, Ratzinger leaves the impression 
that the Church is on the brink of obsolescence in the post-modern world because of a 
European identity that has lost sight of its cultural heritage. The three central themes of 
Ratzinger’s political teaching—humility, obligation, and obsolescence—are present 
throughout all the events, but in Crisis and Regensburg, his solutions to obsolescence 
emerge. In the Crisis event, Ratzinger’s re-interpretation of the Enlightenment as 
Christian in origin is one front on which Ratzinger counters the irrelevance of the Church 
and God in a world produced by the scientific revolution. If the Church cannot be 
understood in terms of perfection—this is also one of Ratzinger’s charges against the 
Enlightenment’s claims of universality—Ratzinger wants the Church to at least be 
understood as reasonable. This reasonableness of the Church and God is then extended in 
the Regensburg event, in which he discusses the nature and Greek origins of God, 
creating this system of Western touch-points that positions the Greek philosophic and 
cultural underpinnings of Europe as supplementary to biblical interpretation. Particular 
attention should be paid to his outline in Regensburg of the three stages of the de-
Hellenization of the Christian faith, as it implies that an essential part of the Roman 
Catholic Church deteriorated as landmark eras and anthropological changes in the West 





Chapter Organization and Progression 
 
This chapter first examines the arguments of Ratzinger’s Crisis of Cultures 
Address and the Regensburg Lecture by taking a critical look at their key arguments 
while placing them within the dialogue of the communitarian critique. These events are 
then followed by two additional sections. “Recreational Pragmatism” seeks to explain 
why Ratzinger desires to absorb the foundations of the Enlightenment into Church 
theology, as well as his rhetorical technique for doing so. The last section of this chapter, 
“The Communitarian Connection,” reflects on the effectiveness of both the Regensburg 
and Crisis events and Ratzinger’s advocacy for more potent Hellenized features and 
influences of Christianity as a solution to Europe’s cultural crisis, bringing the events into 
context with the preceding chapters and Ratzinger’s communitarian thought at large. 
 
Crisis of Cultures Address (April 1, 2005) 
Reconciliation 
Joseph Ratzinger delivered his Crisis of Cultures address40
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 at the Convent of 
Saint Scholastica in Subiaco, Italy, on April 1, 2005, one day before the death of his 
predecessor, Pope John Paul II. The occasion was a ceremony for then Cardinal 
Ratzinger to receive the St. Benedict Award for the promotion of life and the family in 
Europe. This setting should be seen as the contextual background for the address since it 
is largely a critique of the Enlightenment, particularly the movement’s status as the basis 




had in hindering the Church’s efforts to protect all stages of life. The address does touch 
on abortion and reproduction-related issues, but it also takes on the philosophical 
approaches that Ratzinger believes led to challenges in promoting life and curbing the 
human thirst for power. He believes that from the Enlightenment came modernity’s 
tendency to inspire humans to dominate nature, and through this quest for domination, 
humans have created great inequalities since under such influence morality becomes an 
entirely subjective matter. As he puts it, the “possibilities available to humans for 
dominion over matter have grown in a manner we may truly call unimaginable.” This 
new dominion includes terrorism, nuclear and biological weapons, and the self-
manipulation and construction of humans. From a theistic point of view, all of this 
troubles Ratzinger because “man enters the world, no longer as a gift of the Creator, but 
as the product of our activity—and a product that can be selected according to 
requirements that we ourselves stipulated” (25–26). One could interpret Ratzinger’s 
charge here as saying that humans are attempting to promote the species to a higher 
station or order in the world, and doing so without understanding the full implications of 
their actions. It is an example of unstrained will. 
Human autonomy isn’t confined to the realm of science. Ratzinger believes this 
attitude carries over into the political arena and contributes to great economic 
inequalities, the exploitation of the Earth, and famine (26–27). One could say the 
perpetrator of these inequities begins with modern liberal individualism as identified in 
the communitarian critique. Humans do what they can because their individual will 
allows them. That said, he must now account for how humans reached this point to see 




reinterpreting the Enlightenment and Western Logos for the purposes of strengthening 
European identity and morality and re-establishing Christianity as a relevant player in 
serious philosophy; Regensburg then gives that narrative a fuller definition. 
 
A Brief Detour: Defining Culture and Inculturation 
 
Crisis was not the first time Ratzinger wrote on culture and inculturation. His 
1993 lecture, Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures,41
This older lecture broadly defines culture as “the historically developed common 
form of expression of the insights and values which characterize the life of a community” 
(1, 5). Within this package of insights and values, culture and religion are seen as 
inseparable, as religion plays a critical role in shaping a society’s values since it is “the 
essential element of culture” (1, 10). Culture also contains a mutually beneficial 
communal element, since a strong culture helps the individual thrive: community is “the 
prerequisite for individual fulfillment” (1, 7). This Thomistic notion
 given in Hong Kong to the 
presidents of the Asian Bishops’ Conferences and the chairs of their doctrinal 
commissions, explored Christian universalism, the challenges of inculturation, and the 
dependent relationship between religion and culture. A quick summary of this address is 
necessary before discussing culture and Hellenized Christianity as stated in Crisis, as 
well as Regensburg, since it helps define culture and inculturation. 
42
                                                 
41 Citations for this lecture refer to section first, paragraph second. 
 of man as a 
42 See Book I, chapter 1 in St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Kingship. Specifically, he writes: 
“It is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, 
to live in a group” (paragraph 4). Further, he argues that man is not sufficient by himself 




political animal dependent on the cooperation of others to flourish can be seen as an end 
goal of a society’s purpose. True to this philosophic tradition in the Church, Ratzinger 
writes: “In order to be whole, everybody needs each other. Man approaches the unity and 
wholeness of his being only in the reciprocity of all great cultural achievements” (1, 22). 
In addition to self-preservation, Ratzinger asks the individual to wholeheartedly accept 
the notion that by committing himself to the group the individual transcends “himself in 
culture and finds himself carried along in a larger social subject whose insights he can 
borrow, continue and develop further” (1, 9). 
Inculturation is the process by which a culture adopts a new religion and infuses 
its own distinct cultural insights and values into it. The faith then absorbs these customs 
and adapts without compromising its core. Ratzinger does express reservations with this 
process though, especially with regard to the Christian faith, since he sees an inseparable 
relationship between religion and the original culture from which it was generated. The 
religion a culture is derived from is vital to retaining the culture’s essence, for as 
Ratzinger puts it: “If you remove from a culture its own religion which begets it, then you 
rob it of its heart” (1, 2). As for Christianity, he goes so far as to say that it would be 
“nonsensical to offer a sort of pre-cultural or de-cultured Christianity which would rob 
itself of its own historical force and degrade itself to an empty collection of ideas” (2, 
19). 
 For inculturation to be a viable process, there must be a universal nature to the 
culture adopting the new religion. This process presumes two things: 1) human nature is 
the same across all cultures and 2) there is a human condition in all cultures to seek union 
                                                                                                                                                 





(1, 3). Inculturation is most successful when no injustice is done to a culture after 
integrating the new religion, since all cultures possess a disposition toward the truth (1, 
4). However, it is not clear how Ratzinger reconciles this when he also states that “there 
is no such thing as faith devoid of culture or culture devoid of faith” and only offers a 
solution that cultures must take a shape that allows for universality in order to 
successfully complete a process of inculturation, or, as he calls this, a “flourishing [of] 
new forms” (1, 18). This idea of an evolutionary form seems contradictory to the 
previous idea that every faith contains strong elements of its originating culture. The only 
way this works is if the adopter can absorb both the religion’s theological doctrines and 
its core cultural components. 
 While this address demonstrates how Ratzinger understands inculturation in his 
own terms, it is also important to bring in an outside definition of the concept in general. 
Gerald A. Arbuckle’s Culture, Inculturation & Theologians (2010) defines it in more 
reciprocal terms: 
Inculturation is a dialectical interaction between Christian faith and cultures, in 
which these cultures are challenged, affirmed, and transformed toward the reign 
of God, and in which Christian faith is likewise challenged, affirmed, and 
enhanced by this experience. When interacting with members of his own complex 
culture and with people of other cultures Jesus Christ fosters this dialectical 
exchange characteristic of inculturation (152). 
 
Arbuckle’s definition also makes Christ look more like a dialectical ambassadorial figure 
who carries out the inculturation process in which both the adopter and the Christian faith 
participate in a mutually beneficial relationship. What his definition shares with the 
definitions of others is that there is a universal nature of the Christian faith that allows it 




inculturation, some of which emphasize this principle of universalism. This includes the 
ideas that “the holy spirit is the source of truth no matter where it is found,” and no single 
culture can be the sole expresser of the truths of faith since truth translates to all cultures 
(168–170). 
 
A New Moralism, European Foundations, and Scientific Uniformity 
 
The Crisis address calls for a public morality that goes beyond subjective 
standards, for Ratzinger believes the basis for current human behavior is a new moralism 
consisting of “justice, peace, and conservation of creation.” While these values may be of 
some utility, Ratzinger says that this new moralism is vague, “confined to the sphere of 
politics,” and no longer a “personal duty” in everyday life (27–28). One could call this 
the result of utilitarianism or the consequentialism that he was critical of earlier. 
Ratzinger yearns for personal duty as an aspect of moralism, and this is key to the 
communitarian strain found in his work, as it is reminiscent of Taylor’s call for 
generational obligations to foster an environment in which human potential can be 
cultivated. The communal and civic nature of this work, and its connection to common 
moral reference points, makes his approach to community and obligation fit the 
communitarian designation not only in regard to Taylor but also in regard to MacIntyre’s 
commentary on common moral language. 
What logically should follow, and does, in this address is discussion of a common 
ground and baseline for a moral code, namely, Christianity. Ratzinger sees Christianity as 




origin, he believes that Christianity took on its most distinct and developed form in 
Europe. He is disappointed that since the Renaissance era and the Enlightenment 
movement, Europe’s cultural efficacy has been weakened through a scientific rationality 
that “imposes a uniformity on the world.” Under this new paradigm, God then becomes 
less relevant since he cannot be proven with scientific criteria. Worse, he is relegated to 
the “sphere of subjective choices.” There is a dual implication here. First, it is no longer 
reasonable or rational to treat God as relevant since his existence cannot be demonstrated 
through scientific verification. Second, the value of objective and universal standards is 
diminished. Ratzinger describes this doubt in the basic terms of good and evil and 
consequentialism (30–31). Without commitment to values and beliefs based on 
unscientific principles, including the belief in God, basic human rights, and divined codes 
of conduct, Europe is now in a cultural crisis since its identity was based on the 
unverifiable premises of Christianity. 
 
Resuscitating God, Again 
 
One way to bring God back into the public sphere begins with reinterpreting the 
Enlightenment, which eradicated God from political relevancy. But first, Ratzinger must 
clear the decks regarding religious pluralism and those who would oppose any mention of 
God in public life. There is an assumption that belief in the divine is part of the human 
condition, so what Ratzinger first proposes is a soft, equivocal insertion of God. Echoing 
some of Marcello Pera’s doubts regarding religious sensitivities in pluralistic societies, he 




Constitution would offend non-Christians who live on the continent since he calls it a 
“historical fact” that Europe’s history is a Christian one (32–33). The tone here in Crisis 
is slightly more assertive than that of the Pera exchange and resembles Pera’s thoughts on 
the West’s self-censorship and self-repression in the face of pluralism. One could even 
say the idea of establishing a role for Christianity in the European Constitution represents 
an intensity of preference shift by Ratzinger to take on Pera’s ambitious project of a non-
denominational civil religion; however, this is cut short later in the address when he 
proposes that Christianity in its purest form must contain and preserve its Greek 
influence. This influence includes the idea that Christianity is the religion of Logos and 
the etymological argument that to truly understand the Bible one must look at its original 
Greek terms—this is not laid out in Crisis but later in Regensburg, which is why these 
events have been tied together in this chapter as supplements to one another. A Greek 
understanding of God helps to introduce an equivocal insertion of God into public life 
with a non-secular endorsement. This equivocal act looks like a slight deviation from his 
earlier encounter with Pera in which he takes issue with the idea of a legislated non-
denominational state-run religion, though one could argue that it is more in line with the 
sense of the sacred concept since the idea of God—in this case one defined through its 
Greek origins—would connect many religions. In the Regensburg Lecture, he makes 
clear which version of Christianity is most palatable for Europe and for preserving what 
he believes to be original biblical teachings. Before pushing this idea, however, he must 
make an attempt to remove doubt that the other two partners in the big three religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) would accept this. In Pera-like fashion, he asks: Who 




pluralism is the culprit for God’s absence: “It is not the mention of God that offends those 
who belong to other religions; rather, it is the attempt to construct the human community 
in a manner that absolutely excludes God.” He also argues Muslims are more offended by 
“the cynicism of a secularized culture that denies its own foundations,” while Jews share 
the same roots as Christianity, which go back to Mount Sinai, where God’s voice was 
heard (33). 
The closing of Crisis returns to the Pera exchange’s discussion of God’s place in 
the European Constitution. Ratzinger argues that God’s absence from this document is 
not a matter of tolerance to accommodate non-believers, but rather “an expression of a 
consciousness that would like to see God eradicated once and for all from the public life 
of humanity and shut up in the subjective sphere of cultural residues from the past.” The 
responsible party here again is evolutionary relativism and its purported “possession of 
the definitive knowledge of human reason, with the right to consider everything else 
merely as a stage in human history that is basically obsolete and deserves to be 
relativized” (44–45). Ratzinger’s critique of relativism is central to sustaining cultural 
roots, for it does not view religion as a commodity that can succumb to obsolescence. 
That said, one must believe that Ratzinger is stating that Europe’s cultural reference point 
is Christianity. Other cultures may have different points of reference in their history, but 
for Europe, this is the communal narrative that should be preserved. If Christianity cannot 
be immediately reinstalled as this narrative, Ratzinger looks to insert it as part of the 





The Enlightenment: Criticism and a Reinterpretation 
 
To bring God back into everyday European life, Ratzinger begins by unraveling 
the Enlightenment—the movement that exiled God from the public sphere—as part of an 
effort to rebrand the perception of the movement. This is an attempt to make the Church 
relevant to a discussion that left God absent from much of public discourse and the latest 
paradigm transformation to post-modern philosophy. In Thomas Kuhn’s own description 
of paradigm shifts, he argued that those who hold onto the views of the past “are simply 
read out of the profession, which thereafter ignores their work” (1996, 19). Ratzinger’s 
rebranding of the Enlightenment as Christian in origin is one way to avoid having the 
Church perceived as a historical anchor. It also is a hope that such a rebranding will help 
the Church become a part of philosophic conversations again; hence, Ratzinger’s 
engagement in the previously discussed encounters with Habermas and Pera.  
Discussion of the Enlightenment is  a part of the communitarian critique’s 
reaction to the liberal individualism of Rawls and Nozick, particularly the influence of 
Kant. Immanuel Kant’s essay, “What Is Enlightenment?” argues that enlightenment is 
man’s emancipation from self-incurred tutelage, which is the inability “to make use of his 
understanding without direction from another” (85). Kant was forging a democratized 
reason that saw individuals as fully capable of making their own decisions based on 
reason and observation without the influence of faith in revelation or other unobservable 
phenomena. His Critique of Pure Reason similarly stresses the necessity of empirical 
observation as the basis for then guiding one’s thoughts. Whether this is still a viable 
approach to political philosophy has come under fire from all corners of the field, not just 




the idea that it collapses in on itself. Criticism from those advocating communitarian 
theory focuses on the need to balance the individual with the group and emphasizes the 
value of common narratives. At the fringe of Enlightenment criticism are scholars such as 
Richard Rorty who question the relevancy of the Enlightenment in favor of poetics and 
language building over scientizing philosophy: 
It was natural for liberal political thought in the eighteenth century to try to associate 
itself with the most promising cultural development of the time, the natural sciences. 
But, unfortunately, the Enlightenment wove much of its political rhetoric around a 
picture of the scientist as a sort of priest, someone who achieved contact with 
nonhuman truth by being “logical,” “methodological,” and “objective.” This was a 
useful tactic in its day, but it is less useful nowadays (1989, 52). 
 
John Gray, who sides a great deal with MacIntyre, views the era as bringing about 
a calculating and willful nature that is “destructively purposeless” and “a self-defeating 
project, in both intellectual and political terms” (1995, 146 and 151). Gray wonders 
whether the door to the Enlightenment has been closed, since the cultural effects are 
irreversible—this is the question Ratzinger is up against. 
Rather than re-enter this body of criticism—the Church has a demonstrated 
history of attacking liberal individualism—Ratzinger now attempts to reinterpret the 
Enlightenment. Reinterpretation is certainly not a defense, but instead is an 
acknowledgment of the era’s flaws. Ratzinger’s new outlook on this era is achieved by 
first identifying its notable outputs; second, by pointing out its weaknesses; and third, by 
attaching Christianity to the Enlightenment as both a pseudonym for Greek Logos and a 
gap filler where pure reason fails. 
Ratzinger’s understanding of the Enlightenment hinges on the idea that liberty is 




movement, including the freedom of religion and the expression of one’s own opinions, a 
democratic state, political parties, independent administrators of law, and what could be 
described as certain inalienable rights of men (34). This is not to say that Ratzinger would 
deny any of these rights, but he questions at what point they either went too far or 
contributed to an extremely self-centered attitude. 
Crisis contains three general criticisms of the Enlightenment that emerge in 
Ratzinger’s address: the movement created a self-defeating philosophic enterprise, it 
proved to be insufficient in its claims of universality, and it detached man from moral 
obligations through its limitless liberty. The first two claims are best summed up in the 
following passage and strongly resemble claims from the communitarian critique: 
Since it is the culture of reason that has finally achieved complete self-awareness, 
it naturally boasts of its claimed universality and imagines that it is complete in 
itself, without needing any other cultural factors to complement it (36). 
 
The third reason also has a communitarian link since detachment from moral 
obligation, as demonstrated by Taylor, is the first step in forgoing larger communal 
responsibilities. This detachment is also bound up in the insufficiency and self-defeating 
nature of the Enlightenment. Without God—or a sense of the sacred—obligation is an 
optional activity. Further, the philosophic approach that weighs liberty first leads to 
contradictions and suppresses motivation to pursue this sense of the sacred since a 
collection of values is purely subjective and unscientific. 
Ratzinger sees another way the Enlightenment unravels itself: liberty provides a 
cultural foundation that desires the best of two contradictory worlds—the emancipation 
of limits to produce pure liberty and a guarantee that one’s own rights won’t be infringed 




seen, even the concept of liberty, which initially seemed capable of expanding without 
any limits, leads in the end to the self-destruction of liberty itself” (40–41). 
The Enlightenment will always be insufficient for Ratzinger when considering the 
limitations he put forth on faith and reason in the Habermas exchange. Here in Crisis, he 
describes the movement as one that believes in its own completeness and self-sufficiency, 
thus dooming itself in the eyes of Ratzinger. He sees an inherent contradiction in this 
belief, for while the Enlightenment is a “culture of reason” that believes itself to be 
completely self-aware and in possession of a universality that renders cultural factors 
irrelevant (36), it proliferated a world of relativism. 
At first glance, Ratzinger’s attack on the universal nature of the Enlightenment is 
a peculiar criticism since he often boasts of the Church’s universality. One could argue 
that one strength of the Enlightenment is that it lacked any cultural factors to hold it back, 
making it easier to plug it into any society as its guiding force. This is certainly consistent 
with the new culture that Ratzinger believes was forged in Europe through the 
Enlightenment, a culture in which “God has nothing whatever to do with public life and 
with the foundations of the state” (37). However, Ratzinger wonders how any culture, or 
a movement as robust as the Enlightenment, can have roots outside of itself. Surely, it 
must have evolved from something, and this is the opening Ratzinger sees to re-attach 
Greek roots to the Enlightenment. This also exposes the inherent collapsible nature of 
Enlightenment philosophy. With an incomplete cultural component, Ratzinger says the 
Enlightenment “consciously cuts off its own historical roots, depriving itself of the 




particularly the acceptance of God’s existence and the redefinition of him and 
Christianity as Logos itself. 
 
Ratzinger’s Solution: A New Social Glue—Christianity as Logos 
 
The most unique offering from Crisis that separates it from the previous two 
events discussed in this project is the social glue proposed by Ratzinger—this is the hope 
that Christianity can be viewed as the religion of Logos and, in doing so, redefine 
Europe’s current cultural space shaper, the Enlightenment. If the primary driver for the 
world around Ratzinger is the rationalism of the Enlightenment, then this as an 
opportunity to inject a new component into that driver. In the end, he positions 
Christianity, God, and Logos as one in the same, representing a new, multifaceted 
communal narrative for Europe. 
Ratzinger is clear to assert that his critique of the Enlightenment’s rationalism is 
not a rejection of the Enlightenment and modernity altogether. Instead, he believes that 
“[f]rom the very beginning, Christianity has understood itself to be the religion of the 
Logos, to be a religion in keeping with reason” (47). This phrasing, as well as the 
derivative forms used therein, is repeated several times, marking it as the most critical 
message Ratzinger disseminates in the address. True to his previous writings on faith and 
reason, he states that the Christian faith “proceeds from the Logos, from creative reason, 
and is therefore open to all that is truly rational” (50). There is a loose association here 
with connecting the logic of the Church, which accepts revelation as its starting point, 




rejection of unobservable phenomena such as God or revelation as a legitimate starting 
point.  
Ratzinger believes that reason lost its voice in the Christian tradition when the 
Enlightenment segregated reason from religion. This is a reasonable assessment—the 
Enlightenment did elevate reason to philosophy’s central authority—but he questions 
how this meshes with “a religion of the persecuted” who knew the “principle of liberty of 
faith” as well as anyone when it came to understating the dangers of a state religion. In 
this sense, he sees the Enlightenment values of freedom of religion and the human 
reasoning that leads to this understanding as Christian in their origin (47–48).  
The connection Ratzinger is working to establish is far from new frontier for the 
Church; as he notes, the Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World also attempted to reconcile the Church with modernity by demonstrating a 
harmony between Christianity and the Enlightenment (48–49). Ratzinger is reminding his 
audience of the faithful that what has largely been viewed as an antagonistic relationship 
does not have to be so. To appeal to those outside of the faithful, he draws on Kant as a 
representative of the latter portion of the Enlightenment, as well as tactics of pragmatic 
persuasion. Ratzinger interprets Kant as offering a solution for connecting practical 
reason with God. While Kant denied that God could be known through pure reason, he 
doubted that man would act in a moral manner without accepting the concepts of God, 
freedom, and immortality that are derived through practical reason (51). 
Whether individuals are faithful or not, Ratzinger wants them to at least recognize 




manner. If one insists they must be guided by reason alone, one should by way of 
practical concern see the precautionary value of accepting the illusion of God: 
Even the one who does not succeed in finding the path to accepting the existence 
of God ought nevertheless to try to live and to direct his life veluti si Deus 
daretur, as if God did indeed exist. This is the advice Pascal gave to his non-
believing friends, and it is the advice that I should like to give to our friends today 
who do not believe (51–52). 
 
There is a surface-level inconsistency in the above passage, when compared to his 
position against a non-denominational civil religion in the Pera exchange. Ratzinger is 
asking non-believers to set aside a strong belief of theirs to make way for the possibility 
of faith; this underplays the importance this value holds for them (agnostics and atheists). 
He was critical of this very idea in his earlier exchange with Pera and the idea of a non-
denominational Christian civil religion. However, this seeming inconsistency makes 
sense when thought of in terms of the broader sense of the sacred advocated in the Pera 
exchange. One could also argue that Ratzinger is making a case for religion based on its 
utility of human expression, similar to previous claims made by Habermas.43
We need men who keep their eyes fixed on God, learning from him what true 
humanity means. We need men whose intellect is enlightened by the light of God, 
men whose hearts are opened by God, so that their intellect can speak to the 
 From a 
pragmatic perspective, it again seems that Ratzinger is hoping to capitalize on practical 
grounds, warning that “the total exclusion of God leads us more and more to the brink of 
the abyss, toward the utter annihilation of man” (51). Therefore, a substantial subset of 
the faithful is necessary in the populace for solidifying Ratzinger’s social glue. Without 
using the phrase a sense of the sacred, he is calling on the same concept for God’s 
presence to sincerely coalesce in the public and private spheres in the following passage: 
                                                 




intellect of others and their hearts can open the hearts of others. It is only by 
means of we who have been touched by God that God can return to be with 
mankind (52). 
 
The private realm here is understood to be individual pursuits in knowing God. The 
public part is achieved by reaching out to others by either sharing what has been learned 
or by living example. The above quote is also quite important because while Crisis does 
contain some elements of pragmatism, this passage deafens this interpretive approach of 
Ratzinger in this piece, as it is clear he desires a genuine presence of God in society. 
 





“Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections,”44
                                                 
44 The source of Ratzinger’s Regensburg Lecture was obtained on May 14, 2010, from 
the Vatican’s Web site at 
www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html References are identified by 
paragraph. 
 also referred to 
as the Regensburg Lecture, picks up Crisis’s proposition that Christianity is the religion 
of Logos and adds to this idea etymological details on how Greek Logos found its way 
into the Bible, which Ratzinger sees as part of a larger Hellenistic influence that has 
diminished but should be revitalized. In other words, in its proper and original form, 
Christianity must preserve its ancient Greek roots. This is not the explicit intention of the 
lecture, but it is certainly the largest implication that can be drawn from it. The 




for moral language. Scripture cannot simply be interpreted as one chooses; rather, one 
must supplement one’s reading with both anthropological and etymological 
investigations. Doing so will repair—to borrow from MacIntyre—the broken moral 
language that has led to the cultural, moral, and identity crises about which Ratzinger is 
so concerned. 
Hellenized Christianity—the original Greek text contained in the Bible and 
supplementary philosophic works—becomes a narrative itself and the reference point of 
societal values for the West. An additional take-away from the Regensburg Lecture is 
that it begins to look like objective standards are not enough, hence, the need for a 
communitarian system that places objective ideas within a societal context. This is 
certainly not an intention of Ratzinger’s, but rather a byproduct of his writing if he’s 
endorsing Hellenized Christianity. Christianity needs to remain Hellenized to make sense, 
but Ratzinger’s connections between Catholicism and ancient Greek philosophy are loose 
and tangential at best. However, he is on to something. One wishes that he had said 
something more direct about Greek influence on Christian theology by way of 
philosophic examples rather than relying on the idea that culture—bringing with it the 
thoughts of its people—and religion can mix and become infused. This discussion could 
have included, but not limited itself to: the concept of the Christ-like selfless, beautiful 
actions promoted in the Nicomachean Ethics or even the general influence of Aristotle on 
Thomas and, similarly, Plato on Augustine. There are a couple of references to Socrates 
in the lecture, though only in reference to his attempt to transcend myth and something he 
once said to Phaedo regarding false philosophical opinions. It is possible Ratzinger 




lecture’s primary audience of Catholic academia, but it is nonetheless an omission worth 
noting if one is talking about Greek culture and its notable legacies. 
 In reading this lecture, one must eventually ask: If Christianity is to be objective 
and universally valid, why can’t the Greek influence be subtracted if Christianity can 
hold up in any culture? Based on this chapter’s earlier section45
                                                 
45 See the subsection titled “A Brief Detour: Defining Culture and Inculturation” on p. 
148. 
 on culture and 
inculturation, Ratzinger’s likely answer would be that it is difficult to separate the 
influence of a culture that initially generates a religion since there is something intrinsic 
to the religion that makes bracketing its cultural influence a difficult task without great 
compromise to the religion. Also, in the Pera exchange he acknowledged that Christianity 
had experienced its own Greco-Latin inculturation. With the Roman Catholic Church, 
Ratzinger sees something special about the Greek origins in both Christianity’s original 
writing of the New Testament in Greek and translation of the Old Testament from 
Hebrew (mostly) to Greek. Without proper care and attention to the Greek words used to 
construct and reconstruct the Bible, the original message is lost. Ratzinger does not 
mention the generational aspect of interpretive flaw—the idea that there may be cultural 
definitions lost over time—but considering how many centuries have passed since the 
scriptures were written this is an additional reason to bolster his argument. Not only has 
the original intent been obscured, but, according to Ratzinger, the Enlightenment and 
modernity have subtracted this unique element from Christianity at large. Ratzinger sees 
this as the new, humanized Jesus, which he includes in the three stages that de-Hellenized 
the Christian faith. Regensburg calls on the university system to rethink how it 




 Like the Crisis address, Ratzinger’s understanding of modern theory comes to 
light as well as his desire to repackage modernism in the university, which is why the 
lecture begins with reflections on his teaching experiences within the university system. 
Since modernism laid the groundwork to usher in contemporary thought and European 
life, redefining this era and its outputs offers an opportunity to reposition the Church in 
the new world in which Ratzinger finds himself. The connection between the Crisis and 
Regensburg events can also be seen as follows: If one acknowledges the public necessity 
of a deity, the question then becomes which God? In the Pera exchange, Ratzinger 
critiqued Pera’s proposition of ambiguous deities and religions. Crisis partially fills this 
gap by suggesting a constitutional or public decree that takes into account God, while 
Regensburg then details how God is understood in the West. In the end, what emerges is 
a constellation of touch-points for a communal narrative and social glue in the Christian 
West. 
Principally, the lecture has three goals: 1) to show that acting violently is 
irrational and goes against the nature of God (Logos); 2) to highlight essential elements 
of Christianity that are of Greek origin that demonstrate the unreasonableness of 
violence; and 3) to demonstrate that God, Logos, and reason are one and the same. 
Making God an all-knowing, logical entity reveals the imperfect nature of humans since 







Violence as Irrational Behavior 
 
The Regensburg Lecture cannot be discussed without touching on a widely 
controversial remark made in the speech regarding Islam and violence. It is only 
somewhat related to Ratzinger’s social glue, though mostly because it positions God as a 
rational actor and reasonable entity whose rational nature is based on the idea of Logos. 
Using the story of fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor Manuel II and his dialogue with 
an educated Persian, Ratzinger hopes to demonstrate that violence is an irrational act 
because it goes against the nature of God. The interlocutors’ discussion on the subject of 
Christianity, Islam, and the unreasonableness of violence serves as a parable for the 
broader vision of the essay, namely, the idea that God and Logos are the same. 
An analysis of this lecture, including the parable, is included in this research 
project, not due to the controversy it caused by offending the Muslim world, but because 
the parable was part of an attempt in the larger message of the lecture to define the nature 
and origins of God. Yet the misused parable actually detracts from this purpose and the 
magnitude of the lecture. While much attention was paid to the parable and what it meant 
for Muslim-Christian relations, this is not where the greater focus should be since the 
parable does not represent a significant portion of the lecture. This chapter’s analysis of 
the lecture will show greater dimension to this work than simply the parable. One reason 
for this is that one may wonder if the genuineness of the controversial remark should be 
de-emphasized since Ratzinger did apologize for the controversy caused by his misuse of 
the quote. The Vatican’s secretary of state, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, sent the apology 
on behalf of Ratzinger, reiterating that the pope is unequivocally in favor of inter-




meeting with representatives of Muslim communities in Cologne, Germany. Bertone goes 
out of his way to clarify Ratzinger’s true intentions as he writes: “The Holy Father thus 
sincerely regrets that certain passages of his address could have sounded offensive to the 
sensitivities of the Muslim faithful, and should have been interpreted in a manner that in 
no way corresponds to his intentions.”46
The apology also restated the Church’s official position on non-Christian 
religions, particularly Islam, as formulated in Vatican II’s Nostra Aetate, which declared 
that the Church regards Muslims “with esteem” for their recognition of one God, 
reverence of Jesus as a prophet, honor for Mary, belief in a day of judgment, and the 
Muslim way of life that worships God “through prayer, almsgiving, and fasting.”
 
47 It 
should also be noted that Nostra Aetate called for an end to hostilities between Christians 
and Muslims.48
The misappropriated quotation is also likely the result of an early papal decision 
of Ratzinger’s to forgo retaining a Vatican adviser on relations with non-Christian 
religions. When elevated to pontiff, Ratzinger removed Archbishop Michael Fitzgerald 
from his post heading the Vatican department that dealt with relations to non-Christian 
religions under John Paul II. Fitzgerald, a British-born cleric, was redeployed as a papal 
nuncio (ambassador) to Egypt and delegate to the Arab League. One could speculate that 
this reassignment meant the absence of a much-needed expert on Islam from the pope’s 
 
                                                 
46 Bertone, “Statement by Card. Tarcisio Bertone,” paragraph 5. 
47 Bertone, “Statement by Card. Tarcisio Bertone,” paragraph 2. Bertone cites no. 3 from 
Nostra Aetate. 
48 See Nostra Aetate (section 3, paragraph 2), where Pope Paul VI writes: “Since in the 
course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and 
Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual 
understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all 




circle who would have likely caught the misused quote and parable found in the lecture. 
All of this being said, the remark regarding Islam and violence does need to be examined 
because it relates to the nature of God and logic. 
Using an edition of Manuel II Paléologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman by Prof. 
Theodore Khoury, Ratzinger examines the exchange between two interlocutors (the 
fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor Manuel II and an educated Persian) on the concept 
of holy war. It is important to note the reference to Khoury’s version because at times it is 
difficult to distinguish between Ratzinger’s voice and that of the characters, and even that 
of the text’s editor. This confusion likely contributed to what Ratzinger was trying to say 
in Regensburg when he states that “[t]he emperor must have known that surah 2,256 
reads: ‘There is no compulsion in religion.’” The point here is that the emperor should 
have known that religion does not will itself onto others. Yet, in addressing the 
relationship between religion and violence, the emperor states: “Show me just what 
Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, 
such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” Ratzinger explains 
the emperor’s position, that faith through violence is unreasonable because “[v]iolence is 
incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul” (no. 3). If God is to be 
viewed as the equivalent of Logos, then violent conversion is contrary to God’s nature 
since it does not act in accordance with reason. Yet Ratzinger’s use of the citation is 
ultimately unclear. Is he attacking the position that religion in general invokes violence, 
or is he implying there is something inherent in Islam that leads to this? Unfortunately, 
the lecture does not contain the Church’s position on the Muslim world that is articulated 




 Another part of the lecture uses Khoury’s voice to explain that the rationality of 
God also comes at the expense of the Islamic tradition, as Ratzinger writes: 
The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: “For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped 
by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God 
is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, 
even that of rationality” (no. 4). 
 
The implication here is that the God discussed is a Western one, specifically, a 
rational Greek one. Regensburg argues that God cannot be both rational and violent, for it 
is no coincidence that if one studies the original Greek words for God and Logos, one 
will find that in the original Christian tradition God was to be understood as a rational 
actor, which is where Ratzinger’s essay goes next. When God is typically spoken of in 
terms of Logos it is in terms of intelligent design or a natural ordering to God’s doing 
whereby the world is not simply arbitrary. We now have a discussion of God bound to a 
cultural and philosophic understanding. This is the particularist approach of Ratzinger’s 
argument that must be explained. 
 
God = Logos = Reason [or God as Reason/Logos] 
 
Ratzinger sees God, Logos, and reason as one in the same. Citing the book of 
Genesis, Ratzinger reminds his audience that in: 
the first verse of the whole Bible, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the 
words: “In the beginning was the λόγος”…God acts, σὺν λόγω, with Logos. 
Logos means both reason and word—a reason which is creative and capable of 
self-communication, precisely as reason (no. 5). 
 
There appears to be an odd connection here—is God Hellenized simply because of the 




exclusive license to logic? Or, is this the Greco-Latin influence Ratzinger talked about in 
the Pera exchange? First, describing God in terms of Logos distinguishes God’s 
capabilities from those of humans, who are generally intellectually limited on their own, 
and it is important to remember that throughout the four Ratzinger events discussed in 
this project, he has been critical of human efforts to master nature. Second, and this is 
where much of the lecture is directed, Ratzinger is creating an etymological pairing of the 
Bible with its Greek origins. Ratzinger offers a myriad of examples of Greek influence on 
Christianity and the Bible, including the visions and theology of St. Paul, practical 
cultural integration in Hellenistic territories in the early days of Christianity, and the 
Greek translations of the Hebrew Old Testament. 
 The first part of Ratzinger’s St. Paul connection draws on Paul’s vision, in which 
the roads to Asia were barred and a Macedonian man pleads to him for help, which 
Ratzinger sees as an “intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between Biblical faith and 
Greek inquiry” (no. 5). The second connection he makes with St. Paul is when he finds 
that Paul saw love as an act that transcends knowledge and brings one closer to God, who 
is Logos. Through human reason and the love of God, “Christian worship is, again to 
quote Paul—‘λογικη λατρεία,’—worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our 
reason” (no. 7).49
 Ratzinger’s etymological argument has broader impact when describing the 
wholesale translation of the Old Testament from Hebrew into Greek. In doing so, 
Ratzinger says that while the text became simpler, it also gave birth to the spread of the 
Christian faith. This is an acknowledgment of Christianity’s Greek inculturation. He also 
 
                                                 




argues that political history shows a permeation of Hellenistic culture into early 
Christianity, as this was forcefully done by Hellenistic rulers who accommodated both 
Greek customs and thought as well as Christianity. Ratzinger calls this a “mutual 
enrichment.” This fused two traditions, resulting in a new wisdom (no. 6). This history of 
infusion explains what one will find when searching for a sacred, as posited in the Pera 
exchange. At this point, one must go beyond the language of the ancient Greeks and look 
at the body of philosophy that shaped the culture of ancient Greece, and later, Roman 
Catholicism. 
The final part of Ratzinger’s etymological inquiry leads back to the lecture’s 
parable on the incompatibility of violence and religion. With the Christian faith joined 
with Greek thought, Ratzinger says that Manuel II could proclaim that not acting with 
Logos—loosely viewed as reason and love—was contrary to God’s nature (no. 6). This 
works if a Christian accepts the Greek translation of the Bible, but Ratzinger is also 
suggesting that it holds for Muslims since this is a reference back to the parable. This 
point was surely missed, considering the backlash the lecture received from the Muslim 
world. Nevertheless, the importance of Greek influence, if one believes it had a 
significant impact on the West, or at least the Church’s interpretation of the Bible, is that 
it laid the groundwork for a unique Western tradition. Ratzinger believes this tradition is 
the combination of biblical faith, Greek philosophical inquiry, and the addition of the 
Roman heritage that followed. This convergence created Europe (no. 8). However, 
Ratzinger now believes this heritage has gradually eroded since the sixteenth century, and 
he hopes that if this erosion is explored, a rescue will be within reach. The importance of 




specifically the ability to reason in the original position free from attachments to 
community, history (cultural and linguistic), and identity. 
 
Three Stages of De-Hellenization 
 
 Ratzinger posits the de-Hellenization of the Christian faith has taken place in 
three distinct stages: 1) the Reformation of the sixteenth century; 2) the liberal theology 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and 3) the cultural pluralism and simple gospel 
message of contemporary times. As Ratzinger describes each of these three stages, they 
seem to water down the divine aspects of Christianity, and with that the possibility of 
knowledge of the whole. 
The Reformers of the first stage sought to free Christianity from its role as an 
“element of an overarching philosophical system” and return the Gospel to a “living 
historical Word” (no. 10). The implications of this stage are straightforward: 
philosophy’s influence or its process and methods are no longer relevant to understanding 
scripture, and the individual becomes empowered to interpret scripture free from external 
references. Simply put, it democratized biblical interpretation. The second stage of de-
Hellenization—the liberal theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—is 
represented by Adolf von Harnack, who brought forth the idea to reposition Jesus as a 
man with a simple “humanitarian moral message,” which aligned his teachings with 
modern reason and distanced them from philosophy and theology. This also made Jesus 
historical and more able to be received by the scientific and academic paradigms (no. 11). 




when the world was becoming scientized, but it is clear Ratzinger views it as another 
wave of transforming the Christian faith into something less objective or universal. He 
warns that if theology is seen as a scientific process, this excludes the question of God 
and relegates ethical questions to the realm of the subjective. This has profound 
implications for communities, for as ethics and religion become completely personal or 
conditional matters: 
The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers 
tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective “conscience” becomes the sole 
arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power 
to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a 
dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies 
of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that 
questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it (no.13). 
 
This is a striking passage when one considers what this means for communities. The 
implication here sounds much like the concerns of the communitarian critique in that as 
each person decides ethical questions as a personal matter there are no longer compelling 
civic obligations. The act of tying communities through common language and narratives 
seems even more futile, for individuals begin to live in a reality fashioned for their 
respective selves. 
The third stage of de-Hellenization Ratzinger charges came from the rise of 
contemporary cultural pluralism and its ensuing call for a return to the simple gospel 
message of the New Testament. The simple gospel message theory in the third stage 
sounds quite similar to the first stage’s extraction of philosophy. The third stage is part of 
an effort to make room for inculturation in the highly pluralistic world of the twenty-first 
century. The irony that develops from this stage that Ratzinger must confront is the 




early years—the idea that Greek thought was imposed on the New Testament. Ratzinger 
acknowledges that the New Testament “bears the imprint of the Greek spirit,” and 
concedes there are parts that aren’t essential for carrying over when Christianity is 
introduced to cultures for the first time. What he does maintain is faith’s relationship with 
reason: the use of human reason is part of faith itself (no. 14). This passage sends the 
message that even if the earlier St. Paul reference (i.e., love is an act that transcends 
knowledge and brings one closer to God, who is Logos) leaves a trace of this idea in the 
Bible that more is needed, especially as generations pass and cultural variances pose great 
barriers to entry into the original intent of the authors. 
 
Reconnecting with Modernity 
 
 The Enlightenment and modernity make an appearance in the Regensburg Lecture 
when Ratzinger associates them with the university and Greek philosophy. One example 
of this loose association is seen as he aims to connect modernism to Hellenistic roots. He 
calls modern reason “a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism.” In 
this synthesis, the mathematical structure of matter is the Platonic element in the modern 
understanding of nature, and the decisive certainty gained through verification or 
falsification is the empirical application in experiment (no. 11). Regensburg also praises 
the accomplishments of these two eras: 
[C]ritique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock 
back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern 
age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we 
are all grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind 





Ernest L. Fortin offers a similar approach to harmonizing Christianity with the 
Enlightenment, stating there is little purpose in either an “uncritical rejection” or 
“uncritical acceptance” of the Enlightenment. Rather, it may be more fruitful to 
reformulate Christian doctrine in a way “that is both true to its native inspiration and 
appropriate to the needs of our age.” Fortin likens this integration to the way Aristotle 
was examined by the theologians of the Middle Ages. Agreeing with something John 
Paul II said, he says that “it would be futile to seek to live in a ‘pre-Constantian,’ or ‘pre-
Kantian,’ or ‘pre-Einsteinian’ world.” When it comes to the Church’s anti-technology 
stance and caution with emerging scientific developments, Fortin offers a 
recommendation on how to balance the Church with the modern and post-modern worlds 
that tempers what Ratzinger is saying in Regensburg: “Ours [the Church] is a living 
tradition that must not only be maintained in its purity but constantly revitalized through 
its interaction with the best insights of modern science and scholarship” (1997, 133). The 
act of revitalization can be thought of in the Regensburg Lecture as Ratzinger’s call for 
reason and faith to come together in a new way in which reason can overcome its 
limitation of empirical falsification (no. 15). This will connect theology with the hard 
sciences in a visible way and bring back knowledge of the whole to the university system. 
Another reason why the university needs to find a new way to integrate faith and 
God into its curriculum is the challenge that the universal reasoning of the Enlightenment 
poses for global pluralism. Here, there is an echo from the Crisis address’s message that 
the West is not living up to end of the dialogue in multiculturalism. Ratzinger writes: “A 




subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures” (no. 16). The difference 




If Europe has indeed lost a connection to a salient identity and an ability to 
communicate—an issue prominently addressed in the Pera exchange—Ratzinger needs to 
create or revitalize a social glue for Europe, particularly its Christian population. Like 
authors in the communitarian critique, the narrative technique emerges, and in this case it 
is one that preserves the Church’s Hellenized roots. There are times during these 
speeches that Ratzinger can appear to be a pragmatist, possibly even a relativist, but this 
is short-lived as he is better understood as a particularist who accepts revelation as his 
first principle to construct a society’s group identity and reinforce social solidarity. 
Ratzinger can count himself among those easily able to find faults with the 
Enlightenment and its legacy. An earlier lecture of his from 2001, “Common Identity and 
Common Will: Chances and Dangers for Europe,” contends the Enlightenment 
influenced the elimination of revelation and created an autonomous reason that 
transformed the biblical concept of “God the Creator and Sustainer” into “merely the 
initiator who ‘kicked off’ the universe” (2001, 156). In the modern era, reason was 
replaced by an evolutionary outlook on the world in which the concepts of absolute good 
and bad are problematic to define, yet man sought to “bring forth the rational world from 
the irrational raw material of reality.” It was then up to man to master nature and bring 




pleasure, and, consequently, this becomes the end goal for society. Ratzinger likens this 
to the “Aldous Huxley vision” of the world (2001, 156–157). This is likely a reference to 
the soma-induced world of Huxley’s Brave New World in which pleasure is maximized at 
every turn through chemical manipulations of human perceptions and emotions, and 
religion is relocated and relegated to a terrarium-like outpost. Similar anti-Enlightenment 
sentiments are, of course, presented in the Habermas event already discussed in chapter 3. 
The era resurfaces in this chapter since a more balanced approach to viewing the era is 
presented. In his Salt of the Earth interview with Peter Seewald, he acknowledges that the 
model of the separation of Church and state as it appears in the Enlightenment had 
positive effects for the Church since it allowed for a free Church in a free state. However, 
while this reserved a space for the Church, he states: “What is negative about it is that 
modernity at the same time reduces religion to subjectivity” (1996b, 240). 
In the communitarian critique, MacIntyre and Taylor charge the Enlightenment as 
the responsible party for loosening social cohesion. This is also explanatory for 
Ratzinger’s observations of the West in Crisis and Regensburg. Taylor’s criticism is 
simply bound up in his dissection of atomists, whose primacy of rights in the social 
contract was misguided and left out the relationship among freedom, obligation, and 
potential. For MacIntyre, the Enlightenment produced the autonomous, sovereign self, 
who by taking a detour from the group contributes to any meaning of particularism. 
MacIntyre writes that this individual is “totally detached from all social particularity. 
Anyone and everyone can thus be a moral agent, since it is in the self and not in social 
roles or practices that moral agency has to be located” (AV, 32). The danger in this is that 




however, the rival premises “possess no rational way of weight the claims of one as 
against another,” so there is no way to evaluate them (AV, 8). 
MacIntyre also charges that, among the reasons the Enlightenment did not 
succeed, was that eighteenth-century moral philosophers “inherited incoherent fragments 
of a once coherent scheme of thought and action,” and in this broken bequeathing they 
failed to “recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural situation” (AV, 55). In its 
most basic form, MacIntyre traces the fragmented classical inheritance back to 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century shift to the idea that there are normative conclusions 
to be drawn from the way the world is (AV, 59). Along those lines of thinking, Crisis and 
Regensburg are an attempt to put dislodged pieces of European identity back together. 
With Ratzinger’s grievances with the Enlightenment and modernity well stated, 
one must wonder why Crisis advocates a more welcoming position. It appears to be 
largely a matter of practical strategy and messaging. While highly critical of the legacy of 
the Enlightenment, Ratzinger’s Crisis address stops short of rejecting it and the entire 
modern project of philosophy altogether. Instead, he co-opts the Enlightenment by 
attributing its origins to Christianity, calling Christianity the religion of Logos, or reason, 
which is the basis of the Enlightenment. This leaves a prominent religious figure in a very 
curious position—if Christianity is the religion of reason, how does this help remove the 
widespread political relativism of which Ratzinger and the Church are so critical? This is 
difficult to reconcile considering the address is critical of modernity’s disposition to lead 
man to dominate nature, and the scientific uniformity modernity has imposed on the 
world. Yet on the surface, a peculiar marriage between modern reasoning and a religious 




connection is developed by reinterpreting Christianity as the religion of Logos, thereby 
opening an entryway to reintegrate God into the political fold. At the very least this 
interpretation promotes a sense of the sacred by calling for the preservation of an 
intellectual heritage. One wonders whether Ratzinger’s echo of the sense of the sacred as 
put forward in this address is his way of softening agnostics and the secular world toward 
a willingness to recognize the utility of a deity, such as the practical advantages it brings 
to creating a moral equilibrium. Ratzinger’s approach to religion and God as civil 
instruments can at times resemble Montesquieu’s application of religion to correct 
defects of the political state when laws are powerless.50
Regensburg’s approach is to present God, Logos, and reason as one in the same to 
call attention to Greek influence in the Bible. Particularly, the lecture details three stages 
of Christian de-Hellenization as discussed above and rebrands modernity by identifying 
Greek such concepts as the mathematical structure of Platonism that survived in this new 
philosophical enterprise. Regensburg also explores the etymology of the Greek words 
used in the Bible, specifically God as the embodiment of Logos and rational behavior. 
Overall, Regensburg puts forth the criterion for the communal narrative—Hellenistic 
 However, it is important to 
remember that he views sincerity as necessary for leading by example and promoting a 
lifestyle that is close to God. Any strategy to dialogue with the survivalist tendencies of 
his audience is to speak to those disposed to either the Hobbsian reaction to chaos or 
libertarian spirit of Nozick who need to be sold on an alternative ordering of government. 
                                                 
50 See the section titled “How the laws of religion correct the defects of the political 
institution” in Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, “The Spirit of Laws,” Book 24, chapter 
16, p. 470. Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold 




Christianity, which Ratzinger believes Europeans and their descendants should call on as 
an antidote for their identity crisis. 
Ratzinger’s social glue—one tied to a religious system that includes scripture, 
supplementary philosophy, and the history of language—is an example of his 
pragmatism. He is not about to abandon his reliance on objective standards and the 
universal nature of the Church, so while his reference point is larger, namely, Hellenized 
Christianity, he is using and defending it with practical considerations for social 
solidarity rather than divinity. His purpose is communitarian in that he fuses man into a 
system that binds him to a set of principles. Ironically, as much as Ratzinger works to 
fight subjectivism, he leaves himself vulnerable to accusations of this principle itself. He 
too is aware of this in his refutation that Hellenized Christianity is an example of 
inculturation. 
 
The Communitarian Connection 
 
The Poet and the Philosopher: The Narrative Solution 
 
At a very basic level, instruments of common language help Ratzinger counter a 
European cultural crisis, especially if he is serious about Hellenized Christianity. One can 
view common language as that which is derived through a culture’s collective stories, 
including philosophical dialogues. The narrative then becomes another form for 
positioning moral information and propelling individuals into a sense of obligation for 




stated by Gerald Arbuckle: “Narratives are about creating identity in the here and now, 
all the while drawing on the myths of the past” (Arbuckle 2010, 64). The idea of a 
Christian narrative speaks to this idea. 
It’s clear that MacIntyre views common language as a natural device for 
transmitting and receiving information, and that it could be an effective delivery 
mechanism for the Church. The challenge with relying entirely on narrative in the literal 
sense is seen in a classic tension within political philosophy: Who are better seers of the 
truth—the poets and storytellers who lie, or the philosophers? Socrates bans poets from 
his ideal city out of fear their works are imitations of life that obscure the truth and may 
harm the soul by clouding sensible actions (The Republic, Book III, 398a–b; Book X, 
605a–c). Socrates also asserts that justice is a personal virtue in which each individual 
tends to his/her own task and destiny (The Republic, Book IV, 433c–434a), which finds 
itself within Walzer’s distributivist system aimed at circumventing domination across 
industries. The view is also a bit of a predecessor to the Christian understanding of 
treating others as one would want to be treated. Surely one can question whether this 
concept was imported into Christianity, marked its influence as a subconscious carry-
over, or is simply a universal principle? What’s more concrete is that the concept is 
illustrated in a quasi-narrative format in a work such as The Republic, making it well 
prepped for a discussion that is of timeless relevance. With the Church, philosophy, 
metaphysics, and etymology are supplementary to the narrative text of the Bible. It is a 
system in which both the poet and philosopher can live and keep one another in check—




 Most important, the narrative context can also contribute to group and individual 
productivity. This is based on Taylor’s idea that as all participants accept a feeling of 
obligation—which can also be constructed through narrative—to help their fellow 
citizens. This fosters an environment suitable for fulfilling human potentials. Taylor sees 
identity not as an autonomous act one fulfills or self-sustains; rather, one’s “identity is 
always partly defined in conversation with others or through the common understanding 
which underlies the practices of our society” (Atomism, 60). Narrative then also has the 
power to counter the modern allowance (and later Rawls) given to every individual 
regardless of the intellectual capability and training to make judgments free of communal 
considerations, which in the end weakens the community. Sandel is less heavy-handed, 
but still argues that a strong community is constituted in “the shared understandings of 
the participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute 
of certain of the participants’ plans of life” (LLJ, 173). Narrative is needed to counter the 
abstract individual, and Sandel makes a case for this. In one of his lesser communitarian 
passages, he argues that a community is not identified by “merely a spirit of benevolence, 
or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain ‘shared final ends’ alone, but 
a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and 
understandings” (LLJ, 172). Though metaphysical, a community’s framework provides 
its own conception of justice since it contains a “framework of self-understandings that is 
distinguishable from and in some sense prior to the sentiments and dispositions of 





Hellenization and Narrative 
 
On the communitarian parallel, a strongly Hellenized Christianity would certainly 
satisfy MacIntyre’s yearning to bring back Aristotelian ethics. For the Church, it would 
make the classics relevant to scripture if only by engaging the critical mind. Returning to 
the Hellenized roots of Christianity also turns the individual away from modernism, or at 
the very least the pedestal its endless autonomy has been placed on. The act of integrating 
the Enlightenment into Church theology is an additional safeguard to modify or rebrand 
how the Enlightenment is understood. 
 There are a number of Greek parallels regarding the process of reflection that 
Ratzinger could have drawn on, though doing so would have downplayed scripture as 
mere literary expression. Socrates in The Apology states that the unexamined life is not 
worth living (38a). Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics describes contemplation as key 
in the path to happiness (Book Ten, chapter 7). It’s interesting to note that these examples 
of the unexamined and contemplative life echo Sandel’s call for proper reflection. They 
also support the connection MacIntyre sees between moral language and identity—the 
idea of the good life as supported by either stories or lessons in classical ethics made 
people look beyond themselves. Within a clear narrative, an individual’s story and 
commitments were clear since one’s story was “embedded in the story of those 
communities from which they derived their identity” (AV, 221). One of the clearest 
parallels between the Greeks and Christ, which leaves one to wonder about the evolution 
of thought between antiquity and Christ, is expressed in James Schall’s comparison 
between Christ and Socrates: “At the heart of Greek thought lies Socrates’ affirmation 




not excluding its own reflections on Plato, is founded on the abiding truth of this Socratic 
principle” (Schall 2004, xv). 
 Looking back on the Habermas event’s focus on faith and reason (chapter 3), one 
can also see the value Greek philosophy, particularly the limits of human reason as 
handed down in the works of Plato and Aristotle, brings to understanding revelation. 
Schall describes one benefit from studying Plato and Aristotle as learning what the 
“‘unaided’ human mind can learn by itself” without the ‘stimulus of revelation’” (Schall 
2004, 116). Again, the Greeks are seen as providing the necessary dialogue for 
understanding the limits of the human mind and where revelation can serve as a 
supplement. 
Hellenized Christianity and the use of Logos are the particularism and underlying 
unity that Ratzinger is looking for; however, this makes for an odd connection: How can 
revelation be particular? Keith Ward offers some insights that make sense out of this 
oddity based on the notion of revelation context. Ward says that a “Divine 
communication,” may be “shaped to the interests and values of a particular society at a 
particular time” (1994, 25). This pairs well with Ratzinger’s fear that something essential 
is lost when de-Hellenizing the faith and its sacred texts, even with the intent to make 
them accessible to all. General accessibility has the potential to move the message into 
abstractness, freeing it from history. This was the error in Rawls’s original position when 
it disregarded subjective claims easily deduced through observation and reason, such as 
identity, culture, obligations, and so forth. Ratzinger’s notion from the previous 
chapter—a sense of the sacred—can be understood as an attempt to reconcile the values 




including its laws and unspoken customs. A Hellenistic renaissance would link the 
underlying values with the culture, while also turning away from modern liberalism. The 
next chapter, the analysis of this research project, looks at whether Ratzinger simply 
carried out an anti-liberal message developed by the Church for centuries or if he created 
his own version, as well as how Ratzinger’s own communitarian theory fits within the 








The end of the previous chapter brought together concepts from the 
communitarian critique to show how they relate to the larger cultural system that 
Ratzinger’s works constructed in four key events. This system largely consists of two 
fronts: a recognition of the shortcomings of unaided biblical interpretation and the limits 
of faith, and the identification of cultural common denominators through the concept of 
the sacred in the West, particularly the understanding of the Hellenized nature of Roman 
Catholic Christianity. Both fronts ultimately aim for behavioral requirements without 
overt dictation, which in turn helps correct moral disorder and curtail the spread of 
relativism. This chapter looks at each political philosopher in the communitarian critique 
in comparison with Ratzinger’s work to determine whom Ratzinger aligns with and to 
what extent. Through this alignment, we also find the three themes of Ratzinger’s 
communitarian thought: humility, obligation, and the Church’s fight against philosophic 
obsolescence.  I find that each author is relevant to some degree, with MacIntyre as 
Ratzinger’s strongest ally and Walzer to a lesser degree of the four authors, though this is 
mostly due to the documents selected. As discussed below, a separate study using 
Walzer’s Spheres of Justice to interpret Catholic social thought on economics and labor 
would be quite fruitful. Nevertheless, Ratzinger is still in dialogue with some core 
concepts of Spheres, most notably the definition of the social good identity 
(membership). He also has a lot in common with Taylor, followed by Sandel. MacIntyre 




cohesion, his critical approach to Enlightenment, and Ratzinger’s network of cultural 
reference points, or the lack thereof, that he sees in Europe. Taylor’s discussion of 
humility in the Aristotelian notion of human insufficiency is seen in Ratzinger’s 
understanding of faith and reason, and equally important, in his comprehension of how 
generational connections help create solidarity and generate a broad acceptance of the 
common good. As for Sandel, first principles, reflection, the illusion of autonomy, and 
intrasubjective and intersubjective identities are at work in Ratzinger’s views on 
relativism and the European cultural crisis. 
To arrive at this diagnosis, we will first look at how well the four works of 
Ratzinger analyzed in this research project comport with the major themes of the 
communitarian critique in the aggregate, and then draw detailed comparisons with each 
of communitarian critique’s writers. This concluding chapter then touches on the 
Church’s anti-liberal tradition as a possible explanatory factor for why Ratzinger’s works 
appear communitarian and whether he establishes his own unique communitarian vision 
as he seeks to reposition the Church in the post-modern world amidst a cultural and moral 
crisis without compromising its core—this seems to be an issue at the heart of all the 
documents analyzed in this research project. 
 
Macro-Theme Assessment: Finding Humility, Obligation, and Obsolescence 
 
 The communitarian baseline constructed in chapter 2 provided six themes  linked 
to the four major writers in the initial communitarian critique of Rawls and Nozick: 1) the 




rot; 3) a challenge to individual autonomy; 4) responsibilities and obligations; 5) the 
primacy of history, particularism, and anti-hypotheticals; and 6) the power of narrative 
and language. Each chapter that focused on Ratzinger’s works explained his texts through 
the usage of these themes, including discussion of some of the writers who contributed to 
each of these themes where it was deemed necessary. The discussion also illustrated 
where the content of these chapters fit within the three themes unique to Ratzinger’s 
communitarian output. For instance, humility embodies the insufficiency of human nature 
and the challenge of autonomy. Obligation is its own theme, but it includes the topics of 
the narrative method and power of language since they are a means for fostering a sense 
of obligation. Efforts to confront obsolescence are present in the importance of history 
and particularism in achieving a social solidarity, as well as in the criticism of the 
Enlightenment and its successors. 
In the Habermas encounter we saw the concepts of first principles and the 
criticism of modernity’s primacy of will, choice, and self-autonomy, which showed the 
degree to which humility influences Ratzinger’s rationalism. This is primarily seen in 
Ratzinger’s proposal to consider whether religion and reason ought to place limits on one 
another and remind each other of their respective roles. The Pera exchange picks up this 
discussion and includes what role the Enlightenment and modern rationalism might have 
played in the proliferation of relativism and what contribution this made to the idea that 
European identity is at a point of noticeable decay that ought to be healed so as to avoid 
unfulfilled expectations of traditions and entice citizens to feel a sense of care and 
accountability for their fellow citizens. This challenge to relativism is comparable to the 




perceived neutral and self-sufficient original position, as well as the accusation that 
modern rationalism (or even deontological liberalism) leads individuals to reinvent 
themselves inside a bubble outside of broader attachments—present or historical. In 
short, no intelligence is needed outside of itself (reason) for navigating the sterilized 
original position. The Pera exchange examines institutional movements that impacted 
identity and social attachments, particularly the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and 
modernity, that point to excessive autonomy as an underlying driver. Neither Pera nor 
Ratzinger identify it this way. Rather, they point to its effects, namely, relativism and 
weakened identity. In the Crisis and Regensburg events we then see Ratzinger’s solution 
to create a sense of obligation: mending broken moral language and strengthening 
identity by way of Hellenized Christianity. This is a call for the primacy of history and 
how one’s heritage ought to be recaptured rather than treating it as a commodity that is no 
longer in good working order. This might not be known to Ratzinger, but what he is 
doing here is utilizing what Taylor’s considers the value of generational obligation. 
Ratzinger’s reinterpretation of the Enlightenment in Crisis seemed curious at first glance 
until one considers that Vatican II sought to engage the modern world, though one does 
wonder if this reinterpretation is half-committal. What does stand firm is Ratzinger’s 
desire to bring God back into the public sphere. Reinterpreting the Enlightenment, an era 
that eradicated God from moral and political relevancy, is certainly one place to begin. 
This re-interpretation brings the Church back into the discussion of post-Enlightenment 
philosophy that embraces principles of scientific discovery and observation and 





Communitarian Diagnosis: Alignments and Deviations 
 
Liberal-Conservative Communitarianism 
Before discussing each of the philosophers in relation to Ratzinger, it seems fair 
to make a distinction between conservative and liberal communitarians. One way this 
distinction can be seen is through their view of social customs—are they fixed to an 
abstract, objective principle or are they merely social constructions? MacIntyre and 
Taylor do a great deal of nodding to the telos (purpose) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, as well as the idea that one has obligations that must be upheld so that all can 
reach their final end or potential. Both men are Roman Catholic, so one must wonder if 
this is their Catholicism coming through. These two also understand the state of nature 
with a respect for humility, which may signal a similar acceptance of the hierarchal 
system of the Church. This is not to say that other religious backgrounds would not lead 
their followers to this same premise; however, those in the secular world engulfed in the 
modern quest for self-sufficiency leave little room for revelation, or even simpler—
intellectual humbleness. One could even levy the lack of humility charge against biblical 
literalists, who see no need for supplementary texts in understanding scripture. This point 
is clearly seen in Ratzinger’s description of the three waves of Christianity’s de-
Hellenization. Standing across from MacIntyre and Taylor as much less conservative are 
Sandel and Walzer. These two see the definitions of identity and social goods as 
changing, but what Ratzinger does have in common with them is the idea that states need 
virtuous citizens capable of looking beyond their own self-interests as they understand 




transactions with their fellow citizens. Sandel describes this process as non-distant 
reflection and deliberation, while Walzer calls this self-respect a limited autonomy. 
The question still remains: Where does Ratzinger stand on this liberal-
conservative communitarian line? Is he with MacIntyre and Taylor, or he is with Sandel 
and Walzer? The answer is dependent on how Ratzinger views his narrative of 
Hellenized Christianity. Is Hellenized Christianity only fit for the West? If so, than one 
might say Ratzinger embodies the particularist approaches of Sandel and Walzer, though 
it is hard to set aside the moral disorder he sees in the deteriorating European identity and 
its moral decrepitude that came from relativism—this strongly resembles MacIntyre’s 
criticism of emotivism. Looking back to the Habermas exchange and Ratzinger’s 
proposition that sound reason leads the way from revelation, yet understanding that both 
have limitations on one another, there is still a supremacy of an objective or divine good 
that transcends particularist approaches. The particular event is merely the context of this 
divine principle or law. In that sense, Ratzinger is better understood as a synthesis of the 
liberal-conservative distinction in regard to customs and changing social meanings. It 
might be more useful to think of this in terms of how St. Thomas viewed the difference 
between natural and human law and their accuracy at accessing universal precepts. 
Thomas’s Summa Theologica asserted that the reason of humans is changeable, 
imperfect, and an act of the lawgiver’s will. Human laws contain particular precepts 




since they are crafted with an imperfect tool, whereas natural law is more durable since it 
contains some universal precepts, which are everlasting (Q97, A1, R1 and Q97, A3).51
 
 
MacIntyre: Narrative Discourse, Common Language, and Virtue Development 
 
 Ratzinger’s proposition in the Habermas encounter that faith and reason must 
place limitations on one another is reminiscent of MacIntyre’s suggestion that unchecked 
reason turns into pure will (AV, 47). Ratzinger’s proposition of limitations is a safeguard 
for when reason reaches beyond its capabilities. In the same chapter, reason as 
understood in the Catholic tradition was found to be a logical navigational approach in 
philosophic inquiry after revelation is accepted. MacIntyre uses the same assertion that 
reason is a tool used to instruct rather than an end or value itself, as it helps transform 
humans from how they happen to be to realizing their potential in virtue development. 
This presents itself in Ratzinger’s notion that faith is something that must be renewed and 
nurtured to reach its end, as well as the idea that reason informs a process to reach 
spiritual perfection. This point also reaches to the element of humility found in 
Ratzinger’s understanding of faith. 
While Ratzinger understands relativism to be the cause of value-incompatibility, 
which we could easily equate to the same moral disorder described by MacIntyre, it is 
actually the result. The driver is better understood in MacIntyre’s terms as the 
disappearance of common language and narrative. For Ratzinger, the common moral 
language and narrative missing is the West’s heritage, a sense of the sacred and a 
                                                 
51 Citations to the Summa here and in the subsection below on St. Thomas are for 




Hellenized faith. The pluralistic dilemma of objective-subjective distinctions is in both 
the Habermas and Pera exchanges. There is no easy side for Ratzinger to land on, which 
explains the system of limitations he places on faith and reason. If he looks to the purely 
objective route, he could find himself too strongly aligned with a faith that leads to 
fanaticism. He may also find himself in place akin to the purported objective, neutral, and 
the culturally agnostic environment of Rawls’s original position. Ratzinger, like 
communitarians, has a great respect for the subjective conditions of sacred, local customs 
and mores that contribute to group identity. After all, he is explicitly clear that Europe is 
going through a cultural crisis with morality wrapped up in it. This is where the idea of 
narrative becomes very important. It is non-coercive and a natural way of processing and 
disseminating information, as well as placing one’s own life within a history and 
tradition. The narrative model advanced by MacIntyre provides the binding obligations 
that Ratzinger is looking for. This mode counters the subjective disorder emotivism 
creates when autonomous conflicting first principles meet without any broader backdrop. 
Ratzinger is aware of this general idea as his arguments in the Pera exchange contain 
lengthy history lessons on the impact of religious institutions on Western thought. By 
bringing the West into contact with its history, traditions, and stories it creates intellectual 
and cultural homogeneity. Ratzinger’s solution to pluralism is like that of MacIntyre’s 
call for historical backdrop. Ratzinger’s narrative aims to create a social glue that views 
Christianity as the religion of Logos based on etymological details on how Greek Logos 
found its way into the Bible. 
 One important difference to note between MacIntyre and Ratzinger is that while 




eighteenth-century moral philosophers inherited incoherent fragments of philosophy (AV, 
55)—Ratzinger’s Crisis and Regensburg events are an attempt to reassemble dislodged 
pieces of European identity. Still, both acknowledge the role first principles play in the 
integration of philosophy and religion in democracy’s protection of pluralistic 
viewpoints. Where Ratzinger was concerned with any viewpoint considered as valid as 
the next, MacIntyre explains this same issue as tracing rival conclusions back to first 
principles based on nothing more than assertions (AV, 8). 
 
Taylor: Fraternity and Cultivation 
 
As Ratzinger connects sacred customs to an identity, there is hope that one will 
feel an obligation to others that, in turn, will foster an environment in which all persons 
can thrive—this is primarily where we see an analogous relationship with Taylor. We 
also see a commonality between Taylor’s attack on atomism and Ratzinger’s various 
descriptions of relativism in a number of his texts and the dangers of unchecked reason in 
the Munich event. 
Obligation is seen in the Crisis address when Ratzinger calls for a public morality 
that goes beyond the subjective standards of politics that lacks a sense of personal duty. 
Just as Taylor’s idea that society should allow all human capacities to grow, Ratzinger’s 
sense of a sacred aims for the same spirit of self- and group cultivation. In the 
exploration of one’s heritage—the route to discovering the sacred—an individual would 
likely begin to develop meaningful obligations to his/her community after seeing the 




criticisms of the Enlightenment in Crisis held that the movement detached man from 
moral obligations through its limitless liberty. This detachment is part of the insufficiency 
and self-defeating nature of the Enlightenment. Without God, an intelligence that goes 
beyond reason itself, or a sense of the sacred, obligation is purely optional. Put another 
way, liberty as a superior value suppresses motivation to learn more about this sense of 
the sacred since a collection of values is a purely subjective matter lacking any scientific 
verification. Ratzinger’s description of Europe’s identity crisis and its linkage to 
relativism resembles Taylor’s notion that identity is not as an autonomous act one fulfills 
or self-sustains, though Taylor goes a bit further by arguing that identity is a conversation 
one has with others through common understandings within a society. 
One might look at Hellenized Christianity as one narrative with common moral 
reference points that create sticking points for generational connections. Taylor and 
MacIntyre in this sense are synergistic—the narrative mode can contribute to group and 
individual productivity since it contributes to an environment equipped to fulfilling 
human potentials. 
 
Sandel: Identity Adviser 
 
 Sandel can be looked at as a resource that Ratzinger would be well-served to 
listen to for discovering new ways that the Church can contribute to either a collective 
narrative or marketplace of choices that contains core Church teachings that overlap with 
values that even the secular world recognizes. This is not to suggest coercive measures, 




matters of faith: “The Church proposes; she imposes nothing” (Redemptoris Missio 1990, 
no. 39). The act of searching for one’s sense of a sacred can become a proposition itself 
if the values discovered are found to be familiar and universal. For example, out of the 
mutual respect for the enterprise of multiculturalism—one of Ratzinger’s theories from 
the Pera exchange—individuals may begin to look into their own cultural heritage. In 
doing so, they might find the origins of their thoughts and values. They may then choose 
to embrace the culture that gave birth to them in order to stay true to the universal 
principle discovered and particular circumstances (culture) that brought it about. This 
raises issues regarding the objectivity of choice. 
 Sandel views choice as an illusion. If one can penetrate the reference points that 
these purported choices refer to in the subconscious for confirmation, than it is not 
coercive. One chooses the proposition because it is familiar and an already acceptable 
and verified option. Ratzinger, and one could also say MacIntyre, sees human choice as 
almost an arbitrary wielding that selects what is wanted based on one’s will and 
relativistic or utilitarian ends, whereas Sandel sees the choice as simply weighing options 
against recognizable principles and messages. It is the arbitrary decision that possesses 
the potential for perilous outcomes. The impact of true choice for Sandel is minimal since 
individuals are constrained to what they know. In addition to the sense of the sacred 
choice mentioned above, we might view Ratzinger’s attachment of the Enlightenment 
and Logos to the Church as one way that he is attempting to speak to the scientized 
modern and post-modern worlds. If these worlds are consumed by complete knowledge, 
why not assert that knowledge of the true whole must account for God, and therefore 




Sandel’s definitions of intersubjective and intrasubjective identities offer a 
framework to understand individual identity in the European cultural crisis described by 
Ratzinger. The notion of a European—or, even broader, a Western identity—is more 
multidimensional than Ratzinger’s understanding of it as a single unit arbitrating morality 
while under threat from relativism. This is not to deny Ratzinger’s claim here, but 
identity might be better looked at in its intersubjective composition of obligations to 
family, community, and class as well as national or larger geographical boundaries. 
These subsets are an equal force in the individual decision-making process as each person 
deliberates and accounts for these competing and intrasubjective identities. A community 
might be understood as literally one’s neighborhood or immediate surroundings. It might 
also be seen as primarily linked to one’s religious affiliation. Either way, each individual 
is comprised of multiple, and sometimes overlapping, identities. That said, Ratzinger’s 
concern for European identity could be strengthened by relating the cultural crisis to the 
community and class levels. He sufficiently covers the family unit, though civic bonds 
and participation stand to be related to community at large. A discussion of class goes 
missing, though this could easily resurface with the Church’s view on the rights of 
workers, and the benefits and limitations of the modern free market system. Surely in 
today’s world these are important parts of one’s identity that go beyond attributing 
accountability to such errors in philosophic heritage as relativism or extreme 
subjectivism, where there is no leash on reason. 
Sandel’s challenge to autonomy is seen in Ratzinger’s balance between faith and 
reason in the Habermas event, particularly the role that choice plays in navigating the 




faith or reason, or a combination thereof, one has only selected a choice that confirms 
embedded values. Therefore, neither the neutrality of reason—as advanced in the original 
position—nor the deference to revelation played a role in the decision process. Political 
socialization is what is actually at work here. Common experiences deserve 
consideration, as well as meaningful reflection to step back from superficial 
understandings of one’s self that only validate previously held values. For Sandel, this 
accomplishes more than non-distant reflection. It is one way to approach the objective 
and subjective secular worlds that Ratzinger and Habermas worked to reconcile. 
Unfortunately, this comes down to a matter of first principles, and Sandel is not likely to 
be aligned with Ratzinger’s view that reason is a guiding hand that leads from the 
foremost principle, revelation. Ratzinger and Sandel do show some alignment when it 
comes to reflection. For Ratzinger this is the power of restraint—the cooperative 
limitations between faith and reason. For Sandel, this is comprehensive and non-distant 
reflection, which is the antidote to the rigidness of Rawls’s original position and its 
transcendental, objective claims. Sandel’s notion of reflection as a means to negotiate 
community and identity would be of particular interest to Ratzinger, given it harkens 
back to Aristotle’s idea of the reflective self which would aid in the difficult task of 
navigating objective and subjective tensions. This also would further bring Greek 
influence back into Roman Catholicism. 
The discussion of first principles brings with it the tension between universalism 
and particularism, which for Ratzinger was the issue of objective-subjective distinctions, 
also interpreted as the inevitable relationship between faith and reason. Identity is a 




Ratzinger and Sandel view identity as contingent on history. A potent and easily 
intelligible identity is clearly important for what Ratzinger sees as a cause for the political 
and moral malaise in the West, as well as the West’s failure to live up to its own side of 
cultural exchange in multiculturalism. There are no strong communities in the West, or at 
least that is how it seems to Ratzinger, so it’s no surprise that a salient identity is also 
missing. Here again, Ratzinger might be well served by one of Sandel’s ideas, namely, 
that identity and social understandings play an important role in facilitating strong 
communities. The closest Ratzinger gets to this is his discovery (in the Pera exchange) 
that the European Union lacks a significant mentioning of Europe’s identity. 
Overall, Sandel is in less alignment with Ratzinger but offers complimentary 
solutions to the problems of identity and culture that Ratzinger is working through. 
 
Walzer: The Changing Nature and Definitions of Power and Labor 
 
Much of Spheres of Justice is too narrow for a parallelism as strong as the other 
theorists have with Ratzinger’s ideas; however, Walzer’s system of distributive justice 
could be discussed with the Church’s social doctrine on economics and labor. The U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops lists seven themes of Catholic Social Teaching, four of 
which would profit from Spheres as an instrument for their advocacy: rights and 
responsibilities, options for the poor and vulnerable, the dignity of work and the rights of 
workers, and solidarity.52
                                                 
52 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops lists the seven themes as: 1) Life and Dignity 
of the Human Person; 2) Call to Family, Community, and Participation; 3) Rights and 
Responsibilities; 4) Option for the Poor and Vulnerable; 5) The Dignity of Work and the 




systems of socialism and capitalism, as well as the rights of workers within each of these 
respective markets. One could easily conduct a longitudinal study on how the Church has 
reacted to the changing conditions of the labor force in various economic environments 
and the social understandings of labor and the goods produced during those times. For 
example, beginning in the late nineteenth century, Pope Leo XIII condemned socialism 
altogether, along with nihilism and communism in the encyclical, Quod Apostolici 
Muneris (1878). Leo XIII then later softened his tone on socialism in Rerum Novarum 
(1891), advancing the rights of workers against exploitation in unbridled capitalism. 
Rerum then led to two direct follow-ups: Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Ano (40th 
Anniversary) in 1931 and John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus (100th Year) in 1991. These 
three encyclicals represent a dialogue in and of themselves, though there are others 
during this time range that could be included in this conversation.53
                                                                                                                                                 
Rights of Workers; 6) Solidarity; and 7) Care for God’s Creation. These themes are from 
the “Themes of Catholic Social Teaching” (2005), which is drawn from Sharing Catholic 
Social Teaching: Challenges and Directions (Washington, DC: USCCB, 1998) and 
Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility (Washington, DC: 
USCCB, 2003). 
 Rerum cautions 
against the “cruelty of men of greed,” an acknowledgment of man’s nature (or at least 
some men), resembling Walzer’s idea that there is a spirit of domination in some humans 
that must be tempered through the distribution of power. This collection of encyclical 
letters is an attempt to curb this spirit of domination through a system of distributivism 
that allows a liberal free market to operate while a governmental conscience weighs in to 
protect the rights of workers, or as the Church sees it—the dignity of the worker. Today, 
we might speak of skills, education, and opportunity as a new definition of wealth and 





power, and not so about much money or even property. The follow-ups54 to Rerum re-
endorse Rerum while at the same time reinterpret what power means at a specific point in 
time. This interpretive suggestion is made most explicit in John Paul’s Centesimus when 
he says there is a need to interpret “new things” (hence, rerum novarum) as the “life of 
the Church and the world unfolds” and to “propose an analysis of some events of recent 
history” (no. 3) while also interpreting these new things in relation to the Gospel (no. 5). 
For example, John Paul calls attention to what property meant in Leo XIII’s era—land 
ownership (no. 6). The power of unions is another area in which one might discover 
shifts in the Church’s position. In Rerum, Leo XII recognized the value of unions in 
promoting the skills of artisans (no. 39) but said associations should be dissolved when 
they become dangerous to the state (no. 52). In Centesimus, John Paul II offers a more 
nuanced perspective, stating that trade unions play a pivotal role in negotiating minimum 
salaries for workers and safe and dignified working conditions (no. 15). Given today’s 
global recession and the changing outlook on labor unions in the United States,55
                                                 
54 Quadragesimo strikes a softer tone toward socialism at times, as Pius XI writes: “Free 
competition, kept within definite and due limits, and still more economic dictatorship, 
must be effectively brought under public authority” and “public institutions themselves, 
of peoples, moreover, ought to make all human society conform to the needs of the 
common good” (no. 110). However, he makes clear the ideology is incompatible with 
Christianity, as he goes on to write: “Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are 
contradictory terms; no one can be at the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist” 
(no. 120). On the 100th anniversary of Rerum, John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus (1991) 
offers what can be considered an endorsement of liberal economic thought with a few 
caveats, including how power is distributed so that justice is not merely a matter of 
“giving from one’s surplus” (no. 58). Written toward the end of the cold war, Centesimus 
is critical of communism, while accepting the right to private associations such as labor 
unions and describing a compensation system that sounds very much like a living wage. 
 one 
55 For example, a 2009 Gallup poll found that approval of labor unions in the United 
States was at an all-time low: 48 percent, down from 59 percent the previous year and 
considerably down from 75 percent in 1957 and 72 percent in 1937. A 2011 Gallop poll 




could say the Church needs to clarify its position on unions and at what point they are 
dangerous to the state, if ever. It is worth noting that in 2005, the Church entered this 
dialogue again, when Ratzinger (as Benedict XVI) took on this issue in his first 
encyclical, Deus Caritas Est (“God is Love”). He warns that in the past when “[c]apital 
and the means of production were now the new source of power which, concentrated in 
the hands of a few, led to the suppression of the rights of the working classes, against 
which they had to rebel” (no. 26). Deus Caritas Est also recognizes the need for 
reinterpretation of the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2004), as its 
“guidelines need to be addressed in the context of dialogue with all those seriously 
concerned for humanity and for the world in which we live” (no. 27). The interpretation 
of larger changes in institutional power may be too large for the window of Ratzinger’s 
works analyzed in this research project, but there are still a number of ways that his 
works are aligned with Walzer’s Spheres. 
Walzer treats identity as a social good of membership, viewing it as a flexible 
commodity that produces a collective consciousness of common meanings that include 
language, history, and culture. These meanings help create a national character. This 
sounds a lot like what Ratzinger’s seeking to establish in Europe, albeit on a continent or 
hemisphere level rather than at the state level. Individual identities, according to Walzer, 
are formed out of the historical relationship of transactions between people and social 
goods. Ratzinger’s history lessons are launched in a similar fashion by explaining how 
the individual psyche and its morals were formed by the movements of cultural 
institutions in Europe. Spheres demonstrates the nature of shifting social identities and 




as a social good provides something for Ratzinger to learn from as he struggles with how 
to approach a deteriorating European identity. Ratzinger’s usage of European history and 
the particularist view he creates for Europe mirrors Walzer’s desire to move away from 
Rawlsian abstraction to history. In the Pera exchange, Ratzinger addresses a cultural 
malaise that he believes has neutralized European identity. Bound up in this discussion is 
the modern movement’s effect on Europe, which brings with it the ideological baggage of 
relativism. For Walzer, membership it not necessarily historical, but it is based on 
choices, as demonstrated in how he differentiates between how a group is constituted 
instead of how it was constituted. How does one sustain this vision? Ratzinger hopes that 
by returning to Hellenized Christianity, Europeans might remember their common 
foundations. To use Walzer’s terms, this sounds like an attempt to reverse a choice of 
how the group was constituted rather than simply explaining the current situation. 
One major difference that emerges between Ratzinger and Walzer is that Spheres 
accepts shifts in identity as a natural phenomenon over which there is little control. This 
stands in stark contrast to Ratzinger’s attempt to steer the course of Europe’s cultural 
crisis. Another area of difference between the two is that Walzer is cautious of religion 
since he believes it too is capable of breaching boundaries. Ratzinger does not appear to 
be breaching this barrier between religion and politics, but he is certainly looking to bring 







Comparing Ratzinger with General Communitarianism 
 
Garden Variety Anti-Liberalism 
 
 There are two ways one could define communitarian theory at large: first, it could 
be thought of as anti-liberal or anti-modern theory; second, it could also be thought of as 
today’s mainstream communitarianism56
                                                 
56 My definition of “mainstream” communitarianism is the communitarian political 
movement launched by Amitai Etzioni. The political platform of his organization, the 
Communitarian Network, is partly inspired by the writers of the communitarian critique 
and essentially aims at providing a balance between rights and responsibilities, between 
limitless individualism and extreme collectivism. Etzioni’s positions, and those of his 
organization, are derived from several sources: Etzioni’s The Spirit of Community: 
Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda (1993); his The New Golden 
Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (1996); the Responsive 
Communitarian Platform (http://communitariannetwork.org/about-
communitarianism/responsive-communitarian-platform/); and the group’s communitarian 
vision statement (http://communitariannetwork.org/communitarian-vision/). While the 
group’s platform roughly addresses the same issues as the communitarian critique, 
Etzioni and the communitarian political movement are excluded primarily on a content 
basis. The discussions on Rawls, Nozick, and liberalism from the traditional theorists 
(MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel, and Walzer) are more germane to this research project since 
they're speaking to the development and history of political theory, particularly the 
Enlightenment and modernity, which takes center stage in the writings of Ratzinger 
analyzed in this research project. 
 that positions itself as a political movement that, 
in simple terms, seeks a balance between rights and responsibilities as part of an effort to 
promote the common good and notions of strong community. This policy-driven version 
has also been described as a second wave of communitarianism of the 1990s (Bell 2010). 
Overlap between these two theoretical routes is located in their resistance to extreme 
liberal individualism when it becomes dangerous to a group’s collective interests. 





While the common good is the implicit end result Ratzinger is working toward in 
these four events, it is the issues he deals with—pluralism, identity, and the role the 
Enlightenment had in birthing liberal individualism—that drive this final end, making his 
communitarianism more philosophically complex than either of the two theoretical 
routes. Whether standing in agreement or opposition, Ratzinger is clearly in dialogue 
with the communitarian critique’s core set of concepts that deal with identity and 
solidarity in a historical and philosophic context. For Ratzinger, the pinpoint of this 
history is modernity. 
To reconcile the Enlightenment with the Church, Ratzinger is taking a cue from 
Vatican II’s attempt to engage the modern world. His is also a more complex view than 
that of the medieval Church since he has history on his side—Augustine and Thomas did 
not have the Enlightenment and modernity to critique in their works. He also has the 
advantage—at least from the document selection provided in this research project—of the 
perspective of a private theologian to explore philosophic concepts and their impact on 
history in greater depths than Vatican documents such as encyclicals that carry garden 
variety communitarian themes. The extent to which he can deviate from the Church as a 
theologian without jeopardizing his administrative role is certainly a constraint worth 
stating. He was a noted contributor to, and influence upon, some Vatican II documents 
(see chapter 1), so he is aware of the continuity his writings must have with the Church’s 
vision. 
The pre-Vatican II Church was a climate ripe in anti-modern/liberal theory, 
making it fertile ground for a disposition toward communitarianism. Joseph Komonchak, 




during the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century as a “counter-society” 
to the modern and liberal ideas of their time (1994, 77). Vatican II’s efforts to engage the 
modern world explain Ratzinger’s embracing of the Enlightenment in his Crisis address. 
Ernest L. Fortin provides insightful commentary and a summary of the Church’s reaction 
and relationship with modernism, which helps to put Ratzinger’s wish for reinterpretation 
and criticism of liberalism into a broader context. Fortin sees Europe’s initial critical 
reaction to modernism as a period that begins at about the Congress of Vienna (1815) and 
extends to the eve of Vatican II (1962). The encyclicals Mirari Vos (On Liberalism and 
Religious Indifferentism) (1832) and Syllabus Errorum (Syllabus of Errors) (1870) 
denounce modernism, whereas Vatican II’s encyclicals Gaudium et Spes (Religious 
Freedom) (1965) and Dignitatis Humanae (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in 
the Modern World) (1965) look for a way to reconcile modernity and liberalism with the 
Church. During the denouncement phase, “modern thought was portrayed, not as a 
simple aberration, but as something diabolical in root and branch—a universal conspiracy 
aimed at nothing less than the destruction of Christianity” (Fortin 1997, 141). The 
integrity of faith had to be defended “against the encroachments of modern philosophic 
and scientific thought” (Fortin 1985, 131). In looking at these works, one certainly sees 
what Fortin observed in them. In Mirari Vos, Gregory XVI calls science “impudent,” and 
liberty, “dissolute” (no. 5). In a similar tone, Pius IX’s Syllabus Errorum takes issue with 
the proposition that “the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to 
terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization” (no. 80). 
From Vatican II forward, the tone of the Church is quite different. In Dignitatis 




societies, for maintaining the dignity of human persons and their place within a 
community. In Gaudium et Spes, he also addressed how human dignity ought to be 
preserved while viewing the growing need for community: 
Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by 
degrees over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of 
those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual 
members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today 
takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights 
and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take 
account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the 
general welfare of the entire human family (no. 26). 
 
The above quote from Gaudium et Spes represents a significant shift from earlier 
rejections of modernity by the Church, as well as a consistent approach to account for a 
community at large. John Paul II, Ratzinger’s papal predecessor, succinctly reiterates 
some of Gaudium’s principles and addresses the right-responsibilities approach in his 
Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles Laici (1988), adding that: 
Public life on behalf of the person and society finds its basic standard in the 
pursuit of the common good, as the good of everyone and as the good of each 
person taken as a whole, which is guaranteed and offered in a fitting manner to 
people, both as individuals and in groups, for their free and responsible 
acceptance (no. 42). 
 
There is a lengthy trail of the common good in about a hundred and fifty years’ worth of 
encyclical letters that firmly establishes the fertile ground in the Catholic Church from 
which communitarian ideals sprout. 
The Common Good through Encyclicals 
 
Encyclical letters speak of the common good in a variety of social contexts, 




institutional, economic, and social circumstances. Rerum Novarum (1891) speaks of the 
common good in terms of the general welfare and how labor and trade can benefit the 
economy (no. 34). Quadragesimo Anno (1931) is full of references to the common good, 
including one that resembles the communitarian tenant that the state ought to act in a way 
that balances the interests of the individual with those of the greater collective: 
Just freedom of action must, of course, be left both to individual citizens and to 
families, yet only on condition that the common good be preserved and wrong to 
any individual be abolished. The function of the rulers of the State, moreover, is 
to watch over the community and its parts; but in protecting private individuals in 
their rights, chief consideration ought to be given to the weak and the poor (no. 
25). 
 
The state’s role, particularly as it relates to protecting the economy, is also described in 
Mater et Magistra (1961), which contends that the state cannot be held “aloof from 
economic matters.” The letter goes on to say that the state can never “shirk its obligation 
of working actively for the betterment of the condition of the workingman” (no. 20). Any 
charges of collectivism are set aside by Pacem in Terris (1963), which connects the 
common good with the protection of human rights, including a recognition of the U.N.’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a “step in the right direction” (no. 143). 
Dignitatis Humanae repeats the call for balance between individual and collective 
interests in terms of the protection of the “equality of citizens before the law,” which is in 
“itself an element of the common good” (no. 6). While individuals have certain 
inalienable rights, Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes takes a Thomistic interpretation of man’s 
insufficient nature by asserting that he is disposed to form communities and cannot live 
an isolated life. Therefore, others ought to create a society whereby all individuals can 




and socialism (nos. 31–34), the letter states that this liberal ideology contains an 
“erroneous” individual autonomy and calls for “careful discernment” (no. 35). 
The dark side of the liberal economic system is well addressed in the post–
Vatican II era. Populorum Progressio (1967) is highly critical of unbridled liberalism, 
charging that it can lead to a form of tyranny when free competition has “no limits nor 
concomitant social obligations” (no. 26). Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) asserts an 
interdependence of economics, culture, politics, and religion in sustaining solidarity and 
the need for a “persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is 
to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for 
all.” At odds with this is the “desire for profit and that thirst for power” (no. 38). 
Sollicitudo also makes a compelling call for distributivism by acknowledging that 
solidarity hinges on recognizing all participants as persons. This principle is for both the 
rich and poor. John Paul II writes: “Those who are more influential, because they have a 
greater share of goods and common services, should feel responsible for the weaker and 
be ready to share with them all they possess.” While at the same time, he goes on to say 
that: “Those who are weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity, should not 
adopt a purely passive attitude or one that is destructive of the social fabric, but, while 
claiming their legitimate rights, should do what they can for the good of all” (no. 39). 
Centesimus Annus (1991) discusses the dangers consumerism and environmental 
destruction pose for the common good (no. 36–39). This letter also calls into the question 
the infallibility of unregulated markets as this relates to the interests of all, asserting that 
the state should put into place a “defence and preservation of common goods” since they 




extreme collectivism, the same section of this letter calls for protecting the “legitimate 
pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual” (no. 40). 
Lastly, even as pope, Ratzinger has addressed the common good. His third 
encyclical, Caritas In Veritate (2009), describes the common good as “a requirement of 
justice and charity.” By striving toward the common good, individuals find themselves 
contributing to both the polis and other institutions as well as to a higher law or good. 
Benedict is raising the bar for the common good by freeing it, to a degree, from the state 
and connecting it to love. He writes: “The more we strive to secure a common good 
corresponding to the real needs of our neighbours, the more effectively we love them” 
(no. 7). The idea here is that while the state should be held responsible for protecting its 
citizens at all levels from exploitation, it is equally important to penetrate the behaviors 
and conscience of men to lead them to the good and the just. This same concept of 
persuading humans to perform just actions can also be found in the work of St. Thomas. 
 
St. Thomas and the Common Good 
 
In his works, Summa Theologica and De Regno, Ad Regem Cypri (On Kingship, 
to the King of Cyprus), St. Thomas put forth some of the beginnings of deeper 
communitarian themes in Roman Catholic political philosophy. Questions 90–97 of the 
Summa deal with eternal, natural, and human law and their relationship to the common 
good, and they bear a notable resemblance to the communitarian critique’s thoughts on 
obligation, duty, and humility. Thomas sees moral obligation as what binds humans to 




source of obligation is in the order or nature of things and how well human laws are in 
alignment with this (Parry 1963, v–vi). Just laws—those derived from eternal law—bind 
to the conscience of men and are aimed at the common good (Q96, A4). 
Thomas also ties virtue to the common good. Virtue is ordained to, or promotes, 
the common good (Q96, A1, R3), and those who govern must be virtuous if the common 
good of the state is to flourish (Q 92, A1, R3). The difficulty of this task is that while 
there is a category of humans who can be willingly directed to the common good and 
virtue without coercion, there are those of a lesser nature who must be compelled (Q95, 
A1, R1). Thomas’s words here are ammunition for striking down the naiveté of Nozick’s 
Utopia and Rawls’s A Theory of Justice when these texts place too much trust in what 
Thomas would consider this second category of humans who are not pre-disposed to the 
common good without external forces creating an inner compulsion in them. In Nozick’s 
project, this also leaves the state unaccountable for protecting the dignity of the human in 
both working conditions and quality of life provided by fair compensation. If an 
overabundance of persuasion is needed to see and act on this, one might question if 
individualism has become arrogance devoid of a healthy amount of humility and 
forgiveness that blinds one’s concern for others. 
The subjects of humility and human intellectual insufficiency appear in the 
Summa within the notion that while each person “knows the eternal law according to his 
own capacity,” no one truly comprehends it or knows the whole order of things (Q93, A2, 
R1). 
Thomas’s outlook on how communities are formed is inspired by Aristotle’s 




various levels of association, beginning with the household to the village and eventually 
the political association of government. The city is held as necessary, for the demands of 
nature are too great to survive alone (Book I, sections 1252–1253). St. Thomas reiterates 
this in On Kingship, stating that “it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to 
be a social and political animal, to live in a group” (Book I, chapter 1, no. 4). This natural 
and dependent way that communities form is embedded with an understanding that 
humans are insufficient to truly thrive on their own. In the communitarian critique, 
Taylor builds on this concept—and it is a safe assumption to make that he is well versed 
in the works of Thomas and Aristotle—to add that general obligations are necessary for 
individuals to reach their full potentials. Along those same lines, we see Ratzinger’s 
sense of humility in his view that both faith and reason have limitations; societal 
obligations are present in the way he seeks to create a Christian solidarity in the face of a 
cultural crisis. 
Thomas’s On Kingship also sees the political regime and its ruler as necessary for 
directing humans toward their final ends, though reason also plays a role in this. 
Sounding very much like MacIntyre’s call for Aristotelian telos, Thomas writes: “[T]he 
light of reason is placed by nature in every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end” 
(Book 1, chapter 1, no. 3–4). Here, we also see the seeds for how Ratzinger, as well as 









Where Ratzinger differs from general communitarian theory can be found in the 
answers to two questions: How do individuals feel connected to their community and a 
common good, and where can the common language (including philosophy) be derived 
from to define the interests of the whole? The concept of a common good is a social 
understanding in and of itself. A lot of disagreement and competition is likely to exist 
when incompatible ideologies are active in a society. This may also explain why the 
Church and Ratzinger have taken a softer stance toward modernism and are working to 
rebrand the Enlightenment. Another purpose of this rebranding is to re-enter a 
philosophic discussion that once found the Church obsolete. To feel obligated to one’s 
fellow citizens or humanity at large, one must find security in insufficiency, whether this 
means tempering human survivalist tendencies in the state of nature and civilization or 
finding an intellectual stand that challenges both the neutrality of states—such as the 
Rawlsian original position—and the purported infallibility of a religious fundamentalism 
that omits sound reasoning. 
Ratzinger’s philosophy as a private theologian differs from the previous 
discussion of encyclicals in that these prior letters are largely about how the common 
good is applied. Ratzinger’s theological works explain why it is applied and how to 
encourage its application from a socio-philosophic perspective. In this regard, his work 
more approximates the depths of Thomas than the straightforward doctrine of social 
thought produced by the encyclicals. One could also say this is nothing more than 
differences in stylistic form since an encyclical acts as a decree, announcement, or 




bishops, but is accessible to and read by the public simply due to the nature of the 
author’s status as pope. Ratzinger differs from Thomas in that he is addressing a long 
history of political philosophy and the sociological impacts that history has had on 
identity. Metaphysical discussions are implicit in everything Ratzinger writes and no 
longer need to be addressed, save for how they are underlying positions related to 
creationism and directing good habits of faith and reason in the soul. 
Although I have constructed a system through evidence primarily from 
Ratzinger’s career as a private theologian, it does bear to question whether he is serious 
about all of this in terms of implementation, or is it merely material for philosophic 
dialogue among a select audience? The fact that he goes to great lengths in Regensburg to 
describe several stages that de-Hellenized the Christian faith seems sufficient evidence 
that he believes something went off track. If the Bible could be understood on its own 
terms without supplementary materials and linguistic interpretations, what does this say 
of the work of St. Thomas, who found a way to integrate the works of Aristotle into 
Christian theology? Can Christian scripture now be read without the insights of the 
Summa or his various commentaries on the works of Aristotle? Is this true for both the 
Old and New Testaments? The Old Testament (the Torah) was first written in Hebrew, so 
there is one layer of writing to work through before one even gets to the Greek 
translation. To complicate matters further, there is the view expressed by Jewish 
philosopher Moses Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed that the Torah was written 
on two levels—one the surface-level parable, the other a more deeper understanding only 




The Enlightenment lands between stages one (the Reformation) and two (the 
liberal theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) of Ratzinger’s theory on de-
Hellenization. In calling Christianity the religion of Logos, Ratzinger seeks to create a 
direct connection between the Enlightenment and the Church, though this seems largely 
by association except that he is serious about the cooperative relationship between reason 
and faith. 
There are certainly some flaws in Ratzinger’s Greek connections. How much 
Greek influence can we expect? In other words, how authoritative would the Church look 
if there was an excessive deference to Aristotle and Plato and a detailing of their 
influence on the Church? Also, one should question if Ratzinger’s call for re-
Hellenization is purely etymological. If so, are Aristotle and Plato of any use in 
understanding the metaphysical understanding of Logos? To gauge how serious 
Ratzinger is about the Greek language used to reconstruct the Greek version of the Old 
Testament and construct the New Testament, one should consider that his first encyclical 
as pope—Deus Caritas Est (“God is Love”)—discusses the frequency of usage of the 
Greek terms eros (human or passionate love), agape (unconditional love), and eros philla 
(the love of friendship) in the Bible. Mixed in with this commentary is a brief discussion 
of Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity “poisoned eros,” turning “the most precious thing 
in life” to “bitterness” (no. 3). Ratzinger’s discussion of Logos also returns in this 
encyclical to a passage about the Last Supper that equates the Eucharist to both the 





 There are number of lessons from the communitarian critique that Ratzinger could 
drawn on. Some communitarians are reluctant to endorse objective morality, but do point 
to a concept of a higher good and virtue, and at the very least reflection. This is most 
similar to the sense of the sacred that Ratzinger is getting at. When one considers how 
Ratzinger has woven this into cultural identity, it begins to resemble the conditional 
morality that some of the communitarians have endorsed, since their aversion to 
objectivity is based on the importance of historical and cultural considerations. Ratzinger 
also ought to consider the notion of primacy of identity and how to establish Christianity 
(or Catholicism) as an important sub-identity within the self since this seems to be what 
he’s talking about. Sandel explains this as each human is a traveler of the various 
communities that they take membership in, some to a greater allegiance than others. 
Sandel also says there is no “‘the society as a whole’, or ‘the more general society’” (LLJ, 
146). This principle of multi-membership is a dynamic element missing in Ratzinger’s 
writings, namely, how the Church’s membership can compete and reconcile itself among 
the many dimensions each individual’s identity is comprised of. 
One way to enter this internal conversation as a welcome visitor is through a 
viable narrative. MacIntyre asserted that through the narrative mode we understand the 
interrelationships among intentions, beliefs, and historical context (AV, 208). This is one 
tool of a non-coercive nature that could be set in motion without appearing as lobbying, 
the efforts of majorities, or the interests of the wealthy most able to mobilize themselves. 
It is not clear if Ratzinger consciously put together the narrative I have suggested is 
present in his works—scripture as understood by the requirement of relevant philosophy. 




provided by the narrative mode, is behind the concept of relativism Ratzinger attacks in 
many of his works. This is also the extreme individualism critiqued by all 
communitarians that destroys a social identity in which individuals feel connected to their 
various communities and in which one would have felt the weight of non-coercive 
responsibilities targeted at the individual’s conscience. 
Nozick is right—by the force of law it seems unjust to compel someone to act, 
even in a charitable act such as taxation. However, taxation is a passive act since one has 
chosen to participate in an economic system that contains the rule of taxation. It would be 
unjust for the government to force work upon its citizens that only benefits others. The 
Church offers a unique position since it operates outside of constitutional constraints and 
can influence behaviors in ways that the law cannot. While this is a minor concession to 
Nozick, it still points to something that from a standpoint of virtue does not sit right with 
natural compulsion. It should be made clear that Ratzinger does not stand against 
freedom; he recognizes it as “the basic structure of creation, to the spiritual existence of 
man.”57
                                                 
57 The full quote this comes from is Ratzinger’s interview in God and the World: 
Believing and Living in Our Time (2000 [2002]), and reads: “Freedom, on the other hand, 
belongs to the basic structure of creation, to the spiritual existence of man. We are not 
just laid out and determined according to a particular model. Freedom is there so that 
each one of us can shape his own life and, along with his own inner self, can in the end 
follow the path that best corresponds to his essential being. Accordingly, I would not 
refer to freedom as a grace from God but rather as a gift inherent in creation” (94). 
 Ratzinger, like many political thinkers, is grappling with the issue of how to 
allow freedom without relying on the virtuous citizen entirely. Obligation and duty in the 
face of pluralism is the challenge all of the writers in this project are working through. 
For individuals to buy into the concept of the common good and an agreed upon set of 




population. It is not enough to believe in a theoretical common good—a connection is 
needed. To feel obligated and tied to the common good, one must be open to compromise 
and accept a variety of dependencies on others. When a civilization moves forward in a 
way that further atomizes the self, it becomes natural to feel that common criteria that 
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